Effects of erring behavior in a human-robot joint musical task on adopting Intentional Stance toward the iCub robot

In this study, we examined whether the likelihood of attributing intentionality to robots is influenced by the human-likeness of errors during HRI. To this end, we designed an experimental protocol in which users performed a melody in a joint task with the iCub robot. We programmed the iCub robot to make an error in 60% of the repetitions. For half of the users, in the erroneous trials, the robot displayed a human-like error, i.e. switched one element of the melody by pressing the wrong key. For the other half of users, the robot erred mechanically, i.e., it interrupted to play the melody and moved back and forth between two keys in an “endless” loop. Before and after the joint musical task, we administered the InStance Test to evaluate the likelihood of treating the robot as an intentional agent. Results showed that mechanical errors during HRI reduced intentionality attribution toward the robot.

A new case of low modality: Goal PPs*

This paper provides experimental evidence from German and English against the view that a goal to/zu-PP in combination with a motion verb designates a goal that is reached. We propose that to/zu have a modal meaning, responsible for the defeasibility of the inference that the goal is reached. We argue that the type of subjects (intentional agent vs. accidental agent or theme) determines the flavor of the (necessity) modal encoded by the preposition (teleological or circumstantial), which allows us to account for the observed variation in the strength of the inference with the type of subjects and the type of verbs.

Pengembangan Pluralisme Agama di Kalangan Mahasiswa (Analisis atas Proses Pembinaan keagamaan dan Politik Identitas terhadap Religiusitas Mahasiswa di Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta)

Developing a training in religious pluralism to a young generation at a university level in Indonesia seems to work out as the university is a highly intentional agent of for that coaching. It is a place where its stakeholders, including its students, are inclined to bow to the academic tradition, and where the religious pluralism can be a subject that they study and practice. This process is a potential medium to reduce religious conflict and violence in the country. This paper found this dynamic at the Universitas Bhayangkara Jakarta that perpetuates the religious pluralism by its well-organized academic programs, mainly by its discussions and dialogues. This university applies this training to perpetuate religious tolerance and social harmony among its administrative and teaching staff.

Decision and game theory

Decision theory studies individual decision-making in situations in which an individual’s choice neither affects nor is affected by other individuals’ choices; while game theory studies decision-making in situations where individuals’ choices do affect each other. Decision theory asks questions like: what does it mean to choose rationally? How should we make choices when the consequences of our actions are uncertain? Buying insurance and deciding which job to take are examples of the kind of decisions studied by this discipline. Game theory instead applies to all decisions that have a strategic component. The choices of an oligopolist, voting strategies, military tactical problems, deterrence, but also common phenomena such as threatening, promising, conflict and cooperation are its subject matter. In a strategic situation, the goal is not just to choose rationally, but to choose in such a way that a mutual solution is achieved, so that choices ‘coordinate’ in the right way. The formal methods developed by game theory do not require that the subject making a choice be an intentional agent: coordinated interaction between animals or computers can be successfully modelled as well.

An ASP Methodology for Understanding Narratives about Stereotypical Activities

We describe an application of Answer Set Programming to the understanding of narratives about stereotypical activities, demonstrated via question answering. Substantial work in this direction was done by Erik Mueller, who modeled stereotypical activities as scripts. His systems were able to understand a good number of narratives, but could not process texts describing exceptional scenarios. We propose addressing this problem by using a theory of intentions developed by Blount, Gelfond, and Balduccini. We present a methodology in which we substitute scripts by activities (i.e., hierarchical plans associated with goals) and employ the concept of an intentional agent to reason about both normal and exceptional scenarios. We exemplify the application of this methodology by answering questions about a number of restaurant stories. This paper is under consideration for acceptance in TPLP.

1. What are miracles?

The concept of a miracle is elusive. We all know roughly what a miracle is, yet we struggle to state a precise definition. The proper definition of a miracle has been disputed among philosophers for centuries. ‘What are miracles?’ considers a wide range of concrete examples that represent or misrepresent miracles, and examines which conditions are necessary or sufficient for the concept to apply. It looks at ‘miracles’ in sport, technology, and nature; coincidences and religious signs as miracles; and the concept of impossibility. It concludes that a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature that is caused by an intentional agent and has religious significance.

The Theory of Dyadic Morality: Reinventing Moral Judgment by Redefining Harm

The nature of harm—and therefore moral judgment—may be misunderstood. Rather than an objective matter of reason, we argue that harm should be redefined as an intuitively perceived continuum. This redefinition provides a new understanding of moral content and mechanism—the constructionist Theory of Dyadic Morality (TDM). TDM suggests that acts are condemned proportional to three elements: norm violations, negative affect, and—importantly—perceived harm. This harm is dyadic, involving an intentional agent causing damage to a vulnerable patient (A→P). TDM predicts causal links both from harm to immorality (dyadic comparison) and from immorality to harm (dyadic completion). Together, these two processes make the “dyadic loop,” explaining moral acquisition and polarization. TDM argues against intuitive harmless wrongs and modular “foundations,” but embraces moral pluralism through varieties of values and the flexibility of perceived harm. Dyadic morality impacts understandings of moral character, moral emotion, and political/cultural differences, and provides research guidelines for moral psychology.

Morality, Ontology, and Corporate Rights

Does the ontology of corporations matter for corporate rights? Much of the philosophical literature on corporate rights focuses on whether corporations are real entities, aggregations of individuals, or fictions to which rights or other entitlements can be ascribed. We argue that this focus is misplaced. Whether corporations have rights, and the sort of rights they have, is a question of moral theory. It is not fundamentally a matter of ontology, as F.W. Maitland thought, or a matter of legal or moral semantics, as H.L.A. Hart once argued. The going moral theory, not conceptual requirements or explanatory criteria, determines the conditions a corporation must satisfy to have various rights and duties. We argue that this truth is independent of the deontic, consequentialist, or hybrid character of the moral theory. This paper defends three claims. First, the ontological status of a group as an intentional agent is neither necessary nor sufficient for its moral status or entitlements. A moral theory in principle could recognize groups that are not intentional agents, and a group’s existence as an intentional agent does not by itself require moral recognition. A moral commitment to corporate rights and duties is therefore not determined by the indispensability of groups in explaining group behavior. Second, the substantive claims of a moral theory (understood broadly) determine the conditions for assigning rights and duties to corporations. Third, this moral conception of corporate rights has both legal and moral implications for the treatment of corporations.