scholarly journals The influence of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation

2019 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Li ◽  
Yini Geng ◽  
Chen Shen ◽  
Lei Shi
Keyword(s):  
Game Theory ◽  
Numerical Simulations ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Learning Ability ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Game Dynamics ◽  
Potential Reason ◽  
Heterogeneous Learning ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

Abstract In this paper, we design a simple coevolution model to investigate the role of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation. The model weakens the winner’s learning ability in order to keep its current advantage. Conversely, it strengthens the loser’s learning ability for increasing the chance to update its strategy. In particular, we consider this coevolutionary model separately applying to both cooperators and defectors (rule I), only cooperators (rule II), as well as only defectors (rule III) in spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. Through numerical simulations, we find that cooperation can be promoted in rule II, whereas, cooperation is hampered in rule I and rule III. We reveal its potential reason from the viewpoint of enduring and expanding periods in game dynamics. Our results thus provide a deeper understanding regarding the heterogeneous learning ability on game theory.

The prisoner’s dilemma game on scale-free networks with heterogeneous imitation capability

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (09) ◽  
pp. 1850077 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tianhang Wu ◽  
Hanchen Wang ◽  
Jian Yang ◽  
Liang Xu ◽  
Yumeng Li ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Evolutionary Game ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Learning Ability ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Individual Heterogeneity ◽  
Scale Free ◽  
Low Degree ◽  
Heterogeneous Learning ◽  
Scale Free Networks ◽  
The Right

In human societies, personal heterogeneity may affect the strategy adoption capability of the individuals. In this paper, we study the effects of heterogeneous learning ability on the evolution of cooperation by introducing heterogeneous imitation capability of players. We design a pre-factor [Formula: see text] to represent the heterogeneous learning ability of players, which is related to the degree of players. And a parameter [Formula: see text] is used to tune the learning levels. If [Formula: see text], the learning ability of players decreases and the low-degree player has the higher reduction level, but if [Formula: see text], the learning ability of low-degree players enhances to a higher level. By carrying out extensive simulations, it reveals that the evolution of cooperation is influenced significantly by introducing player’s heterogeneous learning ability and can be promoted under the right circumstances. This finding sheds some light on the important effect of individual heterogeneity on the evolutionary game.

scholarly journals Temporal assortment of cooperators in the spatial prisoner’s dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tim Johnson ◽  
Oleg Smirnov
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Pairwise Comparison ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Temporal Networks ◽  
Structure Transition ◽  
Time Out ◽  
Transition Rules ◽  
Selection For ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

AbstractWe study a spatial, one-shot prisoner’s dilemma (PD) model in which selection operates on both an organism’s behavioral strategy (cooperate or defect) and its decision of when to implement that strategy, which we depict as an organism’s choice of one point in time, out of a set of discrete time slots, at which to carry out its PD strategy. Results indicate selection for cooperators across various time slots and parameter settings, including parameter settings in which cooperation would not evolve in an exclusively spatial model—as in work investigating exogenously imposed temporal networks. Moreover, in the presence of time slots, cooperators’ portion of the population grows even under different combinations of spatial structure, transition rules, and update dynamics, though rates of cooperator fixation decline under pairwise comparison and synchronous updating. These findings indicate that, under certain evolutionary processes, merely existing in time and space promotes the evolution of cooperation.

scholarly journals Aspiration-based coevolution of link weight promotes cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game

2018 ◽  
Vol 5 (5) ◽  
pp. 180199 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chen Shen ◽  
Chen Chu ◽  
Lei Shi ◽  
Matjaž Perc ◽  
Zhen Wang
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma Game ◽  
Systematic Analysis ◽  
Link Weight ◽  
Aspiration Levels ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma Game ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

In this article, we propose an aspiration-based coevolution of link weight, and explore how this set-up affects the evolution of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma game. In particular, an individual will increase the weight of its link to its neighbours only if the payoff received via this interaction exceeds a pre-defined aspiration. Conversely, if the received payoff is below this aspiration, the link weight with the corresponding neighbour will decrease. Our results show that an appropriate aspiration level leads to a high-cooperation plateau, whereas too high or too low aspiration will impede the evolution of cooperation. We explain these findings with a comprehensive analysis of transition points and with a systematic analysis of typical configuration patterns. The presented results provide further theoretical insights with regards to the impact of different aspiration levels on cooperation in human societies.

Evolution of cooperation under the influence of environments on individual-performed interactions

2018 ◽  
Vol 29 (08) ◽  
pp. 1850070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guanghai Cui ◽  
Zhen Wang ◽  
Yancun Yang ◽  
Jiahao Xu ◽  
Hongyong Yang
Keyword(s):  
External Environment ◽  
Positive Influence ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Random Networks ◽  
Network Environment ◽  
Environment Changes ◽  
Average Payoff ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Shed Light

Traditionally, individual intensities to perform games are always assumed to be fixed in networks (e.g. to depend on the number of their neighbors). However, to increase their own fitness or payoffs, individuals may adjust their intensities in reaction to external environment changes in real scenarios. With this motivation, we have studied this adjustment by considering the average payoff of individual neighbors to be the network environment in a spatial prisoner’s dilemma game. An individual will unilaterally increase (decrease) its intensity to perform games between itself and its neighbors when its payoff is greater than or equal to (lower than) the average payoff of its neighbors. Compared with the normal situation, we find that individual cooperation is significantly facilitated either on the cooperator fraction or the effective cooperation fraction when the environment-induced intensity adjustment is considered, and the value of intensity adjustment per time has a positive influence on the maintenance of cooperation. Evolution snapshots and a formulated typical schematic are used to explain the results. We find that cooperation behaviors are enhanced because of the existence of defectors with lower intensities who are near the boundaries between cooperator and defector clusters. Finally, the promotion is also validated in random networks. We hope that our results may shed light on a greater understanding of the role of individual adaptive behaviors in reaction to network environments in the maintenance of cooperation in societies.

scholarly journals EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION IN A SPATIAL PRISONER'S DILEMMA

2002 ◽  
Vol 05 (02n03) ◽  
pp. 269-299 ◽  
Author(s):  
FRANK SCHWEITZER ◽  
LAXMIDHAR BEHERA ◽  
HEINZ MÜHLENBEIN
Keyword(s):  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Evolution Of Cooperation ◽  
Critical Conditions ◽  
Agent Interaction ◽  
Spatial Domains ◽  
Simulation Results ◽  
Person Game ◽  
Small Clusters ◽  
Spatial Prisoner’S Dilemma

We investigate the spatial distribution and the global frequency of agents who can either cooperate or defect. The agent interaction is described by a deterministic, non-iterated prisoner's dilemma game, further each agent only locally interacts with his neighbors. Based on a detailed analysis of the local payoff structures we derive critical conditions for the invasion or the spatial coexistence of cooperators and defectors. These results are concluded in a phase diagram that allows us to identify five regimes, each characterized by a distinct spatiotemporal dynamics and a corresponding final spatial structure. In addition to the complete invasion of defectors, we find coexistence regimes with either a majority of cooperators in large spatial domains, or a minority of cooperators organized in small non-stationary domains or in small clusters. The analysis further allowed a verification of computer simulation results by Nowak and May (1993). Eventually, we present simulation results of a true 5-person game on a lattice. This modification leads to non-uniform spatial interactions that may even enhance the effect of cooperation.

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