scholarly journals Closed-loop Supply Chain with Advertising Investment and Reward-Penalty Mechanism Based on Different CSR Sharing Models

2021 ◽  
Vol 257 ◽  
pp. 02086
Author(s):  
Yi Liu ◽  
Yanting Huang

This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of a manufacturer and a retailer based on different corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors. In addition, the advertising investment and government’s reward-penalty mechanism (RPM) are also taken in account. To explore the impact of CSR behaviors on supply chain, we developed three models: (1) Only the manufacturer undertakes CSR (model M); (2) only the retailer undertakes CSR (model R); (3) the manufacturer and the retailer share CSR (model MR). By analyzing the results, we found that: (1) The advertising investment level and waste products return rate both increase with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR when there is only retailer undertakes CSR and when the manufacturer and retailer share CSR, and remain unchanged when there is only the manufacturer undertakes CSR; (2) the overall social welfare increases with the increase of the extent to members undertake CSR no matter which member undertakes CSR, and reaches the highest when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR; (3) it is the most conductive for the performance of the closedloop supply chain when there is only the retailer undertakes CSR.

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 1845937
Author(s):  
A. K. M. Mohsin ◽  
Hongzhen Lei ◽  
Syed Far Abid Hossain ◽  
Hasanuzzaman Tushar ◽  
Mozaffar Alam Chowdhury ◽  
...  

PLoS ONE ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (4) ◽  
pp. e0174951 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ali Pedram ◽  
Payam Pedram ◽  
Nukman Bin Yusoff ◽  
Shahryar Sorooshian

Author(s):  
Qunli Wu ◽  
Xinxin Xu

Aimed at the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of the manufacturer, the retailer and consumers in the waste products market, this paper studies how the government handles the adverse selection problem on the hidden recovery costs of the retailer and deals with the moral hazard problem on the level of retailer's hidden efforts. A government incentive regulation aiming at maximizing social welfare has been established based on the incentive theory in this paper. A list of contracts with transfer payments is presented to reveal the retailer's collection efficiency and motivate the retailer to make the optimal investment. Further, the impact of related factors on the recovery cost and social welfare level according to the numerical simulation are verified. The results show that under the government regulation, only by reporting the true recovery technology type information to the government can the retailer maximizes the profit. In addition, the retailer with high recovery efficiency can obtain both retained profit and additional information rent. Finally, as the retailer makes efforts to improve the recovery level, it also increases investment cost, which affects the enthusiasm of enhancing the retailer's recovery efficiency. Therefore, the government should not blindly pursue the improvement of recycling efficiency regardless of the cost, but should pay more attention to the control of recycling equipment and technology cost.The results facilitate scientific policy development, and provide a reference for promoting closed-loop supply chain operations.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document