Scientific Realism and International Relations

Author(s):  
Colin Wight ◽  
Jonathan Joseph
2018 ◽  
Vol 25 (2) ◽  
pp. 562-587 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam R C Humphreys

Discussions of causal inquiry in International Relations are increasingly framed in terms of a contrast between rival philosophical positions, each with a putative methodological corollary — empiricism is associated with a search for patterns of covariation, while scientific realism is associated with a search for causal mechanisms. Scientific realism is, on this basis, claimed to open up avenues of causal inquiry that are unavailable to empiricists. This is misleading. Empiricism appears inferior only if its reformulation by contemporary philosophers of science, such as Bas van Fraassen, is ignored. I therefore develop a fuller account than has previously been provided in International Relations of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ and how it differs from scientific realism. In light of that, I consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry along scientific realist, rather than empiricist, lines. I argue that scientific realists have failed to make a compelling case that what matters is whether researchers are realists. Constructive empiricism and scientific realism differ only on narrow epistemological and metaphysical grounds that carry no clear implications for the conduct of causal inquiry. Yet, insofar as Van Fraassen has reformed empiricism to meet the scientific realist challenge, this has created a striking disjunction between mainstream practices of causal inquiry in International Relations and the vision of scientific practice that scientific realists and contemporary empiricists share, especially regarding the significance of regularities observed in everyday world politics. Although scientific realist calls for a philosophical revolution in International Relations are overstated, this disjunction demands further consideration.


2009 ◽  
Vol 35 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-419 ◽  
Author(s):  
TORSTEN MICHEL

AbstractIn recent debates in IR theory a specific trend has evolved which advocates a renewed focus on matters of ontology as a way to overcome or at least to reconceptualise the divides within the field of IR that we encounter especially after the considerable widening of scope after the end of the Cold War. Responding to these claims the article sets out to provide a closer look at the different arguments presented for a renewed concern with ontology and its ramifications. With this task in mind, three particular complexes will be addressed. First, we have to identify the central claims of these new ontological approaches and assess them in respect to coherence and analytic rigour. Secondly, then, we will proceed with identifying the underlying reasons for their shortcomings which as will be shown lie with the misguided concept of ontology. If this conception is properly reworked, can indeed bring new light into otherwise protracted or even deadlocked debates.


2000 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 125-130 ◽  
Author(s):  
ROBERT O. KEOHANE

Social Theory of International Politics is in my view a major work in our field, fully deserving of this symposium in the Review of International Studies. Indeed, I think that Alexander Wendt's book is virtually certain to become a classic work on international relations theory, standard on graduate reading lists. Wendt's distinctive combination of scientific realism, holism, and what he calls ‘idealism’, will certainly spark much conversation and, it is to be hoped, a great deal of thought.


2000 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 131-136 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN D. KRASNER

Alexander Wendt has drawn on an exceptional range of theoretical literature in his effort to reconceptualize the nature of the international system. His discussion of scientific realism ought to be required reading for any student of international relations, or political science for that matter. He puts to rest the notion that constructivism is necessarily postmodern, devoid of an objective referent. In John Searle's felicitous formulation it is possible to have a subjective ontology but an objective epistemology. In emphasizing that all knowledge is theory laden, Wendt underscores the point that facts never simply speak for themselves. In both the social and natural sciences brute empiricism is never an adequate research strategy. Our theories shape the way we see the world but they cannot remake the world in their own image.


2008 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID JASON KARP

AbstractThis article applies E. H. Carr’s analysis of utopia and reality, and a Searlean-constructivist analysis of rules and norms, to the concept of ‘sovereignty’ in general, and Stephen Krasner’s argument in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy in particular. In doing this, the article charts a theoretical space that incorporates insights from classical realism, scientific realism, and philosophical (social) constructivism. To view ‘utopia’ and ‘reality’ as distinct yet equally important planes of International Relations (IR) inquiry, thereby treating ‘sovereignty’ as a single concept with descriptive and normative elements, highlights both the merits and the shortcomings of Krasner’s approach. Furthermore, this type of analysis suggests a fruitful way to continue a contemporary normative discussion about what sovereign entities ought to do.


2013 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 459-481 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew Bennett

Theorizing under the rubric of paradigmatic ‘isms’ has made important conceptual contributions to International Relations, but the organization of the subfield around these isms is based on flawed readings of the philosophy of science and has run its course. A promising alternative is to build on the philosophical foundation of scientific realism and orient International Relations theorizing around the idea of explanation via reference to hypothesized causal mechanisms. Yet in order to transform the practice of International Relations theorizing and research, calls for ‘analytic eclecticism’ must not only demonstrate that scientific realism is a defensible epistemology amenable to diverse methods; they must provide a structured and memorable framework for diverse and cumulative theorizing and research, field-wide discourse, and compelling pedagogy. I Introduce a ‘taxonomy of theories about causal mechanisms’ as a structured pluralist framework for encompassing the theories about mechanisms of power, institutions, and legitimacy that have been providing the explanatory content of the isms all along. This framework encourages middle-range or typological theorizing about combinations of causal mechanisms and their operation in recurrent contexts, and it offers a means of reinvigorating the dialogue between International Relations, the other subfields of political science, and the rest of the social sciences.


2000 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 123-124 ◽  

It is fitting that one of the last major statements of International Relations theory in the 1990s should be a response to Kenneth Waltz's path-breaking book, Theory of International Politics. Unlike many other critically inclined scholars, Wendt believes that Waltz asked the right questions but supplied the wrong answers. Putting it simply, Waltz incorrectly conceptualized the structure of the international system. The first half of Wendt's book sets out to offer an alternative social theory of international politics to the ‘materialism’ and ‘individualism’ found in Waltz's work (specifically, chapters on ‘Scientific realism and social kinds’, ‘Ideas all the way down? On the constitution of power and interest’, and ‘Structure, agency, and culture’).


1989 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 441-473 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Dessler

Recent developments in the philosophy of science, particularly those falling under the rubric of “scientific realism,” have earned growing recognition among theorists of international relations but have failed to generate substantive programs of research. Consequently, the empirical relevance of much philosophical discourse, such as that centering on the agent-structure problem in social theory, remains unestablished. This article attempts to bridge the gap between the philosophy and practice of science by outlining a model of international structure based on the principles of scientific realism and by considering its implications for a structural research program in international relations theory. Appealing to Imre Lakatos's methodology of theorychoice, the article presents an ontological case for adopting a “transformational” model of structure over the “positional” model developed in the work of Kenneth Waltz. The article demonstrates that the positional approach offers no conceptual or explanatory hold on those features of the international structure that are the intended products of state action. In conclusion, the article argues that the stakes in the agent-structure debate include the capacity to generate integrative structural theory and the ability to theorize the possibilities for peaceful change in the international system.


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