The Economics of Civil Conflict in Africa: The Case of Chad

2005 ◽  
pp. 109-121
Author(s):  
Nadjiounoum Djimtoingar ◽  
Djona Atchénémou Avocksouma
Keyword(s):  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Conflict In Africa

scholarly journals Borderline Disorder: (De facto) Historical Ethnic Borders and Contemporary Conflict in Africa

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ömer Özak ◽  
Emilio Depetris-Chauvin
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Land ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Population Pressure ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Variable Approach ◽  
Initial Location ◽  
Spatial Partition ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
Conflict In Africa ◽  
Cultural Similarity

We explore the effect of historical ethnic borders on contemporary non-civil conflict in Africa. Exploiting variations across artificial regions (i.e., grids of 50x50km) within an ethnicity's historical homeland, we document that both the intensive and extensive margins of contemporary conflict are concentrated close to historical ethnic borders. Following a theory-based instrumental variable approach, which generates a plausibly exogenous ethno-spatial partition of Africa, we find that grid cells with historical ethnic borders have 27 percentage points higher probability of conflict and 7.9 percentage points higher probability of being the initial location of a conflict. We uncover several key underlying mechanisms: competition for agricultural land, population pressure, cultural similarity and weak property rights.

scholarly journals Roads to Rule, Roads to Rebel: Relational State Capacity and Conflict in Africa

2020 ◽  
pp. 002200272096367
Author(s):  
Carl Müller-Crepon ◽  
Philipp Hunziker ◽  
Lars-Erik Cederman
Keyword(s):  
Instrumental Variable ◽  
Armed Conflict ◽  
State Capacity ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
The State ◽  
Weak State ◽  
Road Maps ◽  
State Capital ◽  
Conflict In Africa ◽  
Relational State

Weak state capacity is one of the most important explanations of civil conflict. Yet, current conceptualizations of state capacity typically focus only on the state while ignoring the relational nature of armed conflict. We argue that opportunities for conflict arise where relational state capacity is low, that is, where the state has less control over its subjects than its potential challengers. This occurs in ethnic groups that are poorly accessible from the state capital, but are internally highly interconnected. To test this argument, we digitize detailed African road maps and convert them into a road atlas akin to Google Maps. We measure the accessibility and internal connectedness of groups via travel times obtained from this atlas and simulate road networks for an instrumental variable design. Our findings suggest that low relational state capacity increases the risk of armed conflict in Africa.

Fiscal Policy and Civil Conflict in Africa

2016 ◽  
Vol 25 (4) ◽  
pp. 614-636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alvaro Aguirre
Keyword(s):  
Fiscal Policy ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Conflict In Africa

Women's Movements and Constitution Making after Civil Unrest and Conflict in Africa: The Cases of Kenya and Somalia

2016 ◽  
Vol 12 (01) ◽  
pp. 78-106 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aili Mari Tripp
Keyword(s):  
Women's Rights ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Women's Movements ◽  
Customary Law ◽  
Women’S Rights ◽  
Gender Quotas ◽  
African Countries ◽  
Conflict In Africa ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Constitutional Changes

As numerous conflicts have come to an end in Africa over the past two decades, women's movements have sought to advance a women's rights agenda through peace accords; through constitutional, legislative, and electoral reforms; as well as through the introduction of gender quotas. This article focuses the impact women's movements have had in shaping constitutions after periods of turmoil, particularly in areas of equality, customary law, antidiscrimination, violence against women, quotas, and citizenship rights. It demonstrates how countries that have come out of major civil conflict and violent upheaval in Africa after the mid-1990s—but especially after 2000—have made more constitutional changes with respect to women's rights than other African countries. The second part of the article provides two examples of how women's movements influenced constitutional changes pertaining to gender equality as well as the difficulties they encountered, particularly with respect to the international community.

scholarly journals Borderline Disorder: (De facto) Historical Ethnic Borders and Contemporary Conflict in Africa

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ömer Özak ◽  
Emilio Depetris-Chauvin
Keyword(s):  
Agricultural Land ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Population Pressure ◽  
Percentage Points ◽  
Variable Approach ◽  
Initial Location ◽  
Spatial Partition ◽  
Underlying Mechanisms ◽  
Conflict In Africa ◽  
Cultural Similarity

We explore the effect of historical ethnic borders on contemporary non-civil conflict in Africa. Exploiting variations across artificial regions (i.e., grids of 50x50km) within an ethnicity's historical homeland, we document that both the intensive and extensive margins of contemporary conflict are concentrated close to historical ethnic borders. Following a theory-based instrumental variable approach, which generates a plausibly exogenous ethno-spatial partition of Africa, we find that grid cells with historical ethnic borders have 27 percentage points higher probability of conflict and 7.9 percentage points higher probability of being the initial location of a conflict. We uncover several key underlying mechanisms: competition for agricultural land, population pressure, cultural similarity and weak property rights.

The Rebels’ Credibility Dilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 70 (3) ◽  
pp. 477-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jakana L. Thomas ◽  
William Reed ◽  
Scott Wolford
Keyword(s):  
Civil War ◽  
Civil Wars ◽  
Historical Data ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Rebel Groups ◽  
Strategic Incentives ◽  
Rebel Group ◽  
The Government ◽  
Conflict In Africa

AbstractThis article examines why rebel groups make large demands of governments that are inconsistent with their fighting capacity, especially when such demands are almost always rejected. We show that making large demands, even if ultimately rejected by the government, makes sense for rebels who face a credibility dilemma. Such a dilemma is most likely to arise when militarily weak rebel groups face governments of uncertain strength and can commit to fight credibly only when they believe the government is also weak. This results in a counterintuitive set of strategic incentives for weak rebels, who choose their demands to ensure that they are rejected even when the government is weak. Thus, to make their threat to fight credible, weak rebels make large demands that, when rejected, result in inefficient fighting. Since most civil wars are characterized by weak rebels bargaining with much stronger governments, it is important to understand how this particular feature of civil war shapes intrawar negotiations between the rebels and the government. We develop a model of bargaining between a government and rebel group and evaluate its implications using historical data on civil conflict in Africa from 1989 to 2010. The results suggest that the tendency for the government to be significantly stronger than rebels induces rebel groups to make unrealistically large demands.

Re-examining Economic Shocks and Civil Conflict

2011 ◽  
Vol 3 (4) ◽  
pp. 228-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward Miguel ◽  
Shanker Satyanath
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Political Violence ◽  
Civil Conflict ◽  
Annual Rainfall ◽  
Economic Shocks ◽  
Theoretical Justification ◽  
Rainfall Variation ◽  
Annual Changes ◽  
Conflict In Africa

Miguel, Satyanath, and Ernest Sergenti (2004), henceforth MSS, show that economic growth is negatively related to civil conflict in Africa, using annual rainfall variation as an IV for growth. Antonio Ciccone (2011) argues that thanks to rainfall's mean-reverting nature, rainfall levels are preferable to annual changes. We make three points. First, MSS's findings hold using rainfall levels as instruments. Second, Ciccone (2011) does not provide theoretical justification for preferring rainfall levels. Third, the first-stage relationship between rainfall and growth is weaker after 2000, suggesting that alternative instruments are needed when studying recent conflicts. We highlight the accumulating microeconomic evidence that adverse economic shocks lead to political violence. (JEL D74, E32, O11, O17, O47)

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