Communication and Co-operation in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma: A Field Experiment

2004 ◽  
pp. 258-286 ◽  
Author(s):  
Juan-Camilo Cardenas ◽  
T. K. Ahn ◽  
Elinor Ostrom
Keyword(s):  
Field Experiment ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Resource Dilemma

Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-94
Author(s):  
Ganga Shreedhar ◽  
Alessandro Tavoni ◽  
Carmen Marchiori
Keyword(s):  
Network Topology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Complete Network ◽  
Resource Dilemma ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

AbstractWith the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.

scholarly journals Sociocultural heterogeneity in a common pool resource dilemma

PLoS ONE ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. e0210561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Gehrig ◽  
Achim Schlüter ◽  
Peter Hammerstein
Keyword(s):  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Resource Dilemma

scholarly journals The Power of Tolerance vs. Unselfishness as a Cultural Determinant of Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimmo Eriksson ◽  
Brent Simpson ◽  
Irina Vartanova
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Personal Values ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Resource Dilemma ◽  
Cross National

Cooperation in collective action problems and resource dilemmas is often assumed to depend on the values of the individuals involved, such as their degree of unselfishness and tolerance. Societal differences in cooperation and cooperative norms may therefore result from cultural variation in emphasis on these personal values. Here we draw on several cross-national datasets to examine whether society-level emphasis on unselfishness and tolerance and respect for other people predict how societies vary in cooperation [in a continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD)] and in norms governing cooperation [in a common pool resource dilemma (CPR)]. The results suggest that high levels of cooperation and cooperative norms are promoted specifically by a cultural emphasis on tolerance.

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