scholarly journals Motivational Foundations of Communication, Voluntary Cooperation, and Self-Governance in a Common-Pool Resource Dilemma

Author(s):  
Daniel A. DeCaro ◽  
Marco A. Janssen ◽  
Allen Lee
2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-94
Author(s):  
Ganga Shreedhar ◽  
Alessandro Tavoni ◽  
Carmen Marchiori

AbstractWith the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.


PLoS ONE ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. e0210561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Gehrig ◽  
Achim Schlüter ◽  
Peter Hammerstein

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimmo Eriksson ◽  
Brent Simpson ◽  
Irina Vartanova

Cooperation in collective action problems and resource dilemmas is often assumed to depend on the values of the individuals involved, such as their degree of unselfishness and tolerance. Societal differences in cooperation and cooperative norms may therefore result from cultural variation in emphasis on these personal values. Here we draw on several cross-national datasets to examine whether society-level emphasis on unselfishness and tolerance and respect for other people predict how societies vary in cooperation [in a continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD)] and in norms governing cooperation [in a common pool resource dilemma (CPR)]. The results suggest that high levels of cooperation and cooperative norms are promoted specifically by a cultural emphasis on tolerance.


Hydrology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Francisco Muñoz-Arriola ◽  
Tarik Abdel-Monem ◽  
Alessandro Amaranto

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.


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