Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma

2019 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 66-94
Author(s):  
Ganga Shreedhar ◽  
Alessandro Tavoni ◽  
Carmen Marchiori
Keyword(s):  
Network Topology ◽  
The Other ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Free Riders ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Complete Network ◽  
Resource Dilemma ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

AbstractWith the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.

scholarly journals Cross-scale cooperation enables sustainable use of a common-pool resource

2019 ◽  
Vol 286 (1913) ◽  
pp. 20191943 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew K. Ringsmuth ◽  
Steven J. Lade ◽  
Maja Schlüter
Keyword(s):  
Resource Sharing ◽  
Sustainable Use ◽  
Theoretical Models ◽  
The Other ◽  
System Level ◽  
Optimal Harvesting ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Shared Resources ◽  
Spatial And Temporal Scales ◽  
Common Pool

In social-ecological systems (SESs), social and biophysical dynamics interact within and between the levels of organization at multiple spatial and temporal scales. Cross-scale interactions (CSIs) are interdependences between processes at different scales, generating behaviour unpredictable at single scales. Understanding CSIs is important for improving SES governance, but they remain understudied. Theoretical models are needed that capture essential features while being simple enough to yield insights into mechanisms. In a stylized model, we study CSIs in a two-level system of weakly interacting communities harvesting a common-pool resource. Community members adaptively conform to, or defect from, a norm of socially optimal harvesting, enforced through social sanctioning both within and between communities. We find that each subsystem’s dynamics depend sensitively on the other despite interactions being much weaker between subsystems than within them. When interaction is purely biophysical, stably high cooperation in one community can cause cooperation in the other to collapse. However, even weak social interaction can prevent the collapse of cooperation and instead cause collapse of defection. We identify conditions under which subsystem-level cooperation produces desirable system-level outcomes. Our findings expand evidence that collaboration is important for sustainably managing shared resources, showing its importance even when resource sharing and social relationships are weak.

scholarly journals Sociocultural heterogeneity in a common pool resource dilemma

PLoS ONE ◽  
2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. e0210561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stefan Gehrig ◽  
Achim Schlüter ◽  
Peter Hammerstein
Keyword(s):  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Resource Dilemma

scholarly journals Assimilation in networks promoting common pool resource conservation

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tuyen Tiet
Keyword(s):  
Social Comparison ◽  
Resource Conservation ◽  
Network Structures ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Conservation Behavior ◽  
Assimilation Effect ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Complete Network ◽  
Individual Behaviors ◽  
Over Exploitation

Abstract This study investigates how assimilation in social comparison (i.e., changing behaviors in order to fit in with a group) impacts individual behaviors in the extraction of a common pool resource in different network structures (i.e., empty network, star, circle, and complete network). Our results suggest that over-exploitation is more likely to happen when there is a presence of assimilation in comparison. However, it is possible to incentivize resource conservation since the assimilation effect on individual conservation behavior highly depends on the network structures. Thus, promoting assimilation to a centralized network or networks with fewer connections is a good way to encourage resource conservation. More particularly, in a decentralized network with fewer connections (e.g., a circle network), assimilation in social comparison (e.g., feedback on their behaviors and the average behaviors of their neighbors) could help to promote resource conservation. A centralized network is useful in diffusing information and promoting assimilation in comparison by incentivizing the resource conservation of the central agents.

scholarly journals Imperfect Public Monitoring with Costly Punishment: An Experimental Study

2012 ◽  
Vol 102 (7) ◽  
pp. 3317-3332 ◽  
Author(s):  
Attila Ambrus ◽  
Ben Greiner
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Study ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Imperfect Monitoring ◽  
Costly Punishment ◽  
Long Run ◽  
The Social ◽  
Severe Punishment ◽  
Public Monitoring ◽  
Perfect Monitoring

This paper experimentally investigates the effects of a costly punishment option on cooperation and social welfare in long, finitely repeated public good contribution games. In a perfect monitoring environment, increasing the severity of the potential punishment monotonically increases average net payoffs. In a more realistic imperfect monitoring environment, we find a U-shaped relationship. Access to a standard punishment technology in this setting significantly decreases net payoffs, even in the long run. Access to a severe punishment technology leads to roughly the same payoffs as with no punishment option, as the benefits of increased cooperation offset the social costs of punishing. (JEL C92, H41, K42)

scholarly journals The Power of Tolerance vs. Unselfishness as a Cultural Determinant of Cooperation

2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kimmo Eriksson ◽  
Brent Simpson ◽  
Irina Vartanova
Keyword(s):  
Collective Action ◽  
Prisoner's Dilemma ◽  
Personal Values ◽  
Prisoner’S Dilemma ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Cultural Variation ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Collective Action Problems ◽  
Resource Dilemma ◽  
Cross National

Cooperation in collective action problems and resource dilemmas is often assumed to depend on the values of the individuals involved, such as their degree of unselfishness and tolerance. Societal differences in cooperation and cooperative norms may therefore result from cultural variation in emphasis on these personal values. Here we draw on several cross-national datasets to examine whether society-level emphasis on unselfishness and tolerance and respect for other people predict how societies vary in cooperation [in a continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD)] and in norms governing cooperation [in a common pool resource dilemma (CPR)]. The results suggest that high levels of cooperation and cooperative norms are promoted specifically by a cultural emphasis on tolerance.

scholarly journals Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Water Resources Planning for Hydrologically Connected Surface and Groundwater Systems

Hydrology ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 51
Author(s):  
Francisco Muñoz-Arriola ◽  
Tarik Abdel-Monem ◽  
Alessandro Amaranto
Keyword(s):  
Water Resources ◽  
Collective Action ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
Integrated Management ◽  
Design Principles ◽  
Water Levels ◽  
High Plains ◽  
Common Pool Resource ◽  
Common Pool ◽  
Connected Surface

Common pool resource (CPR) management has the potential to overcome the collective action dilemma, defined as the tendency for individual users to exploit natural resources and contribute to a tragedy of the commons. Design principles associated with effective CPR management help to ensure that arrangements work to the mutual benefit of water users. This study contributes to current research on CPR management by examining the process of implementing integrated management planning through the lens of CPR design principles. Integrated management plans facilitate the management of a complex common pool resource, ground and surface water resources having a hydrological connection. Water governance structures were evaluated through the use of participatory methods and observed records of interannual changes in rainfall, evapotranspiration, and ground water levels across the Northern High Plains. The findings, documented in statutes, field interviews and observed hydrologic variables, point to the potential for addressing large-scale collective action dilemmas, while building on the strengths of local control and participation. The feasibility of a “bottom up” system to foster groundwater resilience was evidenced by reductions in groundwater depths of 2 m in less than a decade.

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