The Power of Tolerance vs. Unselfishness as a Cultural Determinant of Cooperation

Cooperation in collective action problems and resource dilemmas is often assumed to depend on the values of the individuals involved, such as their degree of unselfishness and tolerance. Societal differences in cooperation and cooperative norms may therefore result from cultural variation in emphasis on these personal values. Here we draw on several cross-national datasets to examine whether society-level emphasis on unselfishness and tolerance and respect for other people predict how societies vary in cooperation [in a continuous prisoner’s dilemma (PD)] and in norms governing cooperation [in a common pool resource dilemma (CPR)]. The results suggest that high levels of cooperation and cooperative norms are promoted specifically by a cultural emphasis on tolerance.

CODEBOOK FOR ANALYZING CONTENT AND FUNCTION OF COMMUNICATION IN SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL DILEMMA EXPERIMENTS

This codebook provides concepts and methodologies for coding and quantifying the content and function of communication in group social dilemma experiments, specifically with a social and ecological component (e.g., common pool resource dilemma). The content that is coded pertains to such categories as small talk, humor, information exchange (e.g., ecological, social, institutional), enforcement (e.g., praise, warnings, threats), decision making (e.g., proposals, choosing). Functional categories pertain to key functions needed for group members to govern the dilemma: e.g., develop agreements, make group decisions (e.g., democratic decision making), resolve conflicts, and enforce compliance. This codebook provides guidance for metrics to associate coded communication content and function to observed cooperation.

State of Research

This chapter outlines the state of research. First, basic biological cooperation mechanisms are examined for their relevance for success in the management of natural resources. In a second step, findings from economic behavioral experiments (public goods games) are summarized in order to identify cooperation-enhancing factors in social dilemmas. Finally, the common-pool resource dilemma will be characterized more precisely. After these broader discussions, social-ecological systems and potential success factors for sustainable management are characterized more precisely by a literature review.

Gratitude Reduces Consumption of Depleting Resources

Sustaining finite public resources presents a dilemma between acting in self-interest for present benefit versus working toward long-term collective gain. Given gratitude’s links to prosociality and self-control, the present studies investigated whether gratitude would promote sustainable resource extraction under conditions of rapidly depleting resources. In Study 1 (N=155), participants were randomly assigned to experience an emotional state (gratitude or neutral) prior to playing a resource dilemma game where the common pool was manipulated to indicate either a sustained or depleting resource status. Neutral participants increased their point taking when the pool was depleting compared to when it was sustained, however this pattern was not observed for grateful participants. Study 2 (N=224) replicated these findings while also showing the effect of gratitude to be distinct from happiness. These findings show that gratitude, as opposed to a general positive emotional state, buffers against overtaking in resource dilemmas, and suggests that this emotion may be useful in promoting sustainable behavior.

Monitoring and punishment networks in an experimental common pool resource dilemma

With the aid of a lab experiment, we explored how imperfect monitoring and punishment networks impacted appropriation, punishment and beliefs in a common pool resource appropriation dilemma. We studied the differences between the complete network (with perfect monitoring and punishment, in which everyone can observe and punish everyone else) and two ‘imperfect’ networks (that systematically reduce the number of subjects who could monitor and punish others): the directed and undirected circle networks. We found that free riders were punished in all treatments, but the network topology impacted the type of punishment: the undirected circle induced more severe punishment and prosocial punishment compared to the other two networks. Both imperfect networks were more efficient because the larger punishment capacity available in the complete network elicited higher punishment amount.