Self-Selection of Peers and Performance

This paper studies how the presence of peers and different peer assignment rules—self-selection versus random assignment—affect individual performance. Using a framed field experiment, we find that the presence of a randomly assigned peer improves performance by 28% of a standard deviation (SD), whereas self-selecting peers induces an additional 15%–18% SD improvement in performance. Our results document peer effects in multiple characteristics and show that self-selection changes these characteristics. However, a decomposition reveals that variations in the peer composition contribute only little to the performance differences across peer assignment rules. Rather, we find that self-selection has a direct effect on performance. This paper was accepted by Yan Chen, decision analysis.

Competing social identities and intergroup discrimination: Evidence from a framed field experiment with high school students in Vietnam

We conducted a framed field experiment to explore a situation where individuals have potentially competing social identities to understand how group identification and socialisation affect in-group favouritism and out-group discrimination. The Dictator Game and the Trust Game were conducted in Vietnam’s Ho Chi Minh City on two groups of high school students with different backgrounds, i.e., French bilingual and monolingual (Vietnamese) students. We find strong evidence for the presence of these two phenomena: our micro-analysis of within- and between-school effects show that bilingual students exhibit higher discriminatory behaviour toward non-bilinguals within the same school than toward other bilinguals from a different school, implying that group identity is a key factor in the explanation of intergroup cooperation and competition.

Reaching for Returns in Retail Structured Investment

The growing market for retail structured investment products and empirical evidence for excessive pricing of such products raise the hypothesis that private investors show increased risk appetite in structured investment contexts. A two-stage framed field experiment building on cumulative prospect theory is designed to test this hypothesis. Subjects’ expectations regarding the future performance of an underlying index are elicited first. A bisection algorithm is then applied to derive the certainty equivalents of 20 simple individually tailored deposits. The results support the increased risk appetite hypothesis, revealing that subjects reach for substantial gains and underweight tail loss events when evaluating the deposits. Similar results emerge in a follow-up experiment where the uncertain deposits are replaced by risky versions. While previous studies propose that misperception of complex terms and optimism contribute to the mispricing of structured instruments, the current experiments show that nonstandard risk appetite manifests in the valuation of simple well-defined products, controlling for expectations. This paper was accepted by Manel Baucells, decision analysis.

Cheating for the Cause: The Effects of Performance-Based Pay on Socially Oriented Misreporting

We examine the effect of performance-based pay on misreporting intended to benefit a social mission. We show that performance-based pay decreases people's propensity to misreport for a social mission in a not-for-profit setting (Experiment 1). We similarly show that, in a for-profit setting, performance-based pay also decreases misreporting propensity for a social mission, though not for a non-social mission (Experiment 2). Finally, using a framed field experiment with participants attending a conference hosted by a real charity, we show that performance-based pay reduces actual misreporting when misreporting leads to more donations for the charity (Experiment 3). These results are consistent with our theory suggesting that, relative to fixed pay, performance-based pay imposes additional costs on misreporting employees' self-concepts of benevolence and honesty.