Manufacturer's pricing strategies in a single-period framework under price-dependent stochastic demand with asymmetric risk-preference information

2007 ◽  
Vol 58 (11) ◽  
pp. 1449-1458 ◽  
Author(s):  
F J Arcelus ◽  
S Kumar ◽  
G Srinivasan
2020 ◽  
Vol 37 (03) ◽  
pp. 2050016
Author(s):  
Xiaogang Lin ◽  
Yong-Wu Zhou ◽  
Qiang Lin

We investigate the pricing strategies of unbundling and mixed-bundling for a firm that produces both a product and a compatible integrated content, respectively. The firm can be viewed as a two-sided transaction platform between sellers and customers, and decides whether to sell the product and the integrated content separately or jointly. Sellers develop independent content and are charged a per-unit royalty rate for each transaction on the platform, and customers are required to pay the prices for the product and the contents. With the consideration of stochastic demand, we study the impacts of cross-side network effect on the pricing strategies of unbundling and mixed-bundling, respectively. Moreover, we compare the impact of unbundling and mixed-bundling on the pricing strategy of the platform. Compared with no cross-side network effect, we show that the firm (with unbundling and mixed-bundling) need not subsidize customers and sellers in the presence of the effect under certain conditions, indicating that it can extract the most surplus from both sides to maximize the profit. This stands in sharp contrast to the finding of the literature on two-sided markets that the platform should subsidize one side of the market in order to make profit from the other side. Moreover, our result suggests that mixed-bundling can help the firm make more profit with fewer products by subsidizing one side of the market compared with the unbundling.


Author(s):  
DING DING ◽  
JIAN CHEN

This paper studies a supply chain consisting of two suppliers and an assembler who also acts as a retailer in a single period model. The suppliers provide complementary modules to the assembler and the latter assembles the final products and sells them to meet a stochastic demand. Each supplier can improve his performance by offering a return policy to the assembler while the best contract depends on that offered by the other supplier. We show that the non-cooperative contracts game between the firms has a unique and stable equilibrium in which the optimal return policies happen to fully coordinate the whole channel. Moreover, the suppliers still have the rights to negotiate with the assembler independently to share their profits properly. With such properties, the suppliers are encouraged to offer return policies to the assembler by following a simple rule derived from the favorable equilibrium, which will lead to a win-win-win situation.


2013 ◽  
Vol 572 ◽  
pp. 699-702 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Wang ◽  
Yu Xiong

The model where the remanufacturer and the manufacturer collaborate with each other in the same channel has been studied before, while this paper firstly investigates it under three channel power structures. This paper investigates a single-period deterministic model which keeps the analysis simple so as to obtain sharper insights. The results characterize the optimal remanufacturing and pricing strategies for the remanufacturer and the manufacturer in the collaborative model under the three channel structures, and find that in each case, because the total market profit in the collaborative model is higher than the competitive model, the collaborative model will be built as soon as the remanufacturer’s profit is ensured. Besides, this paper compares the pricing strategies of the collaborative model between the channel structures.


Omega ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 36 (5) ◽  
pp. 808-824 ◽  
Author(s):  
F.J. Arcelus ◽  
Satyendra Kumar ◽  
G. Srinivasan

Complexity ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-16
Author(s):  
Wenjie Wang ◽  
Lei Xie

Ridesharing two-sided platforms link the stochastic demand side and the self-scheduling capacity supply side where there are network externalities. The main purpose of this paper is to establish the optimal pricing model of ridesharing platforms to dynamically coordinate uncertain supply and stochastic demand with network externalities in order to maximize platforms’ revenue and social welfare. We propose dynamic pricing strategies under two demand scenarios that minimize order loss in the surge demand period and maximize social welfare in the declining demand period. The numerical simulation results show that dynamic pricing strategies could stimulate the supply to reduce delayed orders in the surge demand scenario and adjust the demand to maximize social welfare under declining demand scenario. Additionally, we further find that the direct network externalities positively influence the platforms’ revenue, and the indirect network externalities have a negative effect on social welfare in the declining demand scenario, and a higher wage ratio cannot enhance the platforms’ revenue.


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