scholarly journals The Misunderstood Higher-Order Approach to Consciousness

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Brown ◽  
Hakwan Lau ◽  
Joseph LeDoux
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Intermediate Position ◽  
First Order ◽  
Global Workspace ◽  
Episodic Memories ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models, such as first-order local recurrency theory. The criticism that HOT overintellectualizes conscious experience is inaccurate because in reality the theory assumes minimal cognitive functions for consciousness; in this sense it is an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views, and plausibly accounts for shortcomings of both. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can more readily account for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories, and make HOT potentially useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states.

scholarly journals Consciência intencional e autoconsciência. As teses de Brentano perante as teorias de ordem superior

2021 ◽  
pp. 391
Author(s):  
Pedro M.S. Alves
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental State ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Related Question ◽  
Mental Life ◽  
Higher Order Theory

En este artículo, examino algunas características importantes de las teorías de conciencia y autoconciencia de Brentano y Rosenthal. En particular, analizo la distinción entre estados mentales y estados conscientes, y la cuestión relacionada con de determinar si todos los estados mentales pueden convertirse en estados conscientes. Interpreto la teoría de Brentano como una teoría de la mente de un nivel que está de acuerdo con la fusión cartesiana entre los estados mentales y la conciencia. Argumento que los problemas que surgen de la posición de Brentano son, hasta cierto punto, superados por una teoría de orden superior, de modo que la posición de Rosenthal es más precisa. Sin embargo, estoy en desacuerdo con ambos en la interpretación de la consciencia de un estado mental como autoconciencia. Desarrollo los fundamentos de una teoría basada en la primacía del organismo y su mundo vital, y de la experiencia consciente como la forma superior de la vida mental, que tiene, sin embargo, sus raíces en la compleja red de estados mentales que son no estados conscientes.In this paper, I examine some important features of Brentano’s and Rosenthal’s theories of consciousness and self-consciousness. In particular, I discuss the distinction between mental states and conscious states, and the related question of determining whether all mental states can become conscious states. I interpret Brentano’s theory as a one-level theory of mind which is in keeping with the Cartesian conflation between mental states and conscious-ness. I argue that the problems arising from Brentano’s position are to a certain extent surpassed by a higher-order theory, so that Rosenthal’s position is more accurate. Nevertheless, I disagree with both in the construal of the consciousness of a mental state as self-consciousness. I develop then the fundamentals for a theory based on the primacy of the organism and its vital world, and of conscious experience as the higher form of mental life, which has, however, its roots in the complex net of mental states which are not conscious states.

Seeming to Seem

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
David Rosenthal
Keyword(s):  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Psychological State ◽  
Intentional Stance ◽  
First Person ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Third Person ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
The Third Person

Dennett’s account of consciousness starts from third-person considerations. I argue this is wise, since beginning with first-person access precludes accommodating the third-person access we have to others’ mental states. But Dennett’s first-person operationalism, which seeks to save the first person in third-person, operationalist terms, denies the occurrence of folk-psychological states that one doesn’t believe oneself to be in, and so the occurrence of folk-psychological states that aren’t conscious. This conflicts with Dennett’s intentional-stance approach to the mental, on which we discern others’ mental states independently of those states’ being conscious. We can avoid this conflict with a higher-order theory of consciousness, which saves the spirit of Dennett’s approach, but enables us to distinguish conscious folk-psychological states from nonconscious ones. The intentional stance by itself can’t do this, since it can’t discern a higher-order awareness of a psychological state. But we can supplement the intentional stance with the higher-order theoretical apparatus.

scholarly journals Durand of St.-Pourçain on Reflex Acts and State Consciousness

Vivarium ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 215-240
Author(s):  
Peter John Hartman
Keyword(s):  
Mental State ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Mental Power ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Conscious Mental State

Abstract Some of my mental states are conscious and some of them are not. Sometimes I am so focused on the wine in front of me that I am unaware that I am thinking about it. But sometimes, of course, I take a reflexive step back and become aware of my thinking about the wine in front of me. What marks the difference between a conscious mental state and an unconscious one? In this article, the author focuses on Durand of St.-Pourçain’s rejection of the higher-order theory of state consciousness, according to which a mental act is conscious when there is another, suitably related, mental (reflex) act that exists at the same time with it. Durand rejects such higher-order theories on the grounds that they violate the thesis that a given mental power can have or elicit only one mental act at a given time. The author first goes over some of Durand’s general arguments for this thesis. He then turns to Durand’s application of the thesis to the issue of state consciousness and reflex acts. He closes by considering the objection that Durand’s same-order theory of state consciousness makes consciousness ubiquitous.

Conscious Awareness and (Self-)Representation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Conscious Experience ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
The Self ◽  
Perceptual Content ◽  
Conscious Awareness ◽  
Order Representation ◽  
Materialist Theory ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Another kind of representational theory of phenomenal character is higher-order theory, which identifies our awareness of our conscious states with a higher-order representation of them. One version of such a theory is the “self-representational” theory, according to which phenomenally conscious states are those that include a representation of themselves, along with whatever perceptual content they possess. I criticize this approach for not properly capturing conscious subjectivity, which is its alleged principal virtue. In particular, I argue that the kind of cognitive relation that obtains between ourselves and the contents of our conscious experience cannot be appropriately modeled on the causal relations that underlie any materialist theory of representation.

A higher order theory for compressible turbulent boundary layers at moderately large Reynolds number

1973 ◽  
Vol 57 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-25 ◽  
Author(s):  
Noor Afzal
Keyword(s):  
Reynolds Number ◽  
Viscous Dissipation ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Large Reynolds Number ◽  
Law Of The Wall ◽  
First Order ◽  
The Law ◽  
Higher Order Theory

A higher order theory for two-dimensional turbulent boundary-layer flow of a compressible fluid past a plane wall is formulated, for moderately large values of the Reynolds number, by the method of matched asymptotic expansions. The parameters (γ − 1) M2∞and the molecular Prandtl number are assumed to be of order unity. The analysis deals with the set of Reynolds equations of mean motion (which are underdetermined without an additional set of closure hypotheses) and assumes that the non-dimensional fluctuations in velocity, temperature and density are of orderU*, (friction velocity divided by free-stream velocity a t some designation point), while fluctuations in pressure are of orderU2*.The first-order results of the present study lead to asymptotic laws for velocity and temperature distributions which correspond to the law of the wall, logarithmic law and defect law, and also to skin friction and heat-transfer laws. It turns out that the first-order defect law depends upon the gradient of entropy and stagnation enthalpy and the law of the wall is independent of viscous dissipation. The second-order terms of the present work (accounting for mean convection due to turbulent mass flux, viscous dissipation in the inner flow and displacement effects in the outer flow) describe the necessary corrections to first-order terms due to low Reynolds number effects. In the overlap region the second-order results, for the law of the wall and the defect law, show bilogarithmic terms along with logarithmic terms.

scholarly journals Ultraproducts and Higher Order Models

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
◽  
Wilfred Gordon Malcolm
Keyword(s):  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Embedding Theorems ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order Models

<p>The programme of work for this thesis began with the somewhat genenal intention of parallelling in the context of higher order models the ultraproduct construction and its consequences as developed in the literature for first order models. Something of this was, of course, already available in the ultrapower construction of W.A.J. Luxemburg used in Non Standand Analysis. It may have been considered that such a genenal intention was not likely to yield anything of significance oven and above what was already available from viewing the higher order situation as a 'many sorted' first order one and interpreting the first order theory accordingly. In the event, however, I believe this has proved not to be so. In particular the substructure concepts developed in Chapter II of this thesis together with the various embedding theorems and their applications are not immediately available fnom the first order theory and seem to be of sufficient worth to warrant developing the higher order theory in its own terms. This, anyway, is the basic justification for the approach and content of the thesis.</p>

scholarly journals PERTURBATIVE HAMILTONIAN CONSTRAINTS FOR HIGHER-ORDER THEORIES

2011 ◽  
Vol 26 (26) ◽  
pp. 4661-4686
Author(s):  
S. A. MARTÍNEZ ◽  
R. MONTEMAYOR ◽  
L. F. URRUTIA
Keyword(s):  
Time Derivative ◽  
Canonical Formalism ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Low Energy ◽  
Quantum Level ◽  
First Order ◽  
Present Formalism ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order Lagrangian

We present an alternative method for constructing a consistent perturbative low energy canonical formalism for higher-order time-derivative theories, which consists in applying the standard Dirac method to the first-order version of the higher-order Lagrangian, augmented by additional perturbative Hamiltonian constraints. The method is purely algebraic, provides the dynamical formulation directly in phase space and can be used in singular theories without the need of initially fixing the gauge. We apply it to two paradigmatic examples: the Pais–Uhlenbeck oscillator and the Bernard–Duncan scalar field with self-interaction. We also compare the results, both at the classical and quantum level, with the ones corresponding to a direct perturbative construction applied to the exact higher-order theory, after incorporating the projection to the space of physical modes. This comparison highlights the soundness of the present formalism.

scholarly journals Evaporation and combustion of a slowly moving liquid fuel droplet: higher-order theory

1996 ◽  
Vol 307 ◽  
pp. 135-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. A. Jog ◽  
P. S. Ayyaswamy ◽  
I. M. Cohen
Keyword(s):  
Flow Field ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Second Order ◽  
Spherical Particles ◽  
General Nature ◽  
Fuel Droplet ◽  
First Order ◽  
First Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order Theory

The evaporation and combustion of a single-component fuel droplet which is moving slowly in a hot oxidant atmosphere have been analysed using perturbation methods. Results for the flow field, temperature and species distributions in each phase, inter-facial heat and mass transfer, and the enhancement of the mass burning rate due to the presence of convection have all been developed correct to second order in the translational Reynolds number. This represents an advance over a previous study which analysed the problem to first order in the perturbation parameter. The primary motivation for the development of detailed analytical/numerical solutions correct to second order arises from the need for such a higher-order theory in order to investigate fuel droplet ignition and extinction characteristics in the presence of convective flow. Explanations for such a need, based on order of magnitude arguments, are included in this article. With a moving droplet, the shear at the interface causes circulatory motion inside the droplet. Owing to the large evaporation velocities at the droplet surface that usually accompany drop vaporization and burning, the entire flow field is not in the Stokes regime even for low translational Reynolds numbers. In view of this, the formulation for the continuous phase is developed by imposing slow translatory motion of the droplet as a perturbation to uniform radial flow associated with vigorous evaporation at the surface. Combustion is modelled by the inclusion of a fast chemical reaction in a thin reaction zone represented by the Burke–Schumann flame front. The complete solution for the problem correct to second order is obtained by simultaneously solving a coupled formulation for the dispersed and continuous phases. A noteworthy feature of the higher-order formulation is that both the flow field and transport equations require analysis by coupled singular perturbation procedures. The higher-order theory shows that, for identical conditions, compared with the first-order theory both the flame and the front stagnation point are closer to the surface of the drop, the evaporation is more vigorous, the droplet lifetime is shorter, and the internal vortical motion is asymmetric about the drop equatorial plane. These features are significant for ignition/extinction analyses since the prediction of the location of the point of ignition/extinction will depend upon such details. This article is the first of a two-part study; in the second part, analytical expressions and results obtained here will be incorporated into a detailed investigation of fuel droplet ignition and extinction. In view of the general nature of the formulation considered here, results presented have wider applicability in the general areas of interfacial fluid mechanics and heat/material transport. They are particularly useful in microgravity studies, in atmospheric sciences, in aerosol sciences, and in the prediction of material depletion from spherical particles.

Consciousness, Metacognition, & Perceptual Reality Monitoring

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hakwan Lau
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Justification ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Belief Formation ◽  
Reality Monitoring ◽  
Conscious Perception ◽  
Brute Fact ◽  
Higher Order Theory ◽  
Subjective Level

I introduce an empirically-grounded version of a higher-order theory of conscious perception. Traditionally, theories of consciousness either focus on the global availability of conscious information, or take conscious phenomenology as a brute fact due to some biological or basic representational properties. Here I argue instead that the key to characterizing the consciousness lies in its connections to belief formation and epistemic justification on a subjective level.

Dual Aspect Theory

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. Christopher Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Character ◽  
Order Theory ◽  
Higher Order ◽  
Normal Variation ◽  
Perceptual Representations ◽  
Order Representation ◽  
Management Conflicts ◽  
Higher Order Theory

Carruthers proposes a subtle dispositionalist rendition of higher order theory regarding phenomenal character. The theory would distinguish unconscious movement management from conscious attitude management as perceptual processes. Each process takes perceptual representations as inputs. A representation subject to attitude management is apt to induce a higher order representation of itself that secures a self-referential aspect of its content supposedly determinative of phenomenal character. Unfortunately, the account requires a problematic cognitive ambiguity while failing to explain why attitude, but not movement, management, determines character. Moreover, normal variation in attitudinal management conflicts with the constancy typical of phenomenal character. And although an agent denied perceptual access to a scene about which she is otherwise well informed would suffer no phenomenal character, dispositionalist theory entails otherwise. Such problems, together with the results of the previous chapters, suggest that, whether cloaked under intentionalism or higher order theory, representationalism mistakes content for character.

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