Migration and the Regional Redistribution of Nonearnings Income in the United States: Metropolitan and Nonmetropolitan Perspectives from 1975 to 2000

2005 ◽  
Vol 37 (9) ◽  
pp. 1613-1636 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter B Nelson

Many advanced economies have an aging population that relies heavily on government pensions, social security, and privately held investment-based income. In the United States the geography of social security and investment income (collectively called nonearnings income) is uneven. Furthermore, the ways in which migration serves to redistribute such income across space remain unstudied. This paper highlights regions in the United States that are becoming increasingly attractive to nonearnings income through migration. Overall, there is a consistent Rustbelt-to-Sunbelt shift in nonearnings income due to migration. These income shifts, however, are quite distinct between metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas. Starting in the late 1980s, nonmetropolitan portions of the Rustbelt enjoyed net gains in nonearnings income through migration processes. Therefore, it appears that the migration systems which drew income away from the nonmetropolitan north during the 1970s are now shifting to some degree. Analysis further indicates that migration contributes to greater levels of economic disparity across space. Whereas flows of social security income are highly influenced by the aggregate level of migration, flows of investment income are more influenced by differentials in migrants' per capita income levels. Regions such as the Plains are attracting migrants with relatively low per capita nonearnings income whereas the Rocky Mountain and New England regions are attracting individuals with high per capita income. Destinations such as the Rocky Mountains and New England are likely to enjoy significant economic benefits as new sources of income arrive which are tied to migration, but the Plains region is left with less-well-off populations, which pose significant social and economic problems in such sending regions. As the population in the United States and other advanced economies ages, these processes of nonearnings income migration become increasingly important in shaping local and regional economic conditions.

2004 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Almeida Fonseca ◽  
José Luís Oreiro

O artigo pretende analisar em que medida os modelos neoclássicos de crescimento econômico – mais especificamente, o modelo de Solow (1956, 1957), o modelo de Mankiw, Romer e Weill (1992) e o modelo de Romer (1990) – são capazes de explicar a divergência global nos níveis de renda per capita nos últimos dois séculos e a convergência nos níveis de renda per capita e o catch-up ocorridos entre Europa e Estados Unidos no período do Pós Segunda Guerra Mundial. Com efeito, trata-se de uma confrontação entre teoria e prática, de modo a analisar de que forma tais modelos explicam (ou não) os fatos supramencionados. No trabalho, demonstra-se que a ocorrência dos fatos anteriormente mencionados deveu-se fundamentalmente às diferenças do progresso técnico existente entre as economias (no caso da divergência) e à redução de tais disparidades entre os Estados Unidos e a Europa no período de tempo imediatamente após a 2.a Guerra Mundial (no caso da convergência e do catch-up). Na verdade, tenta-se demonstrar que os modelos apresentados não conseguem explicar satisfatoriamente os fatos ocorridos, sendo válidos apenas em casos específicos. O que o artigo se propõe a expor é que a realidade do crescimento econômico mundial é bastante diferente das conclusões dos modelos neoclássicos considerados. Abstract This work intends to analyze in which way the neoclassical growth models – more specifically, Solow (1956, 1957), Mankiw, Romer and Weill (1992) and Romer (1990) – are capable to explain the global divergence on the levels of per capita income over the last two centuries and the convergence on the levels of per capita income and the catch-up occurred between Europe and the United States after World War II. In fact, it is a confrontation between theory and practice, in order to view in which way these models explain (or not) the above-mentioned facts. During the present work, we demonstrate that the occurrence of these facts were mainly caused by differences on technological progress between economies (case of divergence) and the reduction of such disparities between the United States and Europe on the period of time immediately after World War II (case of convergence and catch-up). In fact, we try to demonstrate that these models are incapable to give a satisfactory explanation to the occurred facts, being only valid on specific cases. The work tries to propose that the reality of global economic growth differs considerably from the conclusions of the considered neoclassical growth models.


2009 ◽  
pp. 134-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard York ◽  
Eugene A. Rosa ◽  
Thomas Dietz

We assess threats to environmental sustainability by examining the trends in three measures of the ecological footprint (EF) — the total EF, the per capita EF, and the EF intensity of the economy (EF/GDP) — for China, India, Japan, and the United States. from 1961 to 2003. The EF, an estimate of the land area needed to sustain use of the environment, is the most comprehensive measure of anthropogenic pressure on the environment available and is growing in use. We argue that the total EF is the most relevant indicator for assessing threats to nature’s capital and services, that per capita EF is the most relevant indicator of global inequalities, and that EF intensity is the most relevant indicator of economic benefits from environmental exploitation. We find in all four nations that the ecological intensity of the economy declined (i.e., efficiency improved) over this period, but the total national EF increased substantially. This is a demonstration of the Jevons paradox, where efficiency does not appear to reduce resource consumption, but rather escalates consumption thereby increasing threats to environmental sustainability.


2014 ◽  
Vol 104 (5) ◽  
pp. 50-55 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carmen M. Reinhart ◽  
Kenneth S. Rogoff

We examine the evolution of real per capita GDP around 100 systemic banking crises. Part of the costs of these crises owes to the protracted nature of recovery. On average, it takes about 8 years to reach the pre-crisis level of income; the median is about 6.5 years. Five to six years after the onset of crisis, only Germany and the United States (out of 12 systemic cases) have reached their 2007-2008 peaks in real income. Forty-five percent of the episodes recorded double dips. Post-war business cycles are not the relevant comparator for the recent crises in advanced economies.


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