scholarly journals Aborto y discurso moral. Ideas clave de la Ética del discurso para el tratamiento de la interrupción voluntaria de la vida humana inicial

Daímon ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 123-139
Author(s):  
Dorando Michelini
Keyword(s):  
Human Life ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Issue ◽  
Stage Of Development ◽  
Initial Stage ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Present Text

El presente texto aborda la problemática del aborto como una cuestión moral, y deja de lado otros enfoques relevantes (por ejemplo, pragmáticos y éticos), dado que estos, en opinión del autor, no tienen como horizonte último el punto de vista moral. A partir de los presupuestos conceptuales y metodológicos de la Ética del discurso, en tanto que ética de la corresponsabilidad solidaria no rigorista, se presentan conceptos ético-discursivos que pueden fundamentar las dos tesis siguientes: a) La interrupción arbitraria de la vida humana en la etapa inicial de desarrollo es una práctica injusta; b) En determinados contextos de interacción y en situaciones específicas de decisión, el principio moral que exige no interrumpir voluntariamente la vida humana inicial puede ser no aplicable o su aplicación no exigible. The present text addresses the problem of abortion as a moral issue, and leaves aside other relevant approaches (e.g. pragmatic and ethical), since these, in the author's opinion, do not have the moral point of view as their ultimate horizon. From the conceptual and methodological assumptions of Discourse Ethics, as ethics of non-rigorous solidary co-responsibility, discourse-ethical concepts are presented that can support the following two theses: a) The arbitrary interruption of human life in the initial stage of development is an unjust practice; b) In certain contexts of interaction and in specific situations of decision, the moral principle that demands not voluntarily interrupting the initial human life may not be applicable or its application may not be enforceable.

Proceduralism and implicatures in dialogue

2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 122-139
Author(s):  
Luciana Garbayo
Keyword(s):  
Relevance Theory ◽  
Discourse Ethics ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Conversational Implicatures ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Moral Strangers ◽  
Bounded Reasoning

This article aims at discussing some of the problems for the construction of a shared moral point of view in dialogical context, through a revision of both Habermas’ proceduralistic discourse ethics and Grice’s pragmatist conversational implicatures project. I claim that a) by discounting the undue idealization of both projects, supported by their Kantian underpinnings, and b) by refreshing them with a consequentialist approach to rationality in a fallibilistic bounded reasoning approach, one could achieve a more realistic understanding of the dialogical problems between moral strangers. By following such a revision, I suggest to be then possible to operate c) a reversal of the principle of rational cooperation in Grice, in convergence with Sperber & Wilson’s relevance theory, while also considering the role of other additional mechanisms in interaction, such as empathy (in Alvin Goldman’s sense). These modifications result in a fallibilistic understanding of the process of the dialogical construction of a shared moral point of view among moral strangers, with the aid of a non-idealized use of procedures and implicatures.

The Importance of Being Human

1991 ◽  
Vol 29 ◽  
pp. 63-81 ◽  
Author(s):  
David McNaughton
Keyword(s):  
Human Nature ◽  
Human Life ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Moral Agents ◽  
Conduct Of Life ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Bodily Sensations

I wish from my Heart, I could avoid concluding, that since Morality, according to your Opinion as well as mine, is determin'd merely by Sentiment, it regards only human Nature & human Life. … If Morality were determin'd by Reason, that is the same to all rational Beings: But nothing but Experience can assure us, that the Sentiments are the same. What Experience have we with regard to superior Beings? How can we ascribe to them any Sentiments at all? They have implanted those Sentiments in us for the Conduct of Life like our bodily Sensations, which they possess not themselves. (Letter from Hume to Hutcheson: March 16, 1740)When we ask whether morality ‘regards only human nature and human life’ we might be concerned with one of two kinds of question. We may be asking what kinds of being could share our moral point of view. What is the potential scope of the community of moral agents and assessors? Is the moral point of view essentially a human point of view? Could we, or should we, adopt a wider standpoint (say that of rational agency as such) which would leave room for a significant moral dialogue with non-human moral agents, if there are any? Alternatively, we could be asking whether only human beings should be the objects of moral concern or whether we should widen the circle of concern to include other kinds of being. We may make the same point using a helpful device of Cora Diamond's. We may be concerned with what should replace x or with what should replace y in the formula: We xs assess together conduct and character in so far as it affects ourselves and our fellow ys.

scholarly journals Expanding the Romantic Circle

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (5) ◽  
pp. 915-929
Author(s):  
Tena Thau
Keyword(s):  
Science Fiction ◽  
Short Story ◽  
Physical Attractiveness ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Principle ◽  
Moral Concern ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
The Future ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
Fiction Writer

AbstractOur romantic lives are influenced, to a large extent, by our perceptions of physical attractiveness – and the societal beauty standards that shape them. But what if we could free our desires from this fixation on looks? Science fiction writer Ted Chiang has explored this possibility in a fascinating short story – and scientific developments might, in the future, move it beyond the realm of fiction. In this paper, I lay out the prudential case for using “attraction-expanding technology,” and then consider it from a moral point of view. Using the technology would, in one respect, be morally good: it would benefit those whom prevailing beauty standards marginalize. But attraction-expanding technology also raises a moral concern – one that can be cast in non-harm-based and harm-based terms. I argue that the non-harm-based objection should be rejected, because it is incompatible with a moral principle central to queer rights. And the harm-based objection, I argue, is outweighed by the benefits of attraction-expanding technology, and undermined by the prerogative you have over your personal romantic choices. I conclude by considering whether, from the perspective of society, the development of attraction-expanding technology would be desirable.

Poetry?

2021 ◽  
pp. 364-380
Author(s):  
Floris Bernard ◽  
Kristoffel Demoen
Keyword(s):  
Social Contexts ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Wide Sense ◽  
Spiritual Dimension ◽  
The Social ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View ◽  
The Difference

This chapter gives an overview of how Byzantines conceptualized “poetry.” It argues that from the Byzantine point of view, poetry only differs from prose in a very formal way, namely that it is written in verse. Both prose and poetry belonged to the category of logoi, the only label that was very frequently used, in contrast to the term “poetry,” which was reserved for the ancient poetry studied at schools. Many authors considered (and exploited) the difference between their own prose texts and poems as a primarily formal one. Nevertheless, poetry did have some functions that set it apart from prose, even if these features are for us less expected. The quality of “bound speech” gained a spiritual dimension, since verse was seen as a restrained form of discourse, also from a moral point of view. Finally, the chapter gives a brief overview of the social contexts for which (learned) poetry was the medium of choice: as an inscription, as paratext in a wide sense, as a piece of personal introspection, as invective, as summaries (often of a didactic nature), and as highly public ceremonial pieces.

A Dialogue on Compassion and Supererogation in Medicine

1995 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 415-425 ◽  
Author(s):  
David C. Thomasma ◽  
Thomasine Kushner
Keyword(s):  
Point Of View ◽  
Moral Point ◽  
Moral Point Of View

According to Frankena, “the moral point of view is what Alison Wilde and Heather Badcock did not have.” Most of us, however, are not such extreme examples. We are capable of the moral point of view, but we fail to take the necessary time or make the required efforts. We resist pulling ourselves from other distractions to focus on the plight of others and what we might do to ameliorate their suffering. Perhaps compassion is rooted in understanding what it is that connects us with others rather than what separates us, and rests on developing sufficient awareness, to internalize what our actions, or lack of them, mean in the lives of others.

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