R&D intensity, firm performance and the identification of the threshold: fresh evidence from the panel threshold regression model

2010 ◽  
Vol 42 (3) ◽  
pp. 389-401 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ming-Liang Yeh ◽  
Hsiao-Ping Chu ◽  
Peter J. Sher ◽  
Yi-Chia Chiu
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Regression Model ◽  
Threshold Regression ◽  
Threshold Regression Model ◽  
Panel Threshold Regression

scholarly journals Does managerial ownership reduce agency cost in Taiwan? A panel threshold regression analysis

2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 119-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Feng-Li Lin ◽  
Tsangyao Chang
Keyword(s):  
Regression Analysis ◽  
Regression Model ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Utilization Efficiency ◽  
Managerial Ownership ◽  
Threshold Regression ◽  
Corporate Ownership ◽  
Threshold Regression Model ◽  
Panel Threshold Regression

Two agency theories have dominated the corporate ownership debate, the convergence of interest and the entrenchment hypothesis. Following the work of Ang et al. (2000) and Sing and Davidson (2003) to a panel of 266 Taiwanese listed companies for the 1996-2006 period, we adopt an advanced panel threshold regression model to determine whether managerial ownership reduces agency costs. We find when managerial ownership is less than 36.55% or greater than 59.06%, consistent with the entrenchment hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership decreases asset utilization efficiency by 0.32% and 0.5%, respectively. However, managerial ownership is between 51.35% and 59.06%, consistent with the convergence of interest hypothesis, a 1% increase in the managerial ownership increases asset utilization efficiency by 0.21%

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