scholarly journals The norm of assertion: a ‘constitutive’ rule?

Inquiry ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Neri Marsili
Keyword(s):  
Constitutive Rule

Can Groups Assert That P?

2019 ◽  
pp. 326-344
Author(s):  
Deborah Tollefsen
Keyword(s):  
Common Ground ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Single Individual ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
The Past ◽  
Group Members ◽  
The Common ◽  
Declarative Statement ◽  
John Macfarlane

When a group or institution issues a declarative statement, what sort of speech act is this? Is it the assertion of a single individual (perhaps the group’s spokesperson or leader) or the assertion of all or most of the group members? Or is there a sense in which the group itself asserts that p? If assertion is a speech act, then who is the actor in the case of group assertion? These are the questions this chapter aims to address. Whether groups themselves can make assertions or whether a group of individuals can jointly assert that p depends, in part, on what sort of speech act assertion is. The literature on assertion has burgeoned over the past few years, and there is a great deal of debate regarding the nature of assertion. John MacFarlane has helpfully identified four theories of assertion. Following Sandy Goldberg, we can call these the attitudinal account, the constitutive rule account, the common-ground account, and the commitment account. I shall consider what group assertion might look like under each of these accounts and doing so will help us to examine some of the accounts of group assertion (often presented as theories of group testimony) on offer. I shall argue that, of the four accounts, the commitment account can best be extended to make sense of group assertion in all its various forms.

High-Temperature Constitutive Behavior of Austenitic Stainless Steel for Weld Residual Stress Modeling

2012 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dongxiao Qiao ◽  
Wei Zhang ◽  
Zhili Feng
Keyword(s):  
Residual Stress ◽  
Finite Element ◽  
Stainless Steel ◽  
High Temperature ◽  
Residual Stresses ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
Dissimilar Metal ◽  
Weld Residual Stress ◽  
Dissimilar Metal Weld ◽  
Metal Weld

Weld residual stress is a major driving force for initiation and growth of primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC), which is a critical challenge for weld integrity of reactor pressure vessel nozzles in nuclear industry. Predicting weld residual stresses for the purpose of understanding and mitigating PWSCC requires the knowledge of material constitutive rule especially strain hardening behavior over a wide range of temperatures. Though it is adequate for describing deformation at low temperature, the conventional, rate-independent, elastic-plastic constitutive rule falls short in predicting the strong microstructure-mechanical interaction such as the softening due to recovery (dislocation annihilation and realignment) and recrystallization at elevated temperature in welding. To quantify the extent of softening under temperature and strain conditions relevant to welding, a framework has been developed by combining advanced experimental techniques and finite element modeling. First, physical simulation in a Gleeble testing machine is used to simulate the temperature transients typical of dissimilar metal weld by subjecting round tensile bar shaped specimens to rapid heating and cooling. Second, the digital image correlation (DIC) technique is used to map the non-uniform strain field and extract local strain history needed for accurately determining the true stress vs. true strain curve of softened material. Third, the thermally-mechanically processed specimens are characterized metallographically to correlate the microstructure changes to the measured stress-strain behavior. Finally, a thermal-stress finite element model of three-bar frame is used to study the effect of softening on the predicted weld residual stresses. As a first step toward developing the much-needed, comprehensive material constitutive relation database for dissimilar metal weld, the framework has been applied to study AISI 304L austenitic stainless steel. The extent of softening due to different duration of high-temperature exposure is studied and its influence on final residual stresses is discussed.

Constitutive Rules and Agency

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk Ludwig
Keyword(s):  
Activity Pattern ◽  
Activity Patterns ◽  
Activity Type ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
Intentional Activity

Chapter 7 first analyzes the concept of a constitutive rule in terms of essentially intentional activity patterns. Then it defines a form of constitutive agency in terms of that. Finally, it contrasts the account with John Searle’s. The rules of chess are constitutive rules. Following them brings into existence a type of activity that would not exist otherwise. The rules define an activity pattern that can be instantiated unintentionally. The rules are followed when it is instantiated intentionally. Thus constitutive rules are constitutive relative to an activity type defined as the intentional instantiation of a pattern of activity. Constitutive rules make available a form of constitutive agency in which what an agent does intentionally contributes constitutively to bringing about an essentially intentional activity type. Searle says constitutive rules have the form ‘X counts as Y in C’. But these instead define certain moments in activities governed by constitutive rules.

scholarly journals Assertion: The Constitutive Rule Account and the Engagement Condition Objection

Erkenntnis ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Bräuer
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
Philosophical Review ◽  
Oxford University ◽  
Oxford University Press

AbstractMany philosophers, following Williamson (The Philosophical Review 105(4): 489–523, 1996), Williamson (Knowledge and its Limits, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000), subscribe to the constitutive rule account of assertion (CRAA). They hold that the activity of asserting is constituted by a single constitutive rule of assertion. However, in recent work, Maitra (in: Brown & Cappelen (ed). Assertion: new philosophical essays, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), Johnson (Acta Analytica 33(1): 51–67, 2018), and Kelp and Simion (Synthese 197(1): 125–137, 2020a), Kelp and Simion (in: Goldberg (ed) The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2020b) aim to show that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, asserting is not an activity constituted by a single constitutive rule and that therefore CRAA is very likely false. To reach this conclusion, they all present a version of what can be dubbed the engagement condition objection. That is, they each propose a necessary condition on engaging in rule-constituted activities. Then they argue that, for all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion proposed in the literature, one can make assertions without satisfying this condition. In response, I present a counterexample that shows that the proposed engagement conditions lead to counterintuitive results, and I propose an alternative that better captures our intuitions. Then I argue that this alternative engagement condition is compatible with all the most popular versions of the constitutive rule of assertion.

Assertion

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guiming Yang ◽  
Sanford C. Goldberg
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Language ◽  
Speech Acts ◽  
Common Ground ◽  
Speech Act ◽  
Great Length ◽  
Lottery Ticket ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
Explicit Content ◽  
The Common ◽  
The One

In the past two to three decades, most of the philosophical attention that has been paid to the speech act of assertion aims to characterize the nature of the act. A first question that is pursued concerns where the speech act of assertion fits within the domain of assertives (the category speech acts in which a proposition is presented-as-true). Simply put, assertions are those assertive speech acts in which the speaker advances a claim. But what is it to perform this sort of speech act? What is the nature of the act? Philosophers have proposed six main answers. These include the attitude view (which characterizes the nature of the act in terms of its role in expressing belief), the grammatical view (on which assertion is picked out by the vehicles used to make acts of this kind, namely, declarative sentences), the common ground view (where assertion is understood in terms of its essential effect on a conversation’s common ground), the commitment view (where assertion is characterized in terms of the kind of commitment that is engendered or reconfirmed by the performance of acts of this type), the constitutive rule view (according to which assertions are individuated by the distinctive rule that governs acts of this type) and the no-assertion view (which holds that there is no unique, interesting speech act type picked out by ‘assertion’). Of these six views, the one that has received the most attention (both critical and supportive) is the constitutive rule view. Such a view has been developed (and criticized) at great length. A leading version of the constitutive rule view is the view that the rule in question requires that one assert only what one knows. The main considerations offered in defense of this version of the view include its role in explaining various features of our assertoric practice, including the paradoxicality of assertions of sentences of the form ‘p, but I do not know that p’, its role in explaining why propositions expressed with, for example, ‘My lottery ticket lost’ are not properly assertable on merely probabilistic grounds (even when the odds of one’s winning are arbitrarily small) and its role in explaining why ‘How do you know?’ is a proper response to an assertion (even when the assertion’s explicit content has nothing to do with the speaker’s knowledge). However, many authors have responded to these arguments for the knowledge rule, finding them unconvincing. Interestingly, a great amount of attention has also been devoted to forging connections between the speech act of assertion and a variety of other topics of philosophical interest. These include topics in philosophy of language (pragmatics, semantics), epistemology (the epistemology of testimony, the epistemology of disagreement, the nature of epistemic authority, the division of epistemic labor), metaphysics (the nature of future contingents, modality), ethics (the ethics of assertion; what we owe to each other as information-sharing creatures) and social and political philosophy (various forms of epistemic injustice, silencing).

Lying, Acting, and Asserting

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ishani Maitra
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
Way Of Thinking

This chapter defends the intent-to-deceive conception of lying against the challenge posed by bald-faced lies. It argues that bald-faced lies aren’t lies, because they’re not assertions. The chapter begins by arguing that lies must be assertions. Next, it sketches a view of assertion according to which a constitutive rule of asserting is being responsive to evidence in a particular way. Then, focusing on two well-known examples of bald-faced lies, it argues that those speakers don’t assert anything; rather, they do something more like what an actor does. The argument thus removes an important objection to the intent-to-deceive tradition. It also offers a different way of thinking about lying. Defenders of bald-faced lies sometimes describe them as attempts to ‘go on record’. This chapter defends an alternate view according to which lying involves taking a kind of (epistemic) responsibility for the content of one’s utterance.

The constitutive rule of a round table

1994 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 167-190
Author(s):  
Rodica Amel
Keyword(s):  
Round Table ◽  
Constitutive Rule ◽  
Analytical Instruments ◽  
Constitutive Norms

'What is the dialogical way to episteme?' and 'What chances has a commentary to approach correctly this question? ' constitute the author's problems in presenting and discussing the collective volume (On) Searle on Conversation. The contributors — along with Searle and the author of this essay — are involved in a discussion about discussion, whose constitutive norms are examined. In order to reduce the 'staging' distance between the critical act and the object of criticism, some of the analyzed concepts are transformed into analytical instruments.

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