Solidarity, but without limits? - Australia and the debate on the US missile defense plans

2002 ◽  
Vol 30 (6) ◽  
pp. 637-643
Author(s):  
Martina Glebocki ◽  
Alexander Wicker
Keyword(s):  
2004 ◽  
Vol 103 (674) ◽  
pp. 280-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
James E. Auer ◽  
Robyn Lim

There are signs that Japan will assume the geostrategic role of the ‘new South Korea’-a leverage point against China. Missile defense in particular will transform the us-Japan relationship into a ‘normal’ alliance, taking it in directions not hitherto contemplated.


Author(s):  
D. V. Streltsov

The article examines recent trends in the development of the US-Japan political and defense alliance, including the sphere of operational planning and coordination. A special attention is drawn to the problem of interaction between the two countries in the area of Ballistic Missile Defense, the problem of procurement American fighters F-35, as well as the issue of relocation of the Futemma base in Okinawa. The author reviews the results of the recent US-Japan Summit, held in Washington on April 30, 2012.


Author(s):  
J. Yu. Parshkova

The article reflects the US officials' point of view on the development of its national missile defense. The major threat to international security is the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. The United States and the former Soviet Union made huge efforts to reduce and limit offensive arms. However, presently the proliferation of ballistic missiles spreads all over the world, especially in the Middle East, because of the ballistic missile technology falling into the hands of hostile non-state groups. Missile defenses can provide a permanent presence in a region and discourage adversaries from believing they can use ballistic missiles to coerce or intimidate the U.S. or its allies. With the possible attack regional missile defense systems will be promptly mobilized to enhance an effective deterrent. The ultimate goal of such large-scale missile defense deployment is to convince the adversaries that the use of ballistic missiles is useless in military terms and that any attack on the United States and its allies is doomed to failure. The United States has missile defense cooperative programs with a number of allies, including United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, Israel, Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, Czech Republic, Poland, Italy and many others. The Missile Defense Agency also actively participates in NATO activities to maximize opportunities to develop an integrated NATO ballistic missile defense capability. The initiative of the development of US BMD naturally belongs to the United States. That country has enormous technological, financial, economic, military and institutional capabilities, exceeding by far those of the other NATO members combined.


Author(s):  
V. B. Kashin

China is currently the only member of the UN Security Council that is actively increasing the quality and quantity of its nuclear potential. Exactly how far China is willing to go in developing its nuclear forces remains a subject of discussion. The prevailing view is that China is seeking to implement a limited increase in its nuclear arsenal in order to secure the potential for a guaranteed re taliation in the face of the US continuously improving its missile defense systems. Since late 1990s, the development of air and naval forces of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been a subject of increased attention both in Asia and in the world at large. Nuclear potential was not perceived as a priority for China’s development of its military power and remained in the background. However, the events of recent years have shown that the world does not quite realize the true scale of China’s efforts in creating strategic nuclear forces. At this point, it can be perceived as a fait accompli that China has managed to implement most of its long-term program for the modernization of its nuclear forces without attracting too much attention from other major countries and, above all, from the world’s sole superpower.


Author(s):  
James Cameron

This chapter shows how Richard Nixon and his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, were forced to change their strategy for nuclear arms control based on the collapse of the US congressional consensus behind nuclear superiority. Nixon entered office with strong convictions on the importance of nuclear superiority for supporting the United States’ national security commitments. Nixon also saw US technological advantages in ballistic missile defenses as one of the main bargaining chips to cap the growth of Soviet offensive forces at the upcoming Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This strategy for détente was thrown into disarray, however, when Congress signaled its lack of support for a new ballistic missile defense system and the strategy of nuclear superiority. Nixon and Kissinger then changed tack, attempting to conclude a quick arms limitation agreement through backchannel negotiations with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. This initiative failed, weakening the American hand at the formal talks.


Author(s):  
F. Basov

This paper offers the analysis of German Policy towards the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and creating of the European Missile Defence System. Special attention is given to a dislocation of the US Tactical Nuclear Weapon (TNW) in Germany, its policy towards nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, the evolution of German stand on the European Missile Defence project.


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