Consistency Among Intentions and the ‘Simple View’

1996 ◽  
Vol 26 (4) ◽  
pp. 515-522 ◽  
Author(s):  
Steven Sverdlik
Keyword(s):  

What is the relation between the intention to A and doing A intentionally? It is natural to suppose that the latter entails the former. That is, it is natural to accept what Michael Bratman has called the ‘Simple View’ of the relation between acting intentionally and having an intention. Bratman is one noteworthy writer who has denied that the Simple View is true. In the present paper I do not defend this view. I contend that one well-known argument that Bratman offers for thinking that the Simple View is false fails, in fact, to disprove it. If there are reasons for thinking that the Simple View is false, as I believe there are, they are not the ones that Bratman has offered. My discussion of Bratman also raises some more general questions about the principles governing the rational formation of intentions. I suggest that a special sort of example casts doubt on the tenability of a commonly accepted principle that Bratman, among others, utilizes.

2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit

Abstract Michael Tomasello explains the human sense of obligation by the role it plays in negotiating practices of acting jointly and the commitments they underwrite. He draws in his work on two models of joint action, one from Michael Bratman, the other from Margaret Gilbert. But Bratman's makes the explanation too difficult to succeed, and Gilbert's makes it too easy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 31 (1) ◽  
pp. 81-120
Author(s):  
’Mampolokeng ’Mathuso Mary-Elizabet Monyakane

AbstractThe Prima facie view regarding the admissibility of admissions, as evidence, in criminal matters is that, to admit admissions as evidence, the court requires a single consideration as to whether the admission was made freely and voluntarily. Without too much ado, the simple view to this understanding presupposes that admission of an admission as evidence against its maker is of a lesser danger compared to the admission of a confession. The admissibility of confessions against their makers does not come as easily as that of admissions. There are many prescribed requirements to satisfy before confessions are admitted as evidence. This comparison has led to a questionable conclusion that requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity equated to the requirements for the admission of confessions. This paper answers the question whether an inference that the requirements for the admissibility of admissions are of a less complexity compared to the requirements for the admission of confessions is rational? It equates this approach to the now done away with commonwealth states rigid differentiation perspective. In the 1800s the commonwealth states, especially those vowing on the Wigmorian perspective on the law of evidence, developed from a rigid interpretation of confessions and admissions and adopted a relaxed and wide definitions of the word, “confession.” To this extent there was a relaxed divide between confessions and admissions hence their common classification and application of similar cautionary rules. The article recounts admissibility requirement in section 219A of the South African Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (CPA) (Hereinafter CPA). It then analyses Section 219A of the CPA requirement in the light of the rationale encompassing precautions for the admission of confessions in terms of 217(1) of the CPA. It exposes the similarities of potential prejudices where confessions and admissions are admitted as evidence. It reckons that by the adherence to this rigid differentiation perspectives of confessions and admissions which used to be the practice in the commonwealth prior the 1800s developments, South African law of evidence remains prejudicial to accused persons. To do away with these prejudices this article, recommends that section 219A be amended to include additional admissibility requirements in section 217(1). In effect it recommends the merging of sections 217(1) and 219A of the CPA.


2021 ◽  
Vol 90 ◽  
pp. 102044
Author(s):  
Brenda A. Wawire ◽  
Benjamin Piper ◽  
Xinya Liang

2017 ◽  
Vol 51 ◽  
pp. 293-302 ◽  
Author(s):  
Connie Suk-Han Ho ◽  
Mo Zheng ◽  
Catherine McBride ◽  
Lucy Shih Ju Hsu ◽  
Mary M.Y. Waye ◽  
...  

1983 ◽  
Vol 91 (3) ◽  
pp. 369-376 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Stanford

Nocardial taxonomy, like that of other actinomyeete genera, has undergone all the viscissitudes of doubt associated with years of inadequate and sometimes inappropriate methodology. This is reflected by the great expansion of species names allocated to the genus over the first two thirds of this century (Buchanan, Holt & Lessel, 1966), followed by the contraction achieved in the list of approved bacterial names in 1980 (Skerman, McGowan & Sneath, 1980). Created by Trevisan in 1889 for five species, modern taxonomists would now allocate some 20 species to the genus, including only one of Trevisan's original five species (Table 1). As an actinomycetc genusNocardiahas suffered from two particular disadvantages. First in having an apparently distinctive nocardioform morphology on the basis of which organisms were referred to this genus long after crude morphology lost its importance in many other genera. Second in having an unfortunate type species,Nocardia farcinica, with no really well accredited type strain.


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