scholarly journals Price competition in the Hotelling model with uncertainty on costs

Optimization ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 64 (11) ◽  
pp. 2477-2493 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alberto A. Pinto ◽  
Telmo Parreira
2021 ◽  
Vol 2021 ◽  
pp. 1-5
Author(s):  
Xiaofeng Chen ◽  
Qiankun Song

This paper investigates the location game of two players in a spoke market with linear transportation cost. A spoke market model has been proposed, which is inspired by the Hotelling model and develops two-player games in price competition. Using two-stage (position and price) patterns and the backward guidance method, the existence of price and location equilibrium results for the position games is proved.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (8) ◽  
pp. 24-26
Author(s):  
Haiyang Hou ◽  
◽  
Chunyu Zhao ◽  

This paper conducts a study on the competition of service and price under the circumstances of duopoly in the Hotelling linear market, of which the results indicate that the unit variable cost of service level upgrade is large, the service investment undertaken by each firm is insufficient. Besides, we have also taken the situation of government price regulation into consideration, showing that proper price regulation is available to stimulate investment, and the government can apply regulated prices to effectively controlling the level of investment in services.


2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raphael Boleslavsky ◽  
Christopher Cotton ◽  
Haresh B. Gurnani
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
W. Jason Choi ◽  
Kinshuk Jerath ◽  
Miklos Sarvary

2004 ◽  
Author(s):  
Paddy V. Padmanabhan ◽  
Ivan P. L. Png

Author(s):  
Peter Scott

The vacuum cleaner was an archetypal new economy product of the early twentieth century. It offered both major time savings and qualitative advantages over previous household cleaning methods—the brush, broom, and manual carpet sweeper—and was sold in a novel way (by household demonstration). The direct sales techniques pioneered by vacuum manufacturers in the United States were to have a profound impact on the way vacuums were sold in Britain, and globally. Yet by 1939 their household diffusion was relatively slow compared to refrigerators or washing machines. This chapter explores why the industry evolved a structure based on high prices, high cost distribution methods (door-to-door sales), and a strong emphasis on non-price competition, based on differentiation through features. It also shows how door-to-door selling eventually came to constitute both a key firm-level competitive advantage and a substantial industry-level constraint on product diffusion.


Author(s):  
A. Bërdëllima

AbstractWe study a variation of the duopoly model by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). Firms limited by their capacity of production engage in a two stage game. In the first stage they commit to levels of production not exceeding their capacities which are then made common knowledge. In the second stage after production has taken place firms simultane- ously compete in prices. Solution of this sequential game shows that the unique Cournot equilibrium outcome as in Kreps and Scheinkman is not always guaranteed. However the Cournot outcome is still robust in the sense that given sufficiently large capacities this equilibrium holds. If capacities are sufficiently small, firms decide to produce at their full capacity and set a price which clears the market at the given level of output.


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