Two-Player Location-Price Game in a Spoke Market with Linear Transportation Cost

This paper investigates the location game of two players in a spoke market with linear transportation cost. A spoke market model has been proposed, which is inspired by the Hotelling model and develops two-player games in price competition. Using two-stage (position and price) patterns and the backward guidance method, the existence of price and location equilibrium results for the position games is proved.

Service-enhancement Investments and Price Competition in a Hotelling Model

This paper conducts a study on the competition of service and price under the circumstances of duopoly in the Hotelling linear market, of which the results indicate that the unit variable cost of service level upgrade is large, the service investment undertaken by each firm is insufficient. Besides, we have also taken the situation of government price regulation into consideration, showing that proper price regulation is available to stimulate investment, and the government can apply regulated prices to effectively controlling the level of investment in services.

LICENSING BY OUTSIDE INNOVATOR IN HOTELLING MODEL REVISITED

This paper extends Banerjee and Poddar [Banerjee, S and S Poddar (2019). ‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator. Economic Modelling, 76, 293–304] by lifting the cap on per unit royalty rates in the cases of royalty licensing and two-part tariff licensing. We reconsider the optimal technology licensing contract by an outside innovator facing two heterogeneous licensees in a standard Hotelling framework. Our findings show that the optimal licensing policy could be fixed fee to the efficient firm, or two-part tariff to both firms (pure royalty to both firms), or two-part tariff to the efficient firm, depending upon the cost differentials between the firms and the size of innovation.

Rating Regulatory Mechanism Effect Promotion under the Environmental Issuance Effects: Based on the Incentive Difference Hotelling Model

Issuance effects are regarded as one of the most important aspects referring to the regulatory guidelines of green corporate bond ratings. This paper developed a new incentive difference Hotelling model, considering four major factors, i.e., the direct effect of issuance, the indirect effect of issuance, the reputation of rating agencies and the regulatory penalties. In this model, how the direct effect and the indirect effect impact the dual rating mechanism and the integrated rating mechanism was discussed. Numerical experiments were conducted to explore the regulatory effects on the two defined mechanisms in different situations. The results demonstrate that under each mechanism, the direct and indirect effects of issuance indirectly improve the effectiveness and efficiency of regulation by increasing the environmental benefit information content in the rating information, and the indirect effect has a greater impact. Moreover, it provides specific recommendations for the design of a regulatory regime. JEL: G18, G2.