Attentional guidance in singleton search: An examination of top-down, bottom-up, and intertrial factors

2008 ◽  
Vol 16 (8) ◽  
pp. 1078-1091 ◽  
Author(s):  
Carly J. Leonard ◽  
Howard E. Egeth
2005 ◽  
Vol 93 (1) ◽  
pp. 337-351 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kirk G. Thompson ◽  
Narcisse P. Bichot ◽  
Takashi R. Sato

We investigated the saccade decision process by examining activity recorded in the frontal eye field (FEF) of monkeys performing 2 separate visual search experiments in which there were errors in saccade target choice. In the first experiment, the difficulty of a singleton search task was manipulated by varying the similarity between the target and distractors; errors were made more often when the distractors were similar to the target. On catch trials in which the target was absent the monkeys occasionally made false alarm errors by shifting gaze to one of the distractors. The second experiment was a popout color visual search task in which the target and distractor colors switched unpredictably across trials. Errors occurred most frequently on the first trial after the switch and less often on subsequent trials. In both experiments, FEF neurons selected the saccade goal on error trials, not the singleton target of the search array. Although saccades were made to the same stimulus locations, presaccadic activation and the magnitude of selection differed across trial conditions. The variation in presaccadic selective activity was accounted for by the variation in saccade probability across the stimulus–response conditions, but not by variations in saccade metrics. These results suggest that FEF serves as a saccade probability map derived from the combination of bottom-up and top-down influences. Peaks on this map represent the behavioral relevance of each item in the visual field rather than just reflecting saccade preparation. This map in FEF may correspond to the theoretical salience map of many models of attention and saccade target selection.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aniruddha Ramgir ◽  
Dominique Lamy

When we search for an object, our performance is strongly influenced by our past experience. In the lab, this influence has been demonstrated by investigating a variety of phenomena, including inter-trial priming, statistical learning and reward history, and collectively referred to as selection history. The resulting findings have led researchers to claim that selection history guides attention, thereby challenging the prevailing dichotomy, according to which attentional priority is determined solely by top-down goals and bottom-up salience. The objective of the present review is to reexamine this claim by evaluating the evidence that specifically pertains to the role of selection history in attentional guidance, rather than in later processes occurring after the target is found. We focus on one selection history phenomenon, priming of pop-out (PoP). After demarcating the conditions under which PoP effects can be dissociated from top-down effects, we review the relevant findings, while distinguishing between the main experimental rationales adopted to address this question. We conclude that despite some inconsistencies that should be resolved by further research, most of the extant empirical evidence does not support the idea that PoP affects attentional priority. We call for similar reevaluations of other selection history phenomena and caution against burying the bottom-up vs. top-down dichotomy too hastily.


2021 ◽  
pp. 096372142098440
Author(s):  
Moshe Bar

The involvement of top-down processes in perception and cognition is widely acknowledged by now. In fields of research from predictions to inhibition, and from attentional guidance to affect, a great deal has already been charted. Integrating this newer understanding with accumulated findings from the past has made it clear that human experience is determined by a combination of both bottom-up and top-down processes. It has been proposed that the ongoing balance between their relative contribution affects a person’s entire state of mind, an overarching framework that encompasses the breadth of mental activity. According to this proposal, state of mind, in which multiple facets of mind are clumped together functionally and dynamically, orients us to the optimal state for the given circumstances. These ideas are examined here by connecting a broad array of domains in which the balance between top-down and bottom-up processes is apparent. These domains range from object recognition to contextual associations, from pattern of thought to tolerance for uncertainty, and from the default-mode network to mood. From this synthesis emerge numerous hypotheses, implications, and directions for future research in cognitive psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.


PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2005 ◽  
Vol 50 (19) ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Cole
Keyword(s):  
Top Down ◽  

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