Attentional Guidance and Match Decisions Rely on Different Template Information During Visual Search

When searching for a target object, we engage in a continuous “look-identify” cycle in which we use known features of the target to guide attention toward potential targets and then to decide whether the selected object is indeed the target. Target information in memory (the target template or attentional template) is typically characterized as having a single, fixed source. However, debate has recently emerged over whether flexibility in the target template is relational or optimal. On the basis of evidence from two experiments using college students ( Ns = 30 and 70, respectively), we propose that initial guidance of attention uses a coarse relational code, but subsequent decisions use an optimal code. Our results offer a novel perspective that the precision of template information differs when guiding sensory selection and when making identity decisions during visual search.

Visual search guidance uses coarser template information than target-match decisions

When searching for an object, we use a target template in memory that contains task-relevant information to guide visual attention to potential targets and to determine the identity of attended objects. These processes in visual search have typically been assumed to rely on a common source of template information. However, our recent work (Yu, et al., in press) argued that attentional guidance and target-match decisions rely on different information during search, with guidance using a “fuzzier” version of the template compared to target decisions. However, that work was based on the special case of search for a target amongst linearly separable distractors (e.g., search for an orange target amongst yellower distractors). Real-world search targets, however, are infrequently linearly separable from distractors, and it remains unclear whether the differences between the precision of template information used for guidance compared to target decisions also applies under more typical conditions. In four experiments, we tested this question by varying distractor similarity during visual search and measuring the likelihood of attentional guidance to distractors and target misidentifications. We found that early attentional guidance is indeed less precise than that of subsequent match decisions under varying exposure durations and distractor set sizes. These results suggest that attentional guidance operates on a coarser code than decisions, perhaps because guidance is constrained by lower acuity in peripheral vision or the need to rapidly explore a wide region of space while decisions about selected objects are more precise to optimize decision accuracy.

Imagine, and you will find – Lack of attentional guidance through visual imagery in aphantasics

Aphantasia is the condition of reduced or absent voluntary imagery. So far, behavioural differences between aphantasics and non-aphantasics have hardly been studied as the base rate of those affected is quite low. The aim of the study was to examine if attentional guidance in aphantasics is impaired by their lack of visual imagery. In two visual search tasks, an already established one by Moriya (Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 80(5), 1127-1142, 2018) and a newly developed one, we examined whether aphantasics are primed less by their visual imagery than non-aphantasics. The sample in Study 1 consisted of 531 and the sample in Study 2 consisted of 325 age-matched pairs of aphantasics and non-aphantasics. Moriya’s Task was not capable of showing the expected effect, whereas the new developed task was. These results could mainly be attributed to different task characteristics. Therefore, a lack of attentional guidance through visual imagery in aphantasics can be assumed and interpreted as new evidence in the imagery debate, showing that mental images actually influence information processing and are not merely epiphenomena of propositional processing.

From Objects to Unified Minds

The involvement of top-down processes in perception and cognition is widely acknowledged by now. In fields of research from predictions to inhibition, and from attentional guidance to affect, a great deal has already been charted. Integrating this newer understanding with accumulated findings from the past has made it clear that human experience is determined by a combination of both bottom-up and top-down processes. It has been proposed that the ongoing balance between their relative contribution affects a person’s entire state of mind, an overarching framework that encompasses the breadth of mental activity. According to this proposal, state of mind, in which multiple facets of mind are clumped together functionally and dynamically, orients us to the optimal state for the given circumstances. These ideas are examined here by connecting a broad array of domains in which the balance between top-down and bottom-up processes is apparent. These domains range from object recognition to contextual associations, from pattern of thought to tolerance for uncertainty, and from the default-mode network to mood. From this synthesis emerge numerous hypotheses, implications, and directions for future research in cognitive psychology, psychiatry, and neuroscience.

Stimulus-driven updating of long-term context memories in visual search

Visual search for a target is faster when the spatial layout of nontarget items is repeatedly encountered, illustrating that learned contextual invariances can improve attentional selection (contextual cueing). This type of contextual learning is usually relatively efficient, but relocating the target to an unexpected location (within otherwise unchanged layouts) typically abolishes contextual cueing. Here, we explored whether bottom-up attentional guidance can mediate the efficient contextual adaptation after the change. Two experiments presented an initial learning phase, followed by a subsequent relocation phase that introduced target location changes. This location change was accompanied by transient attention-guiding signals that either up-modulated the changed target location (Experiment 1), or which provided an inhibitory tag to down-modulate the initial target location (Experiment 2). The results from these two experiments showed reliable contextual cueing both before and after the target location change. By contrast, an additional control experiment (Experiment 3) that did not present any attention-guiding signals together with the changed target showed no reliable cueing in the relocation phase, thus replicating previous findings. This pattern of results suggests that attentional guidance (by transient stimulus-driven facilitatory and inhibitory signals) enhances the flexibility of long-term contextual learning.

Drifting and Directed Minds: The Significance of Mind-Wandering for Mental Agency

Perhaps the central question in action theory is this: what ingredient of bodily action is missing in mere behavior? But what is an analogous question for mental action? I ask this: what ingredient of active, goal-directed thought is missing in mind-wandering? My answer: attentional guidance. Attention is guided when you would feel pulled back from distractions. In contrast, mind-wandering drifts between topics unchecked. My unique starting point motivates new accounts of four central topics about mental action. First, its causal basis. Mind-wandering is a case study that allows us to tease apart two causes of mental action––guidance and motivation. Second, its experiential character. Goals are rarely the objects of awareness; rather, goals are “phenomenological frames” that carve experience into felt distractions and relevant information. Third, its scope. Intentional mind-wandering is a limit case of action where one actively cultivates passivity. Fourth, my theory offers a novel response to mental action skeptics like Strawson.

The state of memory-matched distractor in working memory influence the visual attention

Information in working memory (WM) can guide visual attention towards matched features. While recent work has suggested that cognitive control can act upon WM guidance of visual attention, little is known about how the state of memorized items retaining in WM contribute to its influence over attention. Here, we disentangle the role of inhibition and maintenance on WM-guided attention with a novel delayed match-to-sample dual-task. The results showed that active inhibition facilitated searching by diminishing sensory processing and deterring attentional guidance, indexed by an attenuated P1 amplitude and unaffected N2pc amplitude, respectively. By contrast, active maintenance impaired searching by attentional guidance while sensory processing remained unimpaired, indexed by an enhanced N2pc amplitude and unchanged P1 amplitude, respectively. Furthermore, multivariate pattern analyses could sucessfully decode maintenance and inhibition, suggesting that two states differed in modulating visual attention. We propose that remembered contents may play an anchoring role for attentional guidance, and the state of those contents retaining in WM may directly influence the shifting of attention. The maintenance could guide attention by accessing input information, while the inhibition could deter the shifting of attention by suppressing sensory processing. These findings provide a possible reinterpretation of the influence of WM on attention.