scholarly journals Equality, value pluralism and relevance: Is luck egalitarianism in one way good, but not all things considered?

2018 ◽  
Vol 22 (3) ◽  
pp. 318-334
Author(s):  
Tim Meijers ◽  
Pierre-Etienne Vandamme
Keyword(s):  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

Luck Egalitarianism and Relational Egalitarianism: An Internal Tension in Cohen’s Theory of Justice

2020 ◽  
Vol 42 (1) ◽  
pp. 219-240
Author(s):  
Jiangjin Chen
Keyword(s):  
Social Relationships ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Theory Of Justice ◽  
Egalitarian Ethos

AbstractRelational Egalitarianism focuses on the construction of equal social relationships between persons. It strongly opposes luck egalitarianism, which understands equality as a distributive ideal. In Cohen’s theory of justice, luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism simultaneously exist, and Cohen provides arguments corresponding to each. In this paper, we explore the manifestation of tension between these two forms of egalitarianism in his theory. In addition, we also reconstruct some possible solutions provided by Cohen to soften this tension, including the three approaches of market mechanism, egalitarian ethos and value pluralism, and find them to be unsuccessful. This tension is a serious challenge that needs to be addressed in Cohen’s theory of justice.

A Critical Study on Dworkin’s Luck Egalitarianism

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 151-173
Author(s):  
Joo-Hyun KIM ◽  
Hyeon-cheol Kim 
Keyword(s):  
Critical Study ◽  
Luck Egalitarianism

Inheritance and Luck

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Halliday
Keyword(s):  
Luck Egalitarianism ◽  
Mediating Effects ◽  
Inherited Wealth ◽  
Luck Egalitarian

This chapter reviews and criticizes varieties of the luck egalitarian conception of justice. It begins with the ‘naïve’ distinction between choice and circumstance, on which inequalities are permissible insofar as they depend on the former rather than the latter. The bulk of the chapter discusses more sophisticated versions of luck egalitarianism, which either supplement the naïve view with some countervailing principle (e.g. by appeal to personal prerogatives) or by constraining its scope (e.g. by focusing on the mediating effects of institutions). Later parts of the chapter evaluate other contemporary oppositions to inherited wealth grounded in interpretations of reciprocity and a concern about the role of inheritance in enabling freeriding. The chapter ends with a discussion of Ronald Dworkin’s views, which bear a formal resemblance to the position defended in the following two chapters.

Value Pluralism and Monotheism

2014 ◽  
Vol 7 (4) ◽  
pp. 818-840
Author(s):  
George Crowder
Keyword(s):  
Modern Society ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Isaiah Berlin ◽  
A Value ◽  
Religious Accommodation ◽  
Pluralist Approach

AbstractHow far can monotheism be reconciled with the pluralism characteristic of modern societies? In this article, I focus on the “value pluralism” of Isaiah Berlin, which I suggest captures a deeper level of plurality than Rawls's more familiar version of pluralism. However, some critics have objected that Berlinian pluralism is too controversial an idea in which to ground liberalism because it is profoundly at odds with the monotheism professed by so many citizens of a modern society. I argue that monotheists can be value pluralists as long as they do not insist that their faith is superior to all others. This pluralist position is exemplified by elements of the interfaith movement, according to which many religions are recognized as having roughly equal value. I also argue that a value-pluralist approach to religious accommodation, if it can be achieved, may be more stable than the uneasy combination of disapproval and restraint involved in the more orthodox solution to conflict among religions, toleration.

William James, ‘A Certain Blindness’ and an Uncertain Pluralism

1996 ◽  
Vol 40 ◽  
pp. 33-45
Author(s):  
Anthony Skillen
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
Way Of Life ◽  
Moral Duties

‘Pluralism’ may be an ambiguous term. But it is not the multitude of the word's meanings but the multitude of sorts of thing that ‘pluralists’ might be claiming to be not-single-but-plural that generates unclarity about what any ‘pluralist’ position amounts to. Take ethics: a ‘pluralist’ might be maintaining, as against say an ethical hedonist of a Benthamite sort, that there is more than one sort of thing ‘good in itself. Another ‘pluralist’ might maintain that there is more than one sort of life that counts as a ‘good way of life’. Or that not all moral duties are forms of the duty to be truthful. Or that there is more than one framework in terms of which experiences, actions or lives can properly be assessed. There is a problem in understanding what it is that is supposed to be counted: one-or-many of what? While the value today of William James’s popular essays in what we might now call ‘value pluralism’ far exceeds their role in illustrating this difficulty, they do exemplify it. James of course described himself as a ‘pluralist’; he was on the flagship of that movement. But just to what extent and in what respects remains unclear.

scholarly journals Social Psychology and Social Justice: Dilemmas, Dynamics, and Destinies

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Gergen
Keyword(s):  
Social Psychology ◽  
Social Justice ◽  
Current Work ◽  
Value Pluralism ◽  
History Of

The emergence of this handbook on social justice represents a groundbreaking event in the history of social psychology. In this summary discussion, I outline significant limits to social justice work embedded in the empiricist tradition of inquiry and point to ways in which the current work transcends these limits. However, I also view the present endeavors as in a fledgling state. In the service of enriching and rendering these pursuits more effective, I discuss five domains in which tensions currently prevail and suggest directions for future undertakings. Challenges are discussed in terms of epistemological schisms, presumed ontologies, value pluralism, explanatory paradigms, and the limits of representationalism. A final invitation is made to shift from a mirroring orientation to research to world-making.

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