Corporate governance and carbon emissions performance: empirical evidence from Australia

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance quality and capital structure of firms listed on the S&P/TSX composite index between 2009 and 2012. Using an aggregate corporate governance index, this study finds support for the outcome hypothesis, which argues that capital structure is an “outcome” of corporate governance quality. Governance quality is found to be positively associated with firms’ leverage. Firms with lower governance quality have lower leverage as these firms’ managers do not like to have only little free cash flow leftover or have extra constraints imposed by debt financing. In contrast, firms with higher governance quality are more leveraged because these firms have lower agency costs and thus lower cost of debt financing. As a result, they can take on more debts. The empirical evidence from this study illuminates important links between governance quality and financing decisions of firms.

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TATA KELOLA DAN KINERJA KEUANGAN BADAN USAHA MILIK NEGARA (BUMN) GO PUBLIC PERIODE 2014-2018

Nominal Barometer Riset Akuntansi dan Manajemen ◽

10.21831/nominal.v10i1.32792 ◽

2021 ◽

Vol 10 (1) ◽

pp. 82-101

Author(s):

Andika Dwi Pradito ◽

Axel Giovanni ◽

Devi Wahyu Utami

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Linear Regression ◽

Financial Performance ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Audit Committee ◽

Stock Exchange ◽

Analytical Tool ◽

Board Independence ◽

Government Ownership ◽

Board Size

Abstrak: Tata Kelola Dan Kinerja Keuangan Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) Go Public Periode 2014-2018. Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk memberikan bukti empiris mengenai pengaruh tata kelola perusahaan terhadap kinerja keuangan Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) yang terdaftar di Bursa Efek Indonesia (BEI) selama periode 2014-2018. Sampel penelitian yang memenuhi kriteria berjumlah 12 Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN). Alat analisis yang digunakan adalah regresi linear. Hasil penelitian memberikan bukti mengenai urgensi komite audit dalam tata kelola perusahaan. Penelitian ini juga menunjukan bahwa board size, board independence serta kepemilikan pemerintah tidak memiliki peran dalam menjelaskan variabilitas kinerja keuangan Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN).Kata kunci: Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN), kinerja keuangan, tata kelola perusahaanAbstract: Governance and Financial Performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) Go Public Period 2014-2018. This study aims to provide empirical evidence regarding the effect of corporate governance on the financial performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) during the 2014-2018 period. Research samples that met the criteria totaled 12 State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN). The analytical tool used is linear regression. The results of the study provide evidence of the urgency of the audit committee in corporate governance. This study also shows that board size, board independence, and government ownership do not have a role in explaining the variability in the financial performance of SOEs.Keywords: corporate governance, financial performance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs)

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Can compensation committees effectively mitigate the CEO horizon problem? The role of co-opted directors

Accounting Research Journal ◽

10.1108/arj-11-2019-0213 ◽

2020 ◽

Vol 34 (1) ◽

pp. 1-21

Author(s):

Ruonan Liu

Keyword(s):

Corporate Governance ◽

Research And Development ◽

Empirical Evidence ◽

Design Methodology ◽

Ceo Compensation ◽

Content Type ◽

Horizon Problem ◽

Accruals Management ◽

Compensation Committees

Purpose This study aims to examine whether compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in mitigating the CEO horizon problem. Design/methodology/approach The author uses a sample of 7,280 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2011. Findings In this study, the author finds evidence of opportunistic research and development (R&D) reduction and accruals management in firms with retiring CEOs and compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors. Moreover, it is found that R&D reduction and income-increasing accruals are less discouraged when determining the compensation for retiring CEOs by compensation committees that are dominated by co-opted directors. The results suggest that compensation committees dominated by co-opted directors are less effective in adjusting CEO compensation to mitigate the CEO horizon problem. Originality/value The study reveals that co-opted directors are weak monitors. Moreover, the study adds empirical evidence to the debate of organizations’ CEO horizon problem. Finally, the study adds to the literature on corporate governance, revealing that compensation committees play an important role in mitigating an organization’s CEO horizon problem by adjusting CEO compensation.

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