The political economy of subsidiarity in labour market reforms: the United Kingdom and Italy in times of crises

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 172-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rosa Mulé
2019 ◽  
Vol 60 (3) ◽  
pp. 579-599
Author(s):  
Jon Burnett ◽  
Fidelis Chebe

Abstract Charging regimes and the extraction of revenue are integral components of immigration control in the United Kingdom. However, while these have been analysed in their individual guises, to date, there has been little substantive analysis bringing these regimes together and locating them at the centre of its enquiry. Drawing on data obtained through the Freedom of Information Act 2000, this paper consequently examines the functions of charging regimes as a distinct form of statecraft, focussing its attention on UK Visas and Immigration fees and charges, carrier sanctions, charges related to accessing services and civil penalties administered though immigration enforcement. Analysing their historical roots and their contemporary prevalence, it suggests that they contribute to the political economy of financial power, which has significant implications for understandings of criminalization and immigration enforcement.


2019 ◽  
Vol 97 (4) ◽  
pp. 133-151
Author(s):  
Goranka Rocco

The article illustrates and compares some of the persuasive strategies of the political and entre­preneurial discourse on labour market flexibilization in different contexts: within the political discourse on labour market reforms and on socio-democratic/leftist basic values, and within the entrepreneurial communication and self-presentation (job advertisements, annual relations, per­sonnel manager guides).


2000 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 288-316 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna Gambles

It is striking that historians of the early nineteenth century have been relatively reluctant to consider relationships between economic policy and the consolidation of the British state. In today's context, the economic and political challenges posed by both European integration and resurgent nationalism have generated hotly contested controversies on the political economy of state formation. From the perspective of the United Kingdom, the prospect of political and administrative devolution has forced us to address the implications of political decentralization for regional economic development (and vice versa) and to consider in turn the impact of these dynamics on the political integrity of a multinational state. For Britain, the period between circa 1780 and 1850 was characterized by unprecedented economic growth, imperial crisis and acquisition, and political consolidation. In a metropolitan sense the most dramatic feature of this process was, of course, the creation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in 1800. Insofar as historians of early nineteenth-century Britain have examined the relationship between “state formation” and economic policy, however, they have tended to focus on the ideas, politics, and pressures surrounding the retreat of the state from economic intervention. Thus in more general accounts it became axiomatic that the nineteenth-century state shrank progressively from social and economic intervention, liberating commerce, and resting the fiscal system on secure but modest direct taxation.More recently, the relationship between the concept of “laissez-faire” and British state formation has been dramatically revised and refined by Philip Harling and Peter Mandler.


2019 ◽  
Vol 24 (4) ◽  
pp. 487-507 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrea Ceron ◽  
Sergio Splendore ◽  
Thomas Hanitzsch ◽  
Neil Thurman

Political economy suggests that media owners try to influence the process of media production by providing career incentives to like-minded journalists and adjusting the level of professional autonomy granted to them. Accordingly, we analyze whether the political distance between editors and journalists (i.e., reporters) affects the careers of journalists in terms of rank and salary, as well as their perceived professional autonomy. We hypothesize that editors reward and allow freedom to journalists whose political viewpoints coincide more precisely with their own. Political proximity to editors should lead to a better salary and rank for reporters and to a stronger perception of editorial autonomy among reporters. We tested our hypotheses through statistical analysis using data from the Worlds of Journalism Study. We analyzed the answers of 3,087 journalists interviewed between 2012 and 2016 in six European countries: Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The results support our hypotheses. The analysis reveals a polarization of media outlet editors, and robust results were achieved via a measure of political proximity that takes into account the particular influence of left-leaning and right-leaning editors. Such partisan leaning, however, seems less relevant in countries belonging to Hallin and Mancini’s Atlantic model.


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