Assisted Death

Taking Life ◽  
2015 ◽  
pp. 143-163
Author(s):  
Torbjörn Tännsjö
Keyword(s):  
Author(s):  
L. W. Sumner
Keyword(s):  

Some critics have argued that the concept of dignity has outlived whatever usefulness it ever had, at least in bioethics. However, the concept of dignity has the annoying habit of turning up on both sides of the debate about the ethics and legality of physician-assisted death. This chapter distinguishes two conceptions of dignity: a thick one (commonly invoked by the pro side), which is derived from the experiences of patients at the end of life, and a thin one (often utilized by the anti side), which is rooted in a Kantian ethic. The chapter then provides reasons for preferring the former to the latter.


2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 184-189 ◽  
Author(s):  
William McClelland ◽  
Ewan C. Goligher
Keyword(s):  

Death Studies ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 1-10
Author(s):  
Rosanne Beuthin ◽  
Anne Bruce ◽  
Marney Thompson ◽  
A. E. (Betty) Andersen ◽  
Sarah Lundy
Keyword(s):  

2020 ◽  
pp. 096973302096677
Author(s):  
Michael Wilson ◽  
Marie Wilson ◽  
Suzanne Edwards ◽  
Lynette Cusack ◽  
Richard Wiechula

Background: Legal assisted dying is a rare event, but as legalisation expands, requests for it will likely increase, and the nurse most often receives the informal, initial request. Objectives: To assess the effects of attitude in interaction with normative and control beliefs on an intention to respond to a request for legal assisted dying. Ethical considerations: The study had the lead author’s institutional ethics approval, and participants were informed that participation was both anonymous and voluntary. Methodology: This was a cross-sectional correlational study of 377 Australian registered nurses who completed an online survey. Generalised linear modelling assessed the effects of independent variables against intended responses to requests for legal assisted dying. Results: Compared to nurses who did not support legal assisted dying, nurses who did had stronger beliefs in patient rights, perceived social expectations to refer the request and stronger control in that intention. Nurses who did not support legal assisted dying had stronger beliefs in ethics of duty to the patient and often held dual intentions to discuss the request with the patient but also held an intention to deflect the request to consideration of alternatives. Discussion: This study advances the international literature by developing quantified models explaining the complexity of nurses’ experiences with requests for an assisted death. Attitude was operationalised in interaction with other beliefs and was identified as the strongest influence on intentions, but significantly moderated by ethical norms. Conclusion: The complex of determinants of those intentions to respond to requests for an assisted death suggests they are not isolated from each other. Nurses might have distinct intentions, but they can also hold multiple intentions even when they prioritise one. These findings present opportunities to prepare nurses in a way that enhances moral resilience in the face of complex moral encounters.


2001 ◽  
Vol 49 (2) ◽  
pp. 153-161 ◽  
Author(s):  
Karen Blank ◽  
Julie Robison ◽  
Erin Doherty ◽  
Holly Prigerson ◽  
James Duffy ◽  
...  

2010 ◽  
Vol 182 (12) ◽  
pp. 1330-1331
Author(s):  
V. Cellarius
Keyword(s):  

2013 ◽  
Vol 18 (6) ◽  
pp. 539-555 ◽  
Author(s):  
John S. Westefeld ◽  
Domonique Casper ◽  
Adam M. Lewis ◽  
Christopher Manlick ◽  
Wendy Rasmussen ◽  
...  

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-31
Author(s):  
Jordan MacKenzie ◽  
Adam Lerner

Abstract Typical philosophical discussions of physician-assisted death (“pad”) have focused on whether the practice can be permissible. We address a different question: assuming that pad can be morally permissible, how far does that permission extend? We will argue that granting requests for pad may be permissible even when the pad recipient can no longer speak for themselves. In particular, we argue against the ‘competency requirement’ that constrains pad-eligibility to presently-competent patients in most countries that have legalized pad. We think pad on terminally ill, incapacitated patients can be morally permissible in cases where advance directives or suitable surrogate decision-makers are available, and should be legally permissible in such cases as well. We argue that this view should be accepted on pain of inconsistency: by allowing surrogate decision-makers to request withdrawal of life-sustaining care on behalf of patients and by allowing patients to request pad, we rule out any plausible justification for imposing a competency requirement on pad.


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