Title II: The Program Structure of Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance

Author(s):  
Andrew W. Dobelstein
Author(s):  
Janet L. Lowder ◽  
Mary B. McKee ◽  
Lisa M. Montoni

2012 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 179-195
Author(s):  
Monika Bütler ◽  
Lukas Inderbitzin ◽  
Jonathan F. Schulz ◽  
Stefan Staubli

AbstractAs in many other countries, means tested benefits constitute an important part of the Swiss old age security system and disability insurance. In contrast to universal benefits, such targeted transfers are intended to only support the ones in need and thereby lead to low level of public expenses. However, individuals face strong incentives at various stages in life to adapt their behavior in order to become eligible. Using the Swiss Erg¨anzungsleistungen as an example, we argue that means tested benefits increase the incentive to apply for disability benefits, raise the attractiveness of early retirement, and induce individuals to favor a lump sum payment over an annuity. Moreover, they decrease the incentive to purchase private long-term care insurance.


2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-197
Author(s):  
Wieteke Conen ◽  
Karin Schulze Buschoff

In this article we compare solo self-employment in Germany and the Netherlands. We identify parallels and differences in the structure of solo self-employment and examine to what extent self-employment is related to a precarious situation in terms of earnings and social security. The results show that solo self-employed workers are relatively vulnerable in terms of income and disability insurance in both countries. As compared to the Netherlands, German solo self-employed workers seem to have a higher risk of precariousness, particularly in terms of income and poverty in old age. The article concludes with recommendations for action that follow from the findings.


Author(s):  
Gary Burtless

Without congressional action, the Social Security reserve fund will be exhausted by 2035. When that occurs, benefit payments must be cut by one-fifth. To avoid that outcome, Congress must agree on a reform plan that boosts revenues, cuts pensions, or does both. The choice of a reform strategy should depend on voters’ support for the goals of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program and evidence about the program’s effectiveness in achieving those goals. This article explains the aims of the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) program, briefly describes how the program attempts to achieve those aims, and considers evidence on whether the goals have been achieved and at what cost. It then considers alternative reforms that address OASI’s main problem, namely, the long-term shortfall in program revenues compared with pension commitments. It concludes by identifying the reforms that seem best suited to achieving OASI’s core aims while conforming to voter preferences.


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