Extraterritorial Collective Security: The European Union and Operation ARTEMIS

At a time when Africa is strengthening its attractiveness, acquiring its own story and arousing the interest of new partners, and when Europe is going through an important economic and institutional crisis, what can the new bases for cooperation between the European Union and the African Union be? The Abidjan summit in November 2017 offered an opportunity to reflect on the achievements of bi-regional cooperation between Africa and Europe in the field of migration, peace and security. It emphasized the priority of education, support for sustainable and inclusive development, and multi-sector cooperation, stating that all of them be carried out within the framework of horizontal cooperation favouring reciprocal Africa-European Union contributions. However, one must be aware of the constraints, weighing on both partners, which hinder implementation of the agreed strategies.

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24 Arts. 23 et seq. GG: International Integration

German Constitutional Law ◽

10.1093/law/9780198808091.003.0024 ◽

2019 ◽

Cited By ~ 1

Author(s):

Bumke Christian ◽

Voßkuhle Andreas

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Federal Republic ◽

Federal Republic Of Germany ◽

The European Union ◽

Collective Security ◽

International Integration ◽

Eu Integration ◽

Federal Constitutional ◽

The Relationship ◽

The Eu

This chapter discusses the relevant provisions of Art. 23 et seq. of the Grundgesetz (GG) with regard to the international integration of the Federal Republic of Germany. Art. 23 establishes a special constitutional basis for Germany's participation in the founding of the European Union. Art. 23 para. 1 s. 2 GG contains a provision on authorisation to transfer sovereign powers, whereas Art. 23 para. 1 s. 1 includes a ‘structural safeguard clause’ which imposes limits on legislation integrating Germany into the EU. The chapter examines the Federal Constitutional Court's jurisprudence concerning Germany's integration into the EU, with emphasis on issues such as transfer of sovereign powers, the relationship between EU law and national law, and limits on the legislature when passing EU integration laws. It also considers the provision allowing Germany to enter into a collective security system, focussing on the limits on sovereign rights.

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Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union

International Organization ◽

10.1017/s0020818309990105 ◽

2009 ◽

Vol 63 (4) ◽

pp. 789-810 ◽

Cited By ~ 24

Author(s):

Han Dorussen ◽

Emil J. Kirchner ◽

James Sperling

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Rank Correlation ◽

Burden Sharing ◽

The European Union ◽

Collective Security ◽

Security Governance ◽

Eu Member States ◽

Policy Domain ◽

Joint Product ◽

Product Models

AbstractThis article compares European Union (EU) burden-sharing in security governance distinguishing between assurance, prevention, protection, and compellence policies. We employ joint-product models and examine the variation in the level of publicness, the asymmetry of the distribution of costs and benefits, and aggregation technologies in each policy domain. Joint-product models predict equal burden-sharing for protection and assurance because of their respective weakest-link and summation aggregation technologies with symmetric costs. Prevention is also characterized by the technology of summation, but asymmetry of costs implies uneven burden-sharing. Uneven burden-sharing is predicted for compellence because it has the largest asymmetry of costs and a best-shot aggregation technology. Evaluating burden-sharing relative to a country's ability to contribute, Kendall tau-tests examine the rank-correlation between security burden and the capacity of EU member states. These tests show that the smaller EU members disproportionately shoulder the costs of assurance and protection; wealthier EU members carry a somewhat disproportionate burden in the provision of prevention, and larger EU members in the provision of compellence. When analyzing contributions relative to expected benefits, asymmetric marginal costs can largely explain uneven burden-sharing. The main conclusion is that the aggregated burden of collective security governance in the EU is shared quite evenly.

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SECURITY IN EURASIA: STRATEGIES AND PRACTICE

National Security and Strategic Planning ◽

10.37468/2307-1400-2018-2-2-34-40 ◽

2018 ◽

pp. 34-40

Author(s):

T Musienko ◽

V Lukin

Keyword(s):

European Union ◽

Comparative Analysis ◽

The European Union ◽

Collective Security ◽

Present Stage ◽

Illegal Migration ◽

Defense Strategy ◽

Security Treaty ◽

The Military

The article presents a comparative analysis of the strategies of the European Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization for the period up to 2025. Their fundamental differences are revealed. The necessity of strengthening the military component of the CSTO defense strategy at the present stage and the fight against illegal migration is substantiated.

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