scholarly journals Transaksi Pihak Berelasi: Kompensasi Manajemen Kunci, Kinerja Akuntansi, dan Multiple Large Shareholders

2020 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 877
Author(s):  
Gandy Wahyu Maulana Zulma ◽  
Fitri Chairunnisa ◽  
Azolla Degita Azis
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Financial Accounting ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Accounting Performance ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Research Period ◽  
Positive Effect

The aim of this study is to examine whether multiple large shareholders held by the company can affect the relation between accounting performance and executive compensation, using panel data of all publicly company in Indonesia (except financialand mining industries) with the research period 2017-2019. The result shows that the existence of 2nd largest shareholders that owns more than 10% stocks and also if the board has representation from 2nd largest shareholders in the company, it can reduce the positive effect of accounting performance to executive compensation. This research findings could be as an additional literature in financial accounting and corporate governance area, and also for practitioners in Indonesia that if a firm has good controlling function from multiple large shareholders, it can reduce the opportunistic discretion from executive management if the company has performance evaluation based on earnings.

Culture and Law in Corporate Governance

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amir N. Licht
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Cultural Analysis ◽  
Corporate Law ◽  
Cultural Dimensions ◽  
Dividend Distribution ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Findings ◽  
Corporate Social ◽  
The Relationship

This chapter explores the relationship between culture and law, especially corporate law, and its implications for corporate governance. It begins with an overview of the basic concepts in cultural analysis as well as prevalent theories of cultural dimensions and of social networks as social capital. It then summarizes research findings regarding the consequences of culture for corporate governance on issues ranging from executive compensation to legal transplants and the objectives of the corporation (corporate social responsibility). It also discusses relations with investors and other stakeholders by way of disclosure and dividend distribution, along with the operation, composition, and network structure of the board of directors. Finally, the chapter considers how the relationship between culture and law affects diversity and persistence in corporate governance.

scholarly journals Framed! The Failure of Traditional Agency Cost Explanations for Executive Pay Practices

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bryce C. Tingle
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Best Practices ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Real World ◽  
Agency Cost ◽  
Board Independence ◽  
Executive Pay ◽  
History Of ◽  
Research Findings

This is the second article in a series exploring the empirical evidence arising from the increasing use of certain executive compensation best practices. The first article, “How Good Are Our ‘Best Practices’ When It Comes to Executive Compensation?” summarizes research findings that these best practices are responsible for most of the growth in executive compensation, and lead to suboptimal corporate performance. It also suggests that the best practices currently in widespread use contradict practices that are often very helpful to directors in setting appropriate incentives in real world circumstances.This article goes on to argue that failures in executive compensation are the result, not of overly powerful CEOs confronting supine boards, but rather of directors and management earnestly striving to follow bad “best practices” promulgated by the corporate governance industry. This can be seen in: (1) the pattern of cause and effect distinguishable in the history of changing North American and British pay practices; (2) the link between these questionable pay practices and various measures of board independence and managerial weakness; and (3) the increasing use of these pay practices in circumstances of increased shareholder power. The most obvious solution is to increase board autonomy in setting pay. Regulatory steps for doing so lay close at hand, and in some cases have been discussed for years.

scholarly journals Effectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring executive management: Preliminary evidence from Saudi Arabia

2019 ◽  
Vol 8 (3) ◽  
pp. 72-82
Author(s):  
Khalid Al-Adeem ◽  
Ibrahim Al-Sogair
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Saudi Arabia ◽  
Data Collection ◽  
Board Of Directors ◽  
Capital Market ◽  
Preliminary Evidence ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Effective Mechanism ◽  
The Board Of Directors ◽  
Research Findings

Elements of corporate governance must be activated at all scales for the efficient functioning of a nation’s capital market. The effectiveness of the board of directors depends on factors related to, for example, the composition of the board and its independence. This study aims to investigate empirically whether the board of directors is an effective mechanism for monitoring managers in Saudi Arabia through a survey. A questionnaire that was developed and employed by Elyas (2015) is utilized for data collection after modifying it and judging its appropriateness. We targeted individuals who had relevant experience as members of the board of directors as our respondents. Only 29 subjects took the survey. The results indicate that the respondents generally disagree with the survey items, pointing out the ineffectiveness of the board of directors in monitoring executive management. Although the subjects’ credible experience can be assumed, the generalizability of our research findings is limited because of the low number of respondents.

scholarly journals The Influence of Corporate Governance, Size, Growth and Performance to Executive Compensation (Study of Indonesian Capital Market)

2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 65
Author(s):  
I Gusti Ketut Agung Ulupui ◽  
I Gusti Ayu Made Asri Dwija Putri
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Executive Compensation ◽  
Stock Exchange ◽  
Financial Statements ◽  
Compensation Policy ◽  
Governance Practices ◽  
Size Growth ◽  
And Performance ◽  
Positive Effect ◽  
Observation Period

AbstractThe purposes of this study are as follows: (1) to determine whether executive compensation policies influenced by corporate governance practices, (2) to determine whether executive compensation policy are influenced by the size, growth and performance. This research have done in 2014 with the observation period from 2009 to 2011. The methods of collecting data in this research through the observations of the financial statements of companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange. This study used inferential statistical methods in analyzing the data that is processed by regression analysis. The results showed performance and size have the positive effect significantly on the executive compensation.AbstrakTujuan dari penelitian ini adalah sebagai berikut: (1) menentukan apakah kebijakan kompensasi eksekutif dipengaruhi oleh corporate governance (2) untuk menentukan apakah kebijakan kompensasi eksekutif dipengaruhi oleh ukuran, pertumbuhan dan kinerja. Penelitian ini telah dilakukan pada tahun 2014 dengan periode pengamatan dari tahun 2009 sampai 2011. Metode pengumpulan data dalam penelitian ini melalui pengamatan terhadap laporan keuangan perusahaan yang tercatat di Bursa Efek Indonesia. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode statistik inferensial dalam menganalisis data yang diolah dengan analisis regresi. Hasilnya menunjukkan kinerja dan ukuran memiliki efek positif secara signifikan terhadap kompensasi eksekutif.

The Integration of ERM and Strategy: Implications for Corporate Governance

2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 69-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Therese R. Viscelli ◽  
Dana R. Hermanson ◽  
Mark S. Beasley
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Implementation Process ◽  
Structured Interviews ◽  
Executive Management ◽  
Strategic Direction ◽  
Strategic Value ◽  
Enterprise Risk ◽  
Leadership Structure ◽  
Risk Oversight

SYNOPSIS Since the early 2000s, expectations have increased for organizations to strengthen corporate governance with enterprise risk management (ERM) processes, with the accounting profession playing a major role in these efforts. The ultimate goal of an effective ERM process is to help boards and senior executives to manage risks in the context of strategy so that the organization is more likely to achieve its key objectives. We conduct semi-structured interviews of 15 ERM champions to provide insights about whether the ERM process is integrated with the strategic-planning and execution processes of the firm. We find that while the decision to launch ERM often is based on a desire for ERM to provide strategic value, the integration of ERM with strategy typically is limited. We then examine the ERM implementation process to identify possible ERM implementation practices limiting ERM's integration with strategy. We find that organizations' (1) culture and approach to preparing for ERM's launch, (2) ERM leadership structure, and (3) management of key risks appear to limit the intersection of ERM and strategy. Our summary of key findings highlights important considerations for boards of directors, executive management, and auditors as they assess the effectiveness of their risk oversight efforts in overseeing the strategic direction of the enterprise.

scholarly journals The Effect of Multiple Large Shareholders on Banks’ Profitability and Risk

2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
pp. 1888
Author(s):  
Maria Gaia Soana ◽  
Laura Barbieri ◽  
Andrea Lippi ◽  
Simone Rossi
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Commercial Banks ◽  
Banking Sector ◽  
Positive Impact ◽  
Corporate Structure ◽  
Academic Literature ◽  
Large Shareholders ◽  
Bank Ownership ◽  
Institutional Shareholders

The wide-ranging academic literature on corporate governance in the banking sector includes only a few studies on bank ownership and, specifically, on the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate structure. This paper reports an investigation into the presence of multiple large shareholders and their influence on profitability and risk in the long-term, considering a sample of 697 U.S. and European listed commercial banks from 2008 to 2018. It was found that the number of large and institutional shareholders has a positive impact on profitability, but no effect on risk. However, long-term ownership by multiple large shareholders contributes to decreasing risk in banks.

scholarly journals Corporate governance and IPO underpricing: evidence from the italian market

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuele Teti ◽  
Ilaria Montefusco
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Initial Public Offering ◽  
Boards Of Directors ◽  
Stock Option ◽  
Board Members ◽  
Ipo Underpricing ◽  
Italian Market ◽  
Public Offering ◽  
The Impact ◽  
Positive Effect

AbstractThis paper aims to analyse the impact of firms’ corporate governance characteristics on the degree of first-day returns (i.e., underpricing) in the Italian initial public offering (IPO) market. In particular, this work investigates the impacts of the characteristics of boards of directors (BoDs) and ownership structure on the underpricing of newly offered shares. By studying a sample of 128 Italian IPOs between 2000 and 2016, it is concluded that corporate governance characteristics affect the degree of first-day returns following a company’s IPO. More specifically, the size of the BoD negatively affects underpricing, while the ownership of institutional investors and board members has a positive effect on the degree of underpricing. Conversely, no significant evidence is found with regard to board independence, the number of female directors in the boardroom, the implementation of stock option plans and ownership concentration.

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