Development of Judgment, Decision Making, and Rationality

Author(s):  
Maggie Toplak ◽  
Jala Rizeq

There is a long tradition of studying children’s reasoning and thinking in cognitive development and education. The initial studies in the cognitive development of reasoning were motivated by Piagetian models, and developmental age was thought to bring the gradual onset of logical thinking. The introduction of heuristics and biases tasks in adults and dual process models have provided new perspectives for understanding the development of reasoning, judgment, and decision-making skills. These heuristics and biases tasks provided a way to operationalize the systematic errors that people make in their judgments. Dual process models have advanced our understanding of the basic processes implicated in both optimal and non-optimal responders on several types of paradigms, including heuristics and biases tasks and classic reasoning paradigms. Importantly, these skills and competencies are generally separable from the types of higher cognition assessed on measures of intelligence and executive function task performance. Given the history of the study of reasoning in cognitive development, there is a need to integrate our understanding across these somewhat separate literatures. This is especially true given the opposite predictions that seem to be suggested in these different research traditions. Specifically, there is a focus on increasing logical development in the classic cognitive developmental literature and alternatively, there has been a focus on systematic errors in judgment and decision-making in the study of reasoning in adults. This article provides an integration of the two aforementioned perspectives that are rooted in different empirical and historical traditions. These considerations are addressed by drawing upon their research traditions and by summarizing more recent developmental work that has investigated these paradigms.

Author(s):  
Robert Apel ◽  
Daniel S. Nagin

In theory, deterrence is a behavioral response to an individual’s perceptions about the certainty and/or severity of criminal justice sanctions. The perceptual underpinnings of compliance with the law are therefore of long-standing interest in perceptual deterrence scholarship. This chapter provides an overview of the broad scope of this scholarship. After reviewing the basic perceptual elements of crime decision-making models, attention turns to a consideration of research on the determinants of sanction perceptions. First, the overall accuracy of sanction perceptions with respect to existing statutes and penalties is discussed. Second, the degree to which an individual’s sanction perceptions are updated in response to his or her experiences as a successful or unsuccessful offender is examined. Third, the manifold research traditions speaking to situational influences on sanction perceptions are surveyed. Emerging dual-process models inspired by research on judgment and decision making are finally considered.


Author(s):  
Jean-Louis van Gelder

This chapter discusses the application of dual-process and dual-system models to offender decision making. It is argued that these models offer a more accurate account of the decision process than the traditional choice models in criminology, such as rational choice and deterrence models, and can overcome their various limitations. Specific attention is devoted to the hot/cool perspective of criminal decision making, which takes the dual-process hypothesis as a point of departure. This model is rooted in the idea that both “cool” cognition and “hot” affect, or thinking and feeling, guide behavior and that understanding their interaction is fundamental for understanding how people make criminal choices.


2017 ◽  
Vol 28 (12) ◽  
pp. 1807-1820 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel K. Walco ◽  
Jane L. Risen

Will people follow their intuition even when they explicitly recognize that it is irrational to do so? Dual-process models of judgment and decision making are often based on the assumption that the correction of errors necessarily follows the detection of errors. But this assumption does not always hold. People can explicitly recognize that their intuitive judgment is wrong but nevertheless maintain it, a phenomenon known as acquiescence. Although anecdotes and experimental studies suggest that acquiescence occurs, the empirical case for acquiescence has not been definitively established. In four studies—using the ratio-bias paradigm, a lottery exchange game, blackjack, and a football coaching decision—we tested acquiescence using recently established criteria. We provide clear empirical support for acquiescence: People can have a faulty intuitive belief about the world (Criterion 1), acknowledge the belief is irrational (Criterion 2), but follow their intuition nonetheless (Criterion 3)—even at a cost.


2018 ◽  
Vol 115 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-30 ◽  
Author(s):  
Brian M. Monroe ◽  
Bryan L. Koenig ◽  
Kum Seong Wan ◽  
Tei Laine ◽  
Swati Gupta ◽  
...  

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