American Military History: A Very Short Introduction

Author(s):  
Joseph T. Glatthaar

American Military History: A Very Short Introduction outlines the forces shaping the American military for the past 400 years. Since the colonial period, the United States has struggled to balance standing armed forces with citizen soldiers and sailors. Technological developments and two world wars forced the military to embrace professionalism and its increased obligations. The United States emerged from World War II in a strong position but failed to recognize the limits of its power, a legacy that some might say continues. Recent wars highlight some of the problems of a volunteer-dominated force. To succeed, the American military needs improved communication, understanding, and support.

2021 ◽  
Vol 52 (1) ◽  
pp. 4-8
Author(s):  
W. Howard McAlister ◽  
Jeffrey L. Weaver ◽  
Jerry D. Davis ◽  
Jeffrey A. Newsom

Optometry has made significant contributions to the United States military for over a century. Assuring good vision and eye health of soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines is critical to maximizing the military functions necessary to achieve victory. There was little organization or recognition of the profession in World War I, but optometrists were essential in achieving the mission. Recognition of the profession of optometry was still limited in World War II but it was improving, especially with commissioning as officers occurring in the Navy. Through the Korean and Vietnam Wars, optometry grew in stature and strength with all services eventually commissioning all optometrists, and Army optometrists were assigned to combat divisions. Continuing through the more recent conflicts in the middle east, the profession has continued to make an impact and has become an essential part of the armed forces of the United States. Doctors of optometry are now an integral part of the Department of Defense. The nation cannot field an effective fighting force today without the dedicated performance of these officers.


Author(s):  
Simeon Man

This chapter describes the U.S. buildup of the armed forces of allied nations in East Asia immediately following World War II, focusing in particular on South Korea. The United States justified militarization in the name of teaching Asians how to defend their newly acquired freedom from communism, and, more broadly, of building an Asia for Asians. The chapter argues that this effort carried unintended consequences, as the attempt to incorporate “free Asians” into the U.S. military empire simultaneously heightened the specter of subversive Asians within the military and in the United States in the 1950s.


1999 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 537-565 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vally Koubi

Because of the nature of modern weapons, significant innovations in arms technology have the potential to induce dramatic changes in the international distribution of power. Consider, for example, the “strategic defense initiative” (SDI), a program initiated by the United States in the early 1980s. Had the program been successfully completed, it might have led to a substantial devaluation of Soviet nuclear capabilities and put the United States in a very dominant position. It should not then come as a surprise that interstate rivalry, especially among super powers, often takes the form of a race for technological superiority. Mary Acland-Hood claims that although the United States and the Soviet Union together accounted for roughly half of the world's military expenditures in the early 1980s, their share of world military research and development (R&D) expenditures was about 80 percent. As further proof of the perceived importance of R&D, note that whereas the overall U.S. defense budget increased by 38 percent (from $225.1 billion to $311.6 billion in real terms) from 1981 to 1987, military R&D spending increased by 100 percent (from $20.97 billion to $41.96 billion). Moreover, before World War II military R&D absorbed on average less than 1 percent of the military expenditure of major powers, but since then it has grown to 11–13 percent. The emphasis on military technology is bound to become more pronounced in the future as R&D becomes the main arena for interstate competition.


2021 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 12-47
Author(s):  
Yinan Li

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.


Author(s):  
Sarah Sewall

This chapter argues that the changing character of conflict demands rethinking U S civil-military relations. The United States has long relied on a nuclear deterrent and conventional military superiority to defend itself, but its adversaries have changed the rules of the game to exploit civilian vulnerabilities in the U S homeland using non kinetic tools. To ensure continued civilian control of the military use of force and effective management of competition below the threshold of war, civilian leaders must assume greater responsibility for the political and operational management of hostilities in the Gray Zone. Because civilian leaders are underprepared for this new global competition, they will be tempted to default to conventional military solutions. Traditional civil-military frameworks did not envision permanent conflict or the centrality of civilian terrain, capabilities, and operational responsibilities. The United States needs civilian-led tools and approaches to effectively avoid the dual extremes of national immobilization in the face of non kinetic threats and inadvertent escalation of conflict without civilian authorization or intent. Civilian adaptation could also diminish the traditional role of the armed forces in defending the nation. The United States must rewire the relationship of the military and civilians through its decisions about how to manage Gray Zone competition.


Author(s):  
Jon B. Mikolashek

The chapter covers the early history of what will become known as the tank and the creation of the United States Tank Corps. Patton is the first “tanker” in American military history. After leaving the staff of John J. Pershing, Patton embarks on an educational journey to learn about tanks. He attends tank school in France and tours the Renault tank factory. It is here that he learns to drive a tank and selects the Renault light tank for use by the United States Army. The Renault tank is covered in detail, and Patton prepares to establish the American light tank school in France.


Author(s):  
Joseph T. Glatthaar

Since the 1970s, the United States has struggled to accept that its economic and military powers are finite. The Conclusion looks at ways the American military might make progress while acknowledging these limitations. The American military could be reinvigorated by better communication between politicians and military leaders, a return to traditional values of prudence and circumspection, and greater support during wartime. Technology may have transformed warfare, but enemies often find low-cost means of reducing their impact. The United States possesses the world’s most sophisticated military force, but sometimes the task is greater than it can fulfill, or the results are not worth the price.


Author(s):  
Crystal Mun-hye Baik

Korean immigration to the United States has been shaped by multiple factors, including militarization, colonialism, and war. While Koreans migrated to the American-occupied islands of Hawai’i in the early 20th century as sugar plantation laborers, Japanese imperial rule (1910–1945) and racially exclusive immigration policy curtailed Korean migration to the United States until the end of World War II. Since then, Korean immigration has been shaped by racialized, gendered, and sexualized conditions related to the Korean War and American military occupation. Although existing social science literature dominantly frames Korean immigration through the paradigm of migration “waves,” these periodizations are arbitrary to the degree that they centralize perceived US policy changes or “breaks” within a linear historical timeline. In contrast, emphasizing the continuing role of peninsular instability and militarized division points to the accumulative effects of the Korean War that continue to impact Korean immigration. With the beginning of the American military occupation of Korea in 1945 and warfare erupting in 1950, Koreans experienced familial separations and displacements. Following the signing of the Korean armistice in 1953, which halted armed fighting without formally ending the war, the American military remained in the southern half of the Peninsula. The presence of the US military in South Korea had immediate repercussions among civilians, as American occupation engendered sexual intimacies between Korean women and US soldiers. Eventually, a multiracial population emerged as children were born to Korean women and American soldiers. Given the racial exclusivity of American immigration policy at the time, the US government established legislative “loopholes” to facilitate the migrations of Korean spouses of US soldiers and multiracial children adopted by American families. Between 1951 and 1964 over 90 percent of the 14,027 Koreans who entered the United States were Korean “war brides” and transnational adoptees. Since 1965, Korean spouses of American servicemen have played key roles in supporting the migration of family members through visa sponsorship. Legal provisions that affected the arrivals of Korean women and children to the United States provided a precedent for US immigration reform after 1950. For instance, the 1952 and 1965 Immigration and Nationality Acts integrated core elements of these emergency orders, including privileging heterosexual relationships within immigration preferences. Simultaneously, while the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act “opened” the doors of American immigration to millions of people, South Korean military dictatorial rule and the imminent threat of rekindled warfare also influenced Korean emigration. As a result, official US immigration categories do not necessarily capture the complex conditions informing Koreans’ decisions to migrate to the United States. Finally, in light of the national surge of anti-immigrant sentiments that have crystallized since the American presidential election of Donald Trump in November 2016, immigration rights advocates have highlighted the need to address the prevalence of undocumented immigrant status among Korean Americans. While definitive statistics do not exist, emergent data suggests that at least 10 percent of the Korean American population is undocumented. Given this significant number, the undocumented status of Korean Americans is a critical site of study that warrants further research.


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