The Effects of Australia's Foreign Policy on Indonesia Post-Independence Timor Leste

As initially, Australia supported the integration of Timor Leste into the Republic of Indonesia, many events occurred which caused the relationship between Indonesia and Australia to be slightly disturbed. The changes that have taken place in Australia's relationship with Indonesia illustrate the real effects of Timor-Leste's independence. As a result of Australia's role in the East Timorese independence process, its relationship underwent many changes, especially in the political and military fields. The changes taking place in military relations are evident. The Agreement on Mutual Security (AMS) was released, the joint training was canceled, and the troops that used to work together became enemies. Eventually, Australian arms sales to Indonesia were stopped. Changes in the political and diplomatic sphere, including all political visits, were canceled, and politicians within Australia and Indonesia publicly denounced others. Furthermore, cooperation within the global framework is limited, and the Ambassador's 'high alert' status is. Overall, Australia's relations with Indonesia became hostile. This study aims to determine how the influence of Australian foreign policy on Indonesia after the independence of Timor Leste. This research shows that the independence of Timor Leste and Australia's role in this process directly influenced government relations between Australia and Indonesia. Most Indonesians view the Australian government's actions and policies as separate from its relationship with Australian citizens.

The Soviet Factor in the US-China Military-Technical Cooperation during the Cold War

The development of the PRC’s armed forces included three phases when their modernization was carried out through an active introduction of foreign weapons and technologies. The first and the last of these phases (from 1949 to 1961, and from 1992 till present) received wide attention in both Chinese and Western academic literature, whereas the second one — from 1978 to 1989 —when the PRC actively purchased weapons and technologies from the Western countries remains somewhat understudied. This paper is intended to partially fill this gap. The author examines the logic of the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States in the context of complex interactions within the United States — the USSR — China strategic triangle in the last years of the Cold War. The first section covers early contacts between the PRC and the United States in the security field — from the visit of R. Nixon to China till the inauguration of R. Reagan. The author shows that during this period Washington clearly subordinated the US-Chinese cooperation to the development of the US-Soviet relations out of fear to damage the fragile process of detente. The second section focuses on the evolution of the R. Reagan administration’s approaches regarding arms sales to China in the context of a new round of the Cold War. The Soviet factor significantly influenced the development of the US-Chinese military-technical cooperation during that period, which for both parties acquired not only practical, but, most importantly, political importance. It was their mutual desire to undermine strategic positions of the USSR that allowed these two countries to overcome successfully tensions over the US arms sales to Taiwan. However, this dependence of the US-China military-technical cooperation on the Soviet factor had its downside. As the third section shows, with the Soviet threat fading away, the main incentives for the military-technical cooperation between the PRC and the United States also disappeared. As a result, after the Tiananmen Square protests, this cooperation completely ceased. Thus, the author concludes that the US arms sales to China from the very beginning were conditioned by the dynamics of the Soviet-American relations and Beijing’s willingness to play an active role in the policy of containment. In that regard, the very fact of the US arms sales to China was more important than its practical effect, i.e. this cooperation was of political nature, rather than military one.

Arming a few dictators but not others: The politics of UK arms sales to Chile (1973–1989) and Argentina (1976–1983)

The United Kingdom imposed an arms embargo on Chile in 1974 but not on Argentina after the 1976 coup, despite brutal military dictatorships in both countries. What explains this difference? What can this difference reveal about the determinants of government decisions regarding arms exports? Using mainly archival evidence, this article demonstrates that this difference is explained by a stronger advocacy network in the United Kingdom campaigning on Chile, which was largely due to a greater identification of the British left with the Chilean struggle. The hub of this network was the Chile Solidarity Campaign, which mediated the influence of the transnational anti-Pinochet movement on the UK government. These findings suggest that shared values or identities make transnational issues more likely to resonate with domestic audiences. Evidence also indicates the importance of activists’ connections with gatekeepers, focus on specific arms deals, and demonstrated causal chains between arms exports and repression.

Impact of Technological Innovation, Research and Development on the Defense Economy - Iran Country

The Purpose. This research is to investigate the relationship between the variables of technological innovation, research and development costs, economic growth, sales and export of weapons and military costs in Iran for the years 2000 to 2017. Design/Methodology/Approach. In this study, we examine using Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) method to explore the estimating the impacts of technological innovation, research and development costs, economic growth, sales and export on military costs. Findings/Implications. The results of this study showed that the impact of technological innovation and research and development costs on military costs is negative in short-term and long-term. Although the effect that these two variables have on military spending in the short-term is very close, in long-term the effect that research and development costs have on military spending is far greater and more significant. Also, the impact of economic growth on Iran’s defense economy is much less than the variables of technological innovation and research and development costs. So that this effect will be less in long-term. But, the amount of arms sales and exports in the short-term has a positive effect on defense spending, but in long-term it becomes negative and increase in arms sales and exports can help Iran’s defense economy. Originality. The countries defense economy can always have positive effects on military and civilian research and development, scientific innovation and technological progress, in this condition that the country’s macroeconomics can spend military spending on research and development and support innovation and inventions. Eventually adopt arrangements that use the innovations of the defense industry in the civilian sector, which will lead to economic growth. This is the experience of many developed countries that have been able to use the technological advances and innovations of the military sector in the civilian sectors as well, and to cause the economic progress and development of their country.

Biden Administration Launches Reset in Relations with Saudi Arabia, Withdraws Support for Saudi-Led War in Yemen

The Biden administration has undertaken to reset U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia, making early moves to break with the Trump administration's policy toward the country on several key fronts. White House officials have shifted the locus of diplomatic contact between the two countries from Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, who enjoyed a close relationship with the Trump administration, to his father, King Salman. U.S. officials publicly released an intelligence report accusing Prince Mohammed of ordering the 2018 killing of Saudi dissident and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi and levied travel sanctions against seventy-six Saudi nationals in the crown prince's orbit. President Biden has also taken steps to end U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition fighting in Yemen's civil war, revoking the terrorist designation assigned to the Houthi rebels in the final days of the Trump administration and initiating a review of U.S. arms sales.

Some Democrats want Biden to do more for Palestinians

Significance Although the Democratic Party remains broadly supportive, Israel can no longer assume unconditional support from Democratic politicians amid growing disagreements between traditional party stalwarts and younger, more liberal elements. Impacts Arms sales and military aid to Israel will continue but face increasing scrutiny from some Democrats in Congress. Democrats keen to apply principles of human rights and social justice to foreign policy will not exempt traditional allies. Polls suggest that younger Jewish Americans are less likely to feel deeply connected to Israel or supportive of its government. Democrats who have criticised Israel also have condemned violence by Hamas and recent attacks on Jews in the United States.

Birds of a Feather, Do Sanctioned States Flock Together?

Despite several high-profile cases of cooperation between sanctioned states, little is understood about how being sanctioned affects target states’ incentives to cooperate with one another and what forms that cooperation might take. I theorize that sanctioned states will tend to seek out sanctions-surviving assistance from nonsanctioned states in most cases. Being sanctioned constrains how much useful assistance that sanctioned states can provide to one another, as they suffer from similar trade constraints, levels of economic turmoil, and governmental resource limitations. I test my theory's predictions that sanctioned states are less likely to cooperate with one another via two different large-n tests involving cooperation via engaging in trade-based sanctions-busting and civil nuclear cooperation. Both of these distinct tests provide strong support for my theory. The final portion of the study conducts an exploratory analysis of why sanctioned states still sometimes cooperate with one another, finding that such cooperation may involve risky or taboo transactions, like arms sales, and that sanctioned parties have incentives to keep their cooperation a secret in such cases. These findings improve our understanding of the various cooperative strategies that states employ to survive sanctions.

Russian arms sales challenged by rivals and sanctions

Significance Selling mainly to non-US allies in Asia and North Africa, Russia has been the world's second-largest arms exporter after the United States for the last decade. The 2020 dip seems attributable to COVID-19 disruption having slowed deliveries to China and India. US sanctions might also have had some effect. Impacts The path of global recovery will influence Russian arms sales: lower-income countries are in a worse position than rich ones. New sales to Myanmar will signal Moscow's political support for the military junta. Import substitution efforts to mitigate Western sanctions are still slow and may lead to shortages that impede production and exports.