An alternative translation scheme for counterpart theory

Analysis ◽  
1989 ◽  
Vol 49 (3) ◽  
pp. 131-141 ◽  
Author(s):  
M. Ramachandran
2022 ◽  
pp. 1-14
Author(s):  
Tomasz Bigaj

It is commonplace to formalize propositions involving essential properties of objects in a language containing modal operators and quantifiers. Assuming David Lewis’s counterpart theory as a semantic framework for quantified modal logic, I will show that certain statements discussed in the metaphysics of modality de re, such as the sufficiency condition for essential properties, cannot be faithfully formalized. A natural modification of Lewis’s translation scheme seems to be an obvious solution but is not acceptable for various reasons. Consequently, the only safe way to express some intuitions regarding essential properties is to use directly the language of counterpart theory without modal operators.


2020 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 153-160
Author(s):  
Elmurod Tursunov ◽  

Some inappropriatenesses and defects on the issue of equivalence and adequacy in the translated version of the novel “Navoi” by Aybek are revealed in this article. These inappropriatenesses and defects are described in great detail with the help of examples and alternative translation variants are suggested, the problems of equivalence and adequacy in translation studies are researched from the scientific point of view, as well as, views and comments of the Uzbek and foreign translators and scientists are provided on theissue of the two concepts


2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Harriet E. Baber

Abstract Modal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s possibly being F with its having a counterpart that is F at another possible world; temporal counterpart theory identifies a thing’s having been F or going to be F, with its having a counterpart that is F at another time. Benovsky, J. 2015. “Alethic Modalities, Temporal Modalities, and Representation.” Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 29: 18–34 in this journal endorses modal counterpart theory but holds that temporal counterpart theory is untenable because it does not license the ascription of the intuitively correct temporal properties to ordinary objects, and hence that we should understand ordinary objects, including persons, as transtemporal ‘worms’. I argue that the worm theory is problematic when it comes to accounting for what matters in survival and that temporal counterpart theory provides a plausible account of personal persistence.


1992 ◽  
Vol 12 (10) ◽  
pp. 4796-4805
Author(s):  
A C Prats ◽  
S Vagner ◽  
H Prats ◽  
F Amalric

Four forms of basic fibroblast growth factor (bFGF) are synthesized from the same mRNA, resulting from alternative initiations of translation at three CUG start codons and one AUG start codon. The CUG- and AUG-initiated forms have distinct intracellular localizations and can modify cell phenotypes differently, indicating that control of the alternative expression of the different forms of bFGF has an important impact on the cell. In this study, we investigated the roles of the mRNA 5' untranslated region and the alternatively translated region located between the CUG and AUG codons in the regulation of alternative translation of the different forms of bFGF. Deletions and site-directed mutagenesis were carried out in bFGF mRNA leader, and translation was studied in vitro and in vivo. The results enabled us to identify five cis-acting RNA elements (two in the 5' untranslated region and three in the alternatively translated region) involved in the regulation of either global or alternative initiation of translation. Each of these elements had a specific effect on the level of synthesis of the different forms of bFGF. Furthermore, we showed that the 5' untranslated region regulatory elements had different effects on bFGF translation, depending on the translation system used. These results suggest that bFGF translation is modulated by cis-acting elements corresponding to secondary or tertiary RNA structures, which could be the targets of cell-specific trans-acting factors.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 127-146 ◽  
Author(s):  
THEODORE SIDER

AbstractPersonal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity—such as memory and anticipation—are asymmetric and ‘count in favor of personal identity from one side only’. Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.


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