Chase, Salmon Portland (1808-1873), statesman, antislavery leader, and chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court

Author(s):  
Stephen E. Maizlish
Keyword(s):  
2006 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 198-210 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard L Vining ◽  
Christopher Zorn ◽  
Susan Navarro Smelcer

After more than a decade of membership stability, the U.S. Supreme Court experienced a pair of vacancies following its 2004–2005 term. In July 2005, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her intention to retire. It is widely believed that her own health, that of her husband, and the favorable political environment influenced her decision to step down in January 2006. In the interim, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, after struggling with ill health for many months, passed away on 3 September 2005, becoming the first sitting justice to die in more than five decades.


2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 205316802110530
Author(s):  
Miles T Armaly ◽  
Adam M Enders

Although the U.S. Supreme Court goes to great lengths to avoid the “political thicket,” it is sometimes unwittingly pulled in. We employ several experimental treatments—each of which is composed of real behaviors that took place during the Trump impeachment trial—to understand the impact of the trial on attitudes about the Court. We find that Chief Justice Roberts’ presence and behaviors during the trial failed to legitimize the proceeding and may have even harmed views of the Court. Treatments involving Roberts’ actions decreased willingness to accept Court decisions and, in some cases, negatively impacted perceived legitimacy. We also find that criticisms of the Chief Justice by Senators decreased decision acceptance. These findings clarify both the bounds of the institution’s legitimizing power and the tenuous nature of public support in times of greater Court politicization by outside actors.


2012 ◽  
Vol 9 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-84
Author(s):  
Martin D. Carrigan

In National Federation of Independent Business v. Katherine Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services, Case No. 11393, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed most of the 2010 Affordable Care Act (ACA). In holding the ACA as valid (constitutional), Chief Justice Roberts reasoned that the taxing power in the U.S. Constitution was the reason that the law was enforceable. Although a strong dissent on such reasoning was written by four other Justices, Roberts also wrote that laws are entrusted to our nations elected leaders, who can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. [1]Roberts also wrote that the Commerce Clause in the U.S. Constitution did not give Congress authority to pass the ACA. Moreover, Congress could not impose unfunded mandates on the States to expand Medicaid. In so writing, Roberts disposed of the chief arguments of those in favor of the law and provided a bone to those who opposed it. But, by then holding that Congress taxing power was sufficient to uphold the law, Roberts ignored the Federal Anti-Injunction statute and called into question the ability of the Supreme Court to hold a law passed by Congress entirely unconstitutional. By writing that, in effect, the Court should defer to Acts of Congress, Roberts attempted a finesse first exercised by Chief Justice John Marshall in Marbury v. Madison in 1803. While it may seem as if he intended to demonstrate the same legal adroitness of Marbury, instead he deferred to the wishes of Congress, going through legal gymnastics to uphold a law that many scholars saw as indefensible, and damaged the power of the Supreme Court given to it in Article III immeasurably.


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