scholarly journals Administrative Discretion, Administrative Rule-making, and Judicial Review

2017 ◽  
Vol 70 (1) ◽  
pp. 267-303 ◽  
Author(s):  
Aileen McHarg
1938 ◽  
Vol 32 (5) ◽  
pp. 926-931
Author(s):  
Kenneth C. Cole

Among the problems touched upon by the President's Committee on Administrative Management is that of the role of administrative discretion in the governmental process. Both Professor Hart and Professor Cushman have contributed to the statement of, and have suggested solutions for, this problem.1 Professor Hart is concerned with the exercise of a rule-making discretion at the administrative level, and has ably defended the exercise of this type of decision-making by personnel under the control of the Executive rather than Congress. In other words, the mere fact that administrative action takes the form of general rules does not relate it functionally to the legislative department, and once the notion that rule-making is “legislation” in a separation-of-powers sense is got out of the way, the case for a complete integration of such powers under the control of the President can be pushed through to unqualified conclusion.


2013 ◽  
Vol 51 (1) ◽  
pp. 49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vincent Kazmierski

This article discusses the role of judicial review in access to information regimes in Canada. It provides a review of recent court decisions that show how the Canadian courts are actively supervising the exercise of administrative discretion over access to information. It argues that although efforts to reform Canada’s access to information legislation have so far been met with limited success, the judiciary has provided significant and important scrutiny, providing a key means of enforcing access to information rights in Canada.


2021 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 441
Author(s):  
Andrzej Niezgoda

<p>The article is of a scientific-research nature. The author discusses the problem of limits of judicial review of discretionary decisions made by taxation authorities, which aim at applying relief in payments of tax liabilities under Polish regulations and case-law of administrative courts. It may be noted that despite the issue of administrative discretion being discussed in the academic literature, the question of limits of judicial review in the practice of administrative courts still raises doubts. It is therefore reasonable to undertake the analysis of the main views formulated in the literature and the case-law of administrative courts addressing this problem, from the point of view of the limits of judicial review of discretionary decisions. The thesis of the article is that the nature of discretionary decisions on relief in payment of tax liabilities, determined by the function of administrative discretion, and, at the same time, the criteria set out in the law for judicial review of public administration, limit the role of the administrative court in examining the compliance with procedural law of the tax proceedings preceding the issuance of such a decision and the respecting by tax authorities of the fundamental values of the system of law expressed in the Polish Constitution. This is because they define the limits of administrative discretion, within which the choice of one of the possible solutions remains beyond the judicial review of the public administration. For the law, as it stands (<em>de lege lata</em>) there are no grounds for administrative courts, provided that the tax authorities respect the basic values of the legal system expressed in the Polish Constitution, to formulate assessments as to the circumstances and reasons justifying the granting or refusal to grant a tax relief, or its scope. The concept of internal and external limits of administrative discretion may therefore be useful for administrative court rulings.</p>


Author(s):  
Margit Cohn

This chapter offers an in-depth analysis of one form of constitution-generated fuzziness – unilateral rule-making under the constitution. The bases of such powers include historically-embedded sources of power such as the British royal prerogative, uncontested long-standing practices, expansive interpretations of clauses in a written constitution such as the take-care and the Commander-in-Chief clauses in the US Constitution, and reliance on other constructs such as 'third-source' powers, 'constitutional gloss' and concepts of sovereignty. The high-level but indeterminate sources of such action typically do not demarcate the limits of such action; thus, they essentially guarantee the fuzziness so favoured by executives. The chapter considers in detail all the recognized sources for the continued existence of unilateral non-statutory powers in the two compared systems, and addresses two accepted legal constraints on their application: their subjection to statute, under the doctrine of residuality, and their subjection to judicial review.


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