scholarly journals Dynamic Effects of Co-Ethnic Networks on Immigrants’ Economic Success*

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michele Battisti ◽  
Giovanni Peri ◽  
Agnese Romiti

Abstract This paper investigates how co-ethnic networks affect the economic success of immigrants. Using longitudinal data of immigrants in Germany and including a large set of fixed effects and pre-migration controls to address the possible endogeneity of initial location, we find that immigrants in districts with larger co-ethnic networks are more likely to be employed soon after arrival. This advantage fades after four years, as migrants located in places with smaller co-ethnic networks catch up due to greater human capital investments. These effects appear stronger for lower-skilled immigrants, as well as for refugees and Ethnic Germans.

Author(s):  
S. Zhukov ◽  
V. Zelic ◽  
S. Soima

As a result of the conducted research the problems of development of human capital and basic pre-conditions of providing of his competitiveness are certain. Analyzed the loud speaker of charges on development of education and health protection of summary budget of Ukraine and measures on the improvement of economic situation in Ukraine and providing of development of human capital are offered. The basic types of investments are certain in a human capital on levels and subjects of investing. The mechanism of forming of human capital is presented. The mechanism of forming of human capital is presented. It is grounded, that for strategic development of human capital of Ukraine and achievement of equilibrium and balanced of economy in the conditions of globalization modernization of public policy is needed in area of education, namely, creation of the system of education, oriented to forming and development of skills and jurisdictions of man, necessary for innovative activity. Keywords human capital, investments in a human capital, competitiveness, economic state of affairs, payment for work.


2020 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Lucila Berniell

AbstractInformality is pervasive in many developing countries and it can affect occupational and educational decisions. Cross-country data shows that the rate of entrepreneurship as well as the gap between the skill premium for entrepreneurs and for workers increase with the size of the informal economy. Also, in countries with larger informal sectors the fraction of high-skilled individuals that choose to be entrepreneurs is larger. To explain these facts, I develop a model economy with human capital investments, occupational choice and an informal sector, in which the investment in human capital improves the efficiency of labor as well as managerial skills, and the technology to produce goods exhibits capital-skill complementarity. Model predictions can account for cross-country evidence and also shed light on the mechanisms at work when the level of informality in the economy increases. In particular, a higher level of informality discourages human capital investments for workers while it incentivizes these investments for the case of some managers, mostly informal but talented.


1987 ◽  
Vol 15 (4) ◽  
pp. 21-33
Author(s):  
Shelley I. White-Means

Migrant farmworkers are essential to the supply of low-cost agricultural produce. However, employment earnings of this vital labor force are approximately equal to the federal poverty income. This study examines the role of health capital investments in enhancing farmworker productivity and employment earnings. Health capital investments are found to have a larger marginal effect on earnings than other forms of human capital investments, such as education or experience.


2016 ◽  
Vol 20 (6) ◽  
pp. 1413-1431 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joydeep Bhattacharya ◽  
Xue Qiao ◽  
Min Wang

This paper studies the evolution of wealth inequality in an economy with endogenous borrowing constraints. In the model economy, young agents need to borrow to finance human capital investments but cannot commit to repaying their loans. Creditors can punish defaulters by banishing them permanently from the credit market. At equilibrium, loan default is prevented by imposing a borrowing limit tied to the borrower's inheritance. The heterogeneity in inheritances translates into heterogeneity in borrowing limits: endogenously, some borrowers face a zero borrowing limit, and some are partly constrained, whereas others are unconstrained. Depending on the initial distribution of inheritances, it is possible that all lineages are attracted either to the zero-borrowing-limit steady state or to the unconstrained-borrowing steady state—long-run equality. It is also possible that some lineages end up in one steady state and the rest in the other—complete polarization.


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