7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2021 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Arts 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Art 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Art 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Arts 268 and 340 TFEU); and also the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Art 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2019 ◽  
pp. 208-248
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Right ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the European Commission and other member states against a member state (Articles 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Article 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Article 265 TFEU); actions for damages (Articles 268 and 340 TFEU); and the right to plead the illegality of an EU regulation (Article 277 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Articles 278 and 279 TFEU and enforcement actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

7. The Direct Jurisdiction of the Court of Justice

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Interim Measures

This chapter considers the actions commenced before the Court of Justice. These include actions by the Commission and other member states against a member state (Arts 258–60 TFEU); judicial review of acts of the institutions (Art 263 TFEU); the action against the institutions for a failure to act (Art 265 TFEU); and actions for damages (Arts 268 and 340 TFEU). The chapter also considers interim measures under Arts 278 and 279 TFEU and actions arising from the Commission enforcement of EU competition law against individuals.

4. Direct actions in the Court of Justice of the European Union: Articles 258–260, 263, 265, 277, and 340 TFEU

2020 ◽  
pp. 65-89
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.

4. Direct actions in the Court of Justice of the European Union: Articles 258–260, 263, 265, 277, and 340 TFEU

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthew J. Homewood
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
The Eu

This chapter discusses articles in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) that provide for actions that are brought directly before the Court. Under Articles 258 and 259 TFEU (ex Articles 226 and 227 EC), respectively, the European Commission and Member States may bring enforcement proceedings against a Member State in breach of Treaty obligations. Article 260 TFEU (ex Article 228 EC) requires compliance with the Court’s judgment. Article 263 TFEU (ex Article 230 EC) concerns judicial review of EU acts. The outcome of a successful action is annulment. Article 265 TFEU (ex Article 232 EC) provides for actions against the EU institutions for failure to act.

scholarly journals Predatory Pricing: A Framework for Analysis

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 124-155
Author(s):  
Raimundas Moisejevas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Predatory Pricing ◽  
Member States ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Extensive Analysis ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Abuse Of Dominant Position

Abstract One of the key principles of EU Competition law is a prohibition of the abuse of a dominant position established in the Article 102 of the TFEU. Predatory pricing is one of the forms of the abuse of dominant position. To decide whether the dominant undertaking has referred to predatory pricing it is necessary to check several elements: costs and prices of the dominant undertaking; the possibility to recoup losses; intent; and objective justifications. The Court of Justice, the European Commission and competition institutions in most member states perform extensive analysis of a relationship between costs and prices of a dominant undertaking while dealing with cases on predatory pricing. However, we believe that competition authorities should pay more attention to evaluation and to whether pricing will cause elimination of competitors and damage to consumers. This article critically reviews the framework of the analysis of predatory pricing in the practice of the Court of Justice and the European Commission.

scholarly journals Insights from the Slovak Hybrid Mail Services Case. Case Comment to the Judgement of the General Court of 25 March 2015 and Order of Court of Justice of the EU of 30 June 2016 Slovenská pošta v Commission (Cases T-556/08, C-293/15P)

2017 ◽  
Vol 10 (16) ◽  
pp. 191-203
Author(s):  
Karolis Kačerauskas
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Judicial Review ◽  
Strange Situation ◽  
Member States ◽  
Commission Decision ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
The Eu

The Slovak hybrid mail services case (or Slovenska posta case) is truly unique in EU jurisprudence. Within the last decade, the European Commission rarely applied Article 106(1) in conjunction with Article 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions in individual cases. Thus Slovenska posta constitutes one of the rare examples of such enforcement. Slovenska posta also constitutes a very rare example of a judicial review of Commission decisions based on Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU. Slovenska posta is only the second case when European courts were called upon to review the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU by the Commission and the first when the judicial review was conducted over a Commission decision regarding “failure to meet the demand”. Indeed, since 1989–1990 (when the Commission commenced to apply Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU to challenge competition distortions introduced by the Member States) and until 2014, when the Court of Justice adopted its decision in Greek lignite (DEI) case, none of the Commission decisions was reviewed by EU courts. Such lack of appeals resulted in a rather strange situation under which the Commission and CJEU developed their own jurisprudence on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU and occasionally interpreted the same legal criteria differently. In this regard, a court review in Slovenska posta was eagerly awaited in the hope it would reconcile these diverging positions and provide more clarity on the application of Article 106(1) and 102 TFEU.

EU comitology reform could politicise regulation

2017 ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Member State ◽  
European Commission ◽  
Interest Group ◽  
European Parliament ◽  
Member States ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Eu Regulation ◽  
Regulatory Decisions ◽  
The Eu ◽  
Final Reform

Subject Proposed reform of the EU comitology procedure. Significance The little-known ‘comitology’ procedure plays a key role in EU regulation. In recent years, this process has been breaking down as member-state expert representatives in comitology committees often abstain from voting, forcing the European Commission to take controversial decisions on its own (and accept any blame for them). In response, the Commission has proposed reforms that would pressure member states to take a position on (and hence political ownership of) controversial regulatory decisions. Impacts Government representatives, interest-group representatives and corporate lobbyists will be most affected by comitology reform. Despite adding transparency and avoiding blame-shifting to Brussels, the reforms would probably not help the EU’s image with citizens. The European Parliament might demand -- as part of any final reform package -- an increase in its involvement in the comitology process.

The Role of Private Enforcement within EU Competition Law

2014 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 143-187 ◽  
Author(s):  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Hard Core ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
The Right

AbstractPrivate enforcement is an increasingly prominent element of EU competition law. The forthcoming Directive on damages actions aims to strengthen and, to a degree, harmonise procedures for private competition litigation, while recent case law of the Court of Justice reaffirms the centrality of the right to claim compensation for losses stemming from breach of the competition rules. Moreover, this right has been presented as an essentially unitary one, whereby any victim of any type of competition infringement has, in principle, the right to claim damages. This chapter reviews the evolving framework, and considers, specifically, the role for private enforcement within the overall system of EU competition law. Taking into account the Commission’s efforts to facilitate and increase private enforcement, the emerging EU public enforcement framework, as well as the substantive EU competition rules more generally, this chapter argues that, contrary to the rhetoric, private enforcement is a mechanism best adapted, and arguably most appropriate, for use only in the context of hard-core cartels. It is further suggested that the gap between rhetoric and reality is not problematic as such, yet difficulties may arise insofar as these divergences conflict with the principle of effectiveness.

scholarly journals Piecemeal Harmonisation Through the Damages Directive? Remarks on What Received Too Little Attention in Relation to Private Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 79-98
Author(s):  
Anna Piszcz
Keyword(s):  
European Commission ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Decision Makers ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Member States ◽  
European Approach ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
The Eu

On 11 June 2013, the European Commission adopted a package of measures to tackle the lack of an efficient and coherent private enforcement system of EU competition law in its Member States. In particular, a draft Damages Directive was proposed in order to meet the need for a sound European approach to private enforcement of EU competition law in damages actions. The Damages Directive was ultimately adopted on 26 November 2014. This paper explores some aspects of private antitrust enforcement which have not received sufficient attention from the EU decision-makers during the long preparatory and legislative works preceding the Directive. The paper discusses also some of the remedies that have not been harmonised, and shows how these ‘gaps’ in harmonisation may limit the Directive’s expected influence on both the thinking and practice of private antitrust enforcement in Europe. It is argued in conclusion that further harmonisation may be needed in order to actually transform private enforcement of EU competition law before national courts

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