12. The rule against hearsay III

Author(s):  
Richard Glover

Admissions and confessions are the most important common law exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Section 118(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 preserves any rule of law relating to the admissibility of admissions made by agents in criminal proceedings. This chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which discusses admissions, covering the principles of admissibility; what admissions may bind a party; and what may be proved by admission. The second part deals with confessions, covering the admissibility of confessions; the exclusion of confessions; evidence yielded by inadmissible confessions; excluded confessions as relevant non-hearsay evidence; confessions by the mentally handicapped and those otherwise impaired; the Codes of Practice and the discretionary exclusion of confessions; the use of confessions by co-accused; confessions implicating co-accused; and partly adverse (‘mixed’) statements.

Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 ◽  
pp. 99-104
Author(s):  
O. V. Kachalova ◽  

The coronavirus pandemic has put a number of legal issues on the agenda of the world community – how to ensure the rule of law in the face of the need to save the lives and health of many people, how to achieve a reasonable balance in the ratio of various human rights in a pandemic situation, how to determine the criteria for proportionality of restrictions on essential human rights. The criminal justice authorities and courts have a serious task to ensure human rights, achieve the effectiveness of criminal proceedings and access to justice in the context of the coronavirus pandemic, on the one hand, and take the necessary measures to ensure the safety of persons involved in criminal proceedings, including their own, from the threat of COVID-19 infection, on the other. Measures that restrict human rights in the context of a pandemic must be implemented in accordance with the principles of the rule of law, respect for human rights, the rule of law, legal certainty and proportionality. Proportionality can be established by determining a reasonable balance of private and public interests in each particular situation, through an assessment of the affected interests in terms of their significance. In General terms, the rights and freedoms that provide the most significant benefits are given priority. The criteria for determining a reasonable balance between private and public interests and for resolving an emerging conflict of human rights are determined taking into account the immediate circumstances of the case (the epidemiological situation, the state of health of participants in the process, the urgency and significance of the proceedings for participants in criminal proceedings and the interests of justice, the ability to ensure the necessary sanitary and epidemiological requirements). The coronavirus pandemic has put on the agenda the issue of creating a strategy for the transformation of criminal justice institutions in emergency situations, when the normal mode of criminal proceedings is impossible due to objective reasons.


2015 ◽  
Vol 79 (5) ◽  
pp. 330-343
Author(s):  
Catherine Elliott

The Crime and Courts Act 2013 has amended s. 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 on the amount of force a person can use in self-defence. The amended provision poses a dilemma for the courts: it states that only reasonable force can be used by a householder against a trespasser, but adds that force is unreasonable if it is grossly disproportionate. Until now, the courts have treated reasonable force and proportionate force as synonyms. This article suggests that the amended s. 76 should be interpreted to comply with the rule of law, incorporating the idea of equality before the law and legality. The courts should respect the traditional common law concept of reasonableness which is an impartial, objective concept that plays an important role across the whole of the criminal legal system. In addition, the article points out that the Act must be interpreted, where possible, in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights to avoid the problems that arose with the defence of lawful chastisement.


1968 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-101
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson

No expert long range forecast is needed to predict that in the near future a wind of change of a velocity and a turbulence hitherto unknown is going to sweep away many common law principles of the law of evidence regarded in the past as fundamental. In civil proceedings, the hurricane is upon us, with the thirteenth report of the Law Reform Committee, and the Civil Evidence Bill 1967, virtually providing for the abolition of the rule against first-hand hearsay and the rule against narrative, and substituting a wide discretion in the court. All the signs are that in a short time analogous reforms for criminal proceedings will be announced, and already previous statements have been rendered widely admissible by the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The object of this article is to look at the common law relating to the rule against narrative in criminal proceedings, as it is applied in England and in the United States, and to make a few comments on the procedure introduced by section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.The rule against narrative is sometimes called the rule against self-corroboration. This is misleading, in that a witness can never corroborate himself where corroboration is required by any rule of law or practice. In the thirteenth report, the first description is said to be a misnomer, but a helpful summary of the rule is given: “what the witness himself said outside the witness-box is not evidence.” Wills describes the rule in this way: “… the witness may not repeat to the Court his own previous narratives or statements concerning the relevant facts made to other persons out of Court; when he is in the witness-box he must take his mind back, directly so to speak, to the facts he is called to prove, and must give to the Court his present recollection of those facts.”


2019 ◽  
pp. 61-78
Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter focuses on evidence that is relevant but improperly obtained and thus may be excluded by judicial discretion. It looks at the exclusionary discretion contained within section 78 of the UK’s Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), and explains how common law and statutory exclusionary discretion may be exercised in relation to other areas of evidence, such as character evidence and hearsay evidence, other than confessions. The chapter also looks at the most common areas of exclusion, other than confession evidence, including breach or evasion of legislation such as PACE and the Codes of Practice. It also reviews when a stay of prosecution might be the appropriate procedure. Finally, it discusses the relevant principles of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) that are enshrined in section 78 of PACE.


Author(s):  
Martin Hannibal ◽  
Lisa Mountford

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.


Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

The Concentrate Questions and Answers series offers the best preparation for tackling exam questions. Each book includes typical questions, bullet-pointed answer plans and suggested answers, author commentary and diagrams and flow charts. This chapter concerns a complex question in criminal evidence: situations where defendants may adduce evidence of good character to suggest lack of guilt and support credibility, and those where prosecution counsel or counsel for the co-defendant may cross-examine them on previous ‘reprehensible’ behaviour. The exclusionary rule was fundamental to the English legal system and founded on the principle that the defendant should have a fair trial. The Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003 made comprehensive changes to the rules of admissibility of evidence of bad character of the defendant and witnesses providing that ‘the common law rules governing the admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal proceedings are abolished’. There is now a presumption of admissibility of that evidence.


Author(s):  
Maureen Spencer ◽  
John Spencer

This chapter, which focuses on hearsay evidence and its relationship to confessions, first considers the rule against hearsay and its application to out-of-court statements of witnesses in civil and criminal cases. It then looks at statements, both oral and written, and gestures, as well as the admissibility of hearsay in criminal proceedings under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and, in outline, in civil proceedings under the Civil Evidence Act 1995. The chapter also explains the legal distinction between first-hand (what X told Y) and multiple hearsay (what X told Y who told Z), and concludes by discussing the recent landmark decisions under Article 6(3)(d) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document