Между фактом и фантазией: ранние источники по ойратской исторической диалектологии

The article presents the results of a linguistic analysis of three early sources on Oirat historical dialectology, Rashīd al-Dīn’s Jāmiʿ al-Tawārīkh (Compendium of Chronicles, completed between 1306 and 1311) and the Mongol chronicles Sir-a tuγuǰi (Yellow History, between 1651 and 1662) and Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur (The Jewel Translucent Sūtra, c. 1607). The author concludes that these sources substantially differ in terms of their linguistic value and reliability. The early historical accounts of Oirat lexical differences, provided by Rashīd al-Dīn and the unknown author of the Sir-a tuγuǰi, are most likely to have been obtained from unreliable external sources and based on hearsay evidence, orally transmitted by non-Oirats, at best, only passingly familiar with the Oirat language and its actual features. Both authors probably heard something about distinctive lexical features of the Oirat dialects of their time, but they hardly had a clear idea of what these features were and how to explain them in an adequate manner. On the contrary, the ‘Oirat fragment’ contained in the Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur seems to be much closer to fact than to fantasy. It presents a deliberate and quite reliable attempt to introduce some features of the Oirat dialects spoken at the turn of the seventeenth century. In the absence of earlier internal evidence of the linguistic differences between the Mongolic languages, this may be the oldest known representation of dialectal data in the Mongolian literary tradition. The evidence is of special importance because it includes morphophonological (an innovative colloquial shape of the clitics ni ~ n̠i < *inu and la ~ =la < *ele) and morphosyntactic (the progressive/durative in ‑nA(y)i), rather than lexical, features, which seem to have been considered Oirat by the early seventeenth-century author(s) of the chronicle. These features look more genuinely Oirat, at least for the early 17th century, although their modern distribution is certainly rather wide and non-specific. It may be assumed that the information on Oirat dialects that the Erdeni tunumal neretü sudur contains may have been obtained from an Oirat, or, at least, from an individual well-versed in the language of the time. Thus, one cannot overestimate the importance of the chronicle as a highly valuable source on historical dialectology of Mongolic languages.

Whither, hither and thither, Res Gestae? A comparative analysis of its relevance and application

In Singapore, the common law doctrine of r es gestae (‘RG’) risks becoming extinct given the statutory inclusions of hearsay evidence. Further, the test for RG is unsettled. This article thus argues that RG is still relevant but must be applied principally. It is relevant because first, it is unwise to uproot a doctrine existing since 1808. Second, comparative analysis of cases from United Kingdom, India, New Zealand and Australia evinces the residual need for RG. Third, a modified approach to applying it can in fact exclude inadmissible evidence. This article further proposes a three-strand test. First, as a preliminary requirement, objectively, there was no concoction involved. Second, the evidence must relate to a fact-forming part of the same transaction but was not contemplated in s. 32(1) of the Evidence Act. Third, the evidence must have sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect.

33. Hearsay

This chapter considers the admissibility of and procedural matters relating to hearsay evidence in civil cases. Hearsay evidence is where a witness gives evidence of facts they have not personally experienced for the purpose of proving the truth of those facts. Hearsay may be written or oral, and may be first-hand, second-hand, etc. Evidence is no longer excluded in civil cases solely on the ground that it is hearsay. However, in practice, trial judges give limited weight to hearsay evidence.

18. Hearsay Evidence

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.

11. Hearsay Evidence

Chapter 11 discusses the law on hearsay evidence. It covers the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, now governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995; other proceedings in which the hearsay rule is inapplicable; and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.

Evidence

Andrew Choo’s Evidence provides an account of the core principles of the law of civil and criminal evidence in England and Wales. It also explores the fundamental rationales that underlie the law as a whole. The text explores current debates and draws on different jurisdictions to achieve a mix of critical and thought-provoking analysis. Where appropriate the text draws on comparative material and a variety of socio-legal, empirical, and non-legal material. This (sixth) edition takes account of revisions to the Criminal Procedure Rules, the Criminal Practice Directions, and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act Codes of Practice. It also examines in detail cases on various topics decided since the last edition was completed, or the significance of which has become clear since then, including: • Addlesee v Dentons Europe llp (CA, 2019) (legal professional privilege) • Birmingham City Council v Jones (CA, 2018) (standard of proof) • R v B (E) (CA, 2017) (good character evidence) • R v Brown (Nico) (CA, 2019) (hearsay evidence) • R v C (CA, 2019) (hearsay evidence) • R v Chauhan (CA, 2019) (submissions of ‘no case to answer’) • R v Gabbai (Edward) (CA, 2019) (bad character evidence) • R v Gillings (Keith) (CA, 2019) (bad character evidence) • R v Hampson (Philip) (CA, 2018) (special measures directions) • R v K (M) (CA, 2018) (burden of proof) • R v Kiziltan (CA, 2017) (hearsay evidence) • R v L (T) (CA, 2018) (entrapment) • R v Reynolds (CA, 2019) (summing-up) • R v S (CA, 2016) (hearsay evidence) • R v SJ (CA, 2019) (expert evidence) • R v Smith (Alec) (CA, 2020) (hearsay evidence) • R v Stevens (Jack) (CA, 2020) (presumptions) • R v Townsend (CA, 2020) (expert evidence) • R v Twigg (CA, 2019) (improperly obtained evidence) • R (Jet2.com Ltd) v CAA (CA, 2020) (legal professional privilege) • R (Maughan) v Oxfordshire Senior Coroner (SC, 2020) (standard of proof) • Serious Fraud Office v Eurasian Natural Resources Corpn Ltd (CA, 2018) (legal professional privilege) • Shagang Shipping Co Ltd v HNA Group Co Ltd (SC, 2020) (foundational concepts; improperly obtained evidence) • Stubbs v The Queen (PC, 2020) (identification evidence) • Volaw Trust and Corporate Services Ltd v Office of the Comptroller of Taxes (PC, 2019) (privilege against self-incrimination) • Volcafe Ltd v Cia Sud Americana de Vapores SA (SC, 2018) (burden of proof)

Hearsay evidence in Uganda: Understanding its meaning, admissibility and probative value

In Uganda legislation requires witnesses to adduce direct evidence in court. However, this may not be possible in all cases and the law provides for circumstances in which hearsay may be admissible. The Evidence Act is the main piece of legislation which governs the issue evidence. In this article, the author relied on 539 cases in which the Ugandan High Court, Court of Appeal and Supreme Court have dealt with hearsay evidence to establish the principles which these courts have developed on this issue. This case law shows, inter alia, that there are three major issues that Ugandan courts are still grappling with when it comes to hearsay evidence: the definition of hearsay; the admissibility of hearsay (exceptions to the hearsay rule) and the probative value of hearsay evidence. The author suggests ways in which courts can handle these issues.

18. Hearsay Evidence

Hearsay evidence in criminal cases most often arises in two situations: if a witness testifies about facts of which he has no personal knowledge because the facts were communicated to the witness by another person who is not in court; and where a witness’ written statement is put before the court because the witness is unable to attend court to give oral evidence. This chapter discusses the general rule of hearsay evidence; identifying hearsay evidence; statutory exceptions to the hearsay rule; hearsay evidence under the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 2003; hearsay admissible under the preserved common law rules; procedure for admitting hearsay evidence; and hearsay evidence and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 1950.

33. Hearsay

This chapter considers the admissibility of and procedural matters relating to hearsay evidence in civil cases. Hearsay evidence is where a witness gives evidence of facts they have not personally experienced for the purpose of proving the truth of those facts. Hearsay may be written or oral, and may be first-hand, second-hand, etc. Evidence is no longer excluded in civil cases solely on the ground that it is hearsay. However, in practice, trial judges give limited weight to hearsay evidence.

Defining the Scope of the Hearsay Rule in Criminal Cases: A Comparative Perspective

This chapter offers, from a comparative perspective, a consideration of possible approaches to defining the scope of the hearsay rule in criminal cases. In The Principles of Criminal Evidence (1989), Adrian Zuckerman called for a more flexible approach to criminal hearsay doctrine than that prevailing in England and Wales at the time. Some three decades later, the major common law jurisdictions retain rules that have the effect, broadly speaking, of presumptively excluding hearsay evidence in criminal cases. There has been considerable judicial and academic focus in recent times on issues associated with the exceptions to such exclusionary rules. This chapter examines a related question that, although fundamental, has attracted far less attention and remains relatively under-explored: what is, and what should be, the precise scope of the rules that presumptively exclude hearsay evidence in criminal cases? It is noted that the decision of the Supreme of Court of Canada in R v Baldree (2013) offers a radically different approach to this question from that taken in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (England and Wales), the US Federal Rules of Evidence, the Australian uniform evidence legislation, or the Evidence Act 2006 (New Zealand). In the light of a consideration of the approaches taken in various jurisdictions and the implications of these approaches, the chapter concludes that the Canadian approach provides the most sensible basis for possible reform. Some suggestions on the way in which the relevant law in England and Wales might be reformed are also offered.