Previous Consistent Statements

1968 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 64-101
Author(s):  
R. N. Gooderson
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Civil Proceedings ◽  
Or Practice ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Short Time ◽  
Near Future

No expert long range forecast is needed to predict that in the near future a wind of change of a velocity and a turbulence hitherto unknown is going to sweep away many common law principles of the law of evidence regarded in the past as fundamental. In civil proceedings, the hurricane is upon us, with the thirteenth report of the Law Reform Committee, and the Civil Evidence Bill 1967, virtually providing for the abolition of the rule against first-hand hearsay and the rule against narrative, and substituting a wide discretion in the court. All the signs are that in a short time analogous reforms for criminal proceedings will be announced, and already previous statements have been rendered widely admissible by the Criminal Justice Act 1967. The object of this article is to look at the common law relating to the rule against narrative in criminal proceedings, as it is applied in England and in the United States, and to make a few comments on the procedure introduced by section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967.The rule against narrative is sometimes called the rule against self-corroboration. This is misleading, in that a witness can never corroborate himself where corroboration is required by any rule of law or practice. In the thirteenth report, the first description is said to be a misnomer, but a helpful summary of the rule is given: “what the witness himself said outside the witness-box is not evidence.” Wills describes the rule in this way: “… the witness may not repeat to the Court his own previous narratives or statements concerning the relevant facts made to other persons out of Court; when he is in the witness-box he must take his mind back, directly so to speak, to the facts he is called to prove, and must give to the Court his present recollection of those facts.”

scholarly journals EXTRA-CURIAL STATEMENTS BY A NON- TESTIFYING CO-ACCUSED, THE CANADIAN SUPREME COURT AND CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA

Obiter ◽  
2018 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
Author(s):  
BC Naudé
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Supreme Court ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Constitutional Court ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law ◽  
Law Of Evidence ◽  
Court Of Appeal

In S v Ndhlovu (2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA)), the court opened the door to the admissibility of extra-curial statements made by a non-testifying accused against a co-accused as hearsay in terms of section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988), if the interests of justice so require. However, first the Supreme Court of Appeal and later the Constitutional Court rejected such an approach.It is beyond the scope of this comment to repeat the arguments in favour of a discretionary approach for such statements, but it is submitted that there is scope for disagreement with the findings of both courts.Whitear points out that the provisions dealing with the admissibility of hearsay in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) were not declared unconstitutional by any court. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) could not be used to admit the extra-curial statement of an accused against his co- accused because the interests of justice would never allow this. The Constitutional Court found that section 3 did not override the common-law rule prohibiting the admission of extra-curial statements against a co- accused since this would amount to unfair discrimination against an accused implicated by such admissions or confessions. Significantly, because it is stated in section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) that section 3 is subject to the “provisions of any other law”, the court decided that the common-law prohibition should prevail.Previously, however, the Supreme Court of Appeal has held that the “other laws” referred to in the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) are alternative ways for admitting hearsay, and do not preclude the admissibility of hearsay in terms of section 3, even where there is another law that prohibits it. The court also referred with approval to S v Ndhlovu (supra) where it was explained that the very purpose of section 3 of the Law of Evidence Amendment Act (45 of 1988) was to “supersede the excessive rigidity and inflexibility – and occasional absurdity – of the common law position” by allowing for the admission of hearsay when the interests of justice so require. The admissibility of out-of-court statements by an accused against a co- accused is also dealt with differently in the United Kingdom (our relevant common law) today. Section 114(1)(d) of the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 makes it possible to admit the out-of-court statement of an accused against a co-accused as hearsay. However, the court in R v Y (supra par 57−62) did mention that this does not mean such statements should routinely be admitted without a consideration of the relevant factors mentioned in the Criminal Justice Act of 2003 and that, in the majority of cases, it will not be in the interests of justice to admit such statements, especially those made during police interviews.Even though, under South African law, it is not currently possible to present evidence of an extra-curial statement made by an accused that also implicates a co-accused, the recent judgment by the Canadian Supreme Court in R v Bradshaw (2017 SCC 35) provides insight into how this could possibly happen in future. It is thus useful to consider the Supreme Court’s decision.

“Visible” and “Invisible” Victims in the Criminal Justice System

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-23
Author(s):  
Armando Saponaro
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Justice System ◽  
Justice System ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Public Prosecutor ◽  
Law System ◽  
The Public ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Victim Impact Statement

This chapter outlines the “conflict” and “peace-keeping” victim-oriented justice paradigms. The latter empowers the victims of crime, putting them at the center of an encounter and using interindividual mediation or collective circles to address conflict resolution. Two models are critically discussed in the conflict victim-oriented justice paradigm. The European continental “visible victim” model structures the role of the victim as a full-fledged processual party together with the public prosecutor and offender. In this model, the victim has the same rights and powers of the defendant. The “invisible victim” common law model views the victim as a trial witness, participating, for example, through a victim impact statement (in the United States) or victim personal statement (in the United Kingdom) at the sentencing stage. The visible victim conflict paradigm model enhances a victim's role and involvement in the criminal justice system, offering a solution to existing controversial and critical common law system issues.

Taking Seriously Affordability, Expedition, and Integrity in Adjudication

2020 ◽  
pp. 179-196
Author(s):  
Rabeea Assy
Keyword(s):  
Common Law ◽  
Legal Rights ◽  
The Third ◽  
Abusive Behaviour ◽  
The Law ◽  
Short Time ◽  
Economic Inequalities

This chapter explores the potentially far-reaching consequences of treating cost and time as dimensions of justice. It shows that an exaggerated pursuit of accurate judgments may undermine the effort to enforce the law, because it produces lengthy and expensive litigation that is likely to deter many from seeking enforcement in the first place, and to distort justice by subjecting the process to economic inequalities. When affordability and expedition are prioritized, courts will be expected to ensure that litigation remains within the financial reach of litigants and that it concludes within a short time. This means that the court must avoid unaffordable spending or lengthy litigation even when these might otherwise be justified by the features of the case in question, namely its value, complexity, importance, etc. Reducing the uncertainty concerning the legal rights of the litigants has value independent of outcome accuracy; it simply enables people to move on with their lives. This chapter also explores the multi-dimensional nature of justice beyond the trifecta of accuracy, cost, and time. It shows that common law procedures seek to protect additional values, including three senses of integrity. One is concerned with the integrity of litigants, using procedural sanctions to deter abusive behaviour. The second focuses on the morality of the court, requiring it to keep its hands clean and refuse to rely on illegality or engage with proceedings advanced through fraud and falsity. The third sense of integrity focuses on the message a court sends by imposing procedural sanctions on abuse of process.

12. The rule against hearsay III

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Glover
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Common Law ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Mentally Handicapped ◽  
Codes Of Practice ◽  
Hearsay Evidence

Admissions and confessions are the most important common law exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Section 118(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 preserves any rule of law relating to the admissibility of admissions made by agents in criminal proceedings. This chapter is divided into two parts, the first of which discusses admissions, covering the principles of admissibility; what admissions may bind a party; and what may be proved by admission. The second part deals with confessions, covering the admissibility of confessions; the exclusion of confessions; evidence yielded by inadmissible confessions; excluded confessions as relevant non-hearsay evidence; confessions by the mentally handicapped and those otherwise impaired; the Codes of Practice and the discretionary exclusion of confessions; the use of confessions by co-accused; confessions implicating co-accused; and partly adverse (‘mixed’) statements.

11. Hearsay Evidence

Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Civil Proceedings ◽  
The Law ◽  
Hearsay Rule ◽  
Hearsay Evidence

Chapter 11 discusses the law on hearsay evidence. It covers the admissibility of hearsay evidence in civil proceedings, now governed by the Civil Evidence Act 1995; other proceedings in which the hearsay rule is inapplicable; and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in criminal proceedings.

10. Character Evidence

Evidence ◽  
2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Andrew L-T Choo
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Justice ◽  
Criminal Proceedings ◽  
Character Evidence ◽  
The Law ◽  
Civil Cases

Chapter 10 begins with a discussion of the relevance of evidence of character. It then deals with the admissibility of character evidence in civil and criminal proceedings. In civil cases, the admissibility of evidence of a party’s bad character is governed simply by the test of relevance. In criminal proceedings, the entitlement of a defendant to a direction on the significance of his or her good character is taken seriously. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 now provides a comprehensive statement of the law on evidence of bad character in criminal proceedings.

The Law of Personal Status: Wives, Paupers, and Slaves

2019 ◽  
pp. 173-212
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Civil Rights ◽  
Common Law ◽  
White Men ◽  
The United States ◽  
Political Rights ◽  
Poor Laws ◽  
Marriage And Divorce ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Law

This chapter discusses the law on marriage and divorce, family property, adoption, poor laws and social welfare, and slavery and African Americans in the United States. In the colonial period, the United States had no courts to handle matters of marriage and divorce. Marriage was a contract—an agreement between a man and a woman. Under the rules of the common law, the country belonged to the whites; and more specifically, it belonged to white men. Women had civil rights but no political rights. There were no formal provisions for adoption. A Massachusetts law, passed in 1851, was one of the earliest, and most significant, general adoption law. The so-called poor laws were the basic welfare laws.

The Republic of Bees

2019 ◽  
pp. 77-126
Author(s):  
Lawrence M. Friedman
Keyword(s):  
Eighteenth Century ◽  
Common Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
State Constitutions ◽  
System A ◽  
The Social ◽  
American Law ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Republic ◽  
Law Of Evidence

This chapter details changes in American law from the eighteenth century onward, covering federal and state constitutions, judges, organization of courts, and civil procedure, and the law of evidence. The colonies declared themselves independent in 1776. However, American law continued to borrow from English law. English doctrines that were needed and appropriate were welcome. Between 1776, and the middle of the nineteenth century, there developed a true republic of bees; their flowers were the social and economic institutions that grew up in the United States. American conditions and ideas were the lawmakers that made American law a distinctive system: a separate language within the common-law family.

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