9. Horizontal Agreements—Cartels and Collusion

2019 ◽  
pp. 642-702
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Prisoners Dilemma ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Collective Dominance

This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on a market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion in the light of the theory of games and the ‘prisoners’ dilemma’. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements akin to cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the oligopoly problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, either ex ante or ex post, such as the use of the concept of collective dominance and sector enquiries under Regulation 1/2003, art 17.

9. Cartels and Oligopoly

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Oligopolistic Market ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. This chapter examines how EU competition law applies both to undertakings operating cartels and to undertakings that tacitly coordinate their behaviour on an oligopolistic market. It starts by looking at the difference between ‘explicit’ and ‘tacit’ collusion. The chapter then deals with cartels and other agreements that may be used to bolster cartels, or which may facilitate explicit or tacit collusion on a market. Next, it considers the problem of tacit collusion and whether, in particular, Articles 101 and 102 operate as effective mechanisms for dealing with the problem. The chapter also considers other options that EU competition law might offer to deal with tacit collusion, eitherex anteorex post.

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Collective Dominance

This chapter describes how competition law addresses oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. This chapter is concerned with the related topics of oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance. Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. This chapter begins with discussion of the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and of the possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’. It then considers the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

scholarly journals Bayesian privacy

2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 1557-1603
Author(s):  
Ran Eilat ◽  
Kfir Eliaz ◽  
Xiaosheng Mu
Keyword(s):  
Bayesian Approach ◽  
Information Technologies ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Leibler Divergence ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Modern Information ◽  
The Difference

Modern information technologies make it possible to store, analyze, and trade unprecedented amounts of detailed information about individuals. This has led to public discussions on whether individuals' privacy should be better protected by restricting the amount or the precision of information that is collected by commercial institutions on their participants. We contribute to this discussion by proposing a Bayesian approach to measure loss of privacy in a mechanism. Specifically, we define the loss of privacy associated with a mechanism as the difference between the designer's prior and posterior beliefs about an agent's type, where this difference is calculated using Kullback–Leibler divergence, and where the change in beliefs is triggered by actions taken by the agent in the mechanism. We consider both ex post (for every realized type, the maximal difference in beliefs cannot exceed some threshold κ) and ex ante (the expected difference in beliefs over all type realizations cannot exceed some threshold κ) measures of privacy loss. Applying these notions to the monopolistic screening environment of Mussa and Rosen (1978), we study the properties of optimal privacy‐constrained mechanisms and the relation between welfare/profits and privacy levels.

scholarly journals Entrepreneurial Stewardship: Why Some Profits Should Be Used to Benefit Others

2020 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 525-551 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jooho Lee
Keyword(s):  
Property Rights ◽  
Social Welfare ◽  
Moral Obligation ◽  
Market Process ◽  
Market Participants ◽  
Welfare Maximization ◽  
Social Welfare Maximization ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Difference

ABSTRACTEntrepreneurs should act as stewards of entrepreneurial rent. Entrepreneurial rent is the difference between the ex post value of a venture and its ex ante costs. It is the result of competition among buyers and sellers within the market process rather than the sole efforts of the entrepreneur. As a result, entrepreneurs should allocate entrepreneurial rent for the benefit of other market participants rather than consuming it for themselves. The moral obligation to steward entrepreneurial rent is consistent with traditional bases of property rights and the norm of social welfare maximization, and it applies to corporations and their shareholders, as well as individual entrepreneurs.

14. Horizontal agreements (2): oligopoly, tacit collusion and collective dominance

2021 ◽  
pp. 588-612
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Market Failure ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Tacit Collusion ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Law And Policy ◽  
Concerted Practice ◽  
Collective Dominance

Oligopoly exists where a few firms between them supply all or most of the goods or services on a market without any of them having a clear ascendancy over the others. The purpose of this chapter is to examine whether oligopoly presents a particular problem for competition policy and, if so, how that problem should be overcome. The chapter discusses the theory of oligopolistic interdependence and how oligopolies can lead to a well-known problem for competition law and policy: oligopolists are able, by virtue of the characteristics of the market, to behave in a parallel manner and to derive benefits from their collective market power without, or without necessarily, entering into an agreement or concerted practice of the kind generally prohibited by competition law. This phenomenon is known in economics as ‘tacit collusion’ and is the result of each firm’s individual and rational response to market conditions. The chapter identifies possible ways of dealing with the ‘oligopoly problem’, before considering the extent to which Articles 101 and 102 can be used to address that problem. The chapter also discusses UK law and, in particular, the possible use of the market investigations to address market failure that may arise in oligopolies.

Slovak Telekom/Deutsche Telekom AG: The Interplay Between EU Competition Law and Sector Specific Rules in the Electronic Communications Sector

2019 ◽  
Vol 10 (5) ◽  
pp. 301-303
Author(s):  
Francesco Liberatore ◽  
Kety Tsochas ◽  
Matthew Buckwell
Keyword(s):  
Competition Law ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Retail Prices ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Specific Regulation

Abstract Case T-827/14, Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission, and Case T-851/14 Slovak Telekom a.s. v Commission, Judgments of 13 December 2018. Granting access to a product or service, which is required under sector specific regulation, on unfair, unreasonably complicated or delayed terms amounts to constructive refusal to supply, without the need to demonstrate that the regulated access product or service is an indispensable input. In addition, a margin squeeze test, to assess whether the difference between wholesale and retail prices is negative, should be carried out on a year-by-year basis, and not on a multi-period basis. Finally, when a parent is jointly and severally liable for anti-competitive conduct of its subsidiary, the liability of the parent can exceed that of the subsidiary only if it reflects the parent’s individual conduct in the infringement at issue.

scholarly journals Escasa eficiencia en costos y plazos en proyectos de inversión en Arequipa y Moquegua 2004-2020

2021 ◽  
Vol 39 (71) ◽  
pp. 800-821
Author(s):  
Javier Pedro Flores Arocutipa ◽  
Jorge Jinchuña Huallpa ◽  
Rocío Claribel Cornelio Aira ◽  
Moisés Chacolla Soto ◽  
José Miguel De la Paz Ramos ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Wilcoxon Test ◽  
P Value ◽  
Regional Government ◽  
Investment Projects ◽  
Subsequent Period ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Before And After ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Low Efficiency

Objective: To demonstrate the low efficiency in costs and timeframes in 22 investment projects (PIP) of the Regional Government of Moquegua and Arequipa, which generated higher costs and timeframes between the ex ante and ex post in the period 2004-2020. Method: Inductive, basic, not experimental. Results: Based on the Wilcoxon test, it was shown that the costs of 12 projects in Moquegua, before and after, were different with asymptotic significance (bilateral) 0.006, from 127 to 220 million; and the "t" test for related samples generated the significance (bilateral) of 0.000. It was observed that the average calculated in days was different, that the average of the ex ante period turned out to be 339 days while the average of the actual period was 2307 days. In 10 projects in Arequipa, the Wilcoxon test generated 0.007 and the costs went from 1030 to 1585 million soles; the difference in terms generated a p-value of wilcoxon of 0.004 from an average of 15.4 to 57.5 months. Conclusion: The costs of the previous and subsequent period are different, as are the proposed deadlines and actual deadlines in both regions.

Preventives Versus Treatments *

2015 ◽  
Vol 130 (3) ◽  
pp. 1167-1239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Kremer ◽  
Christopher M. Snyder
Keyword(s):  
Private Information ◽  
Vaccine Development ◽  
Disease Risk ◽  
Disease Status ◽  
Heart Attacks ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Producer Surplus ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Consumer Values ◽  
The Difference

Abstract Preventives are sold ex ante, before disease status is realized, while treatments are sold ex post. Even if the mean of the ex ante distribution of consumer values is the same as that ex post, the shape of the distributions may differ, generating a difference between the surplus each product can extract. If, for example, consumers differ only in ex ante disease risk, then a monopolist would have more difficulty extracting surplus with a preventive than with a treatment because treatment consumers, having contracted the disease, no longer differ in disease risk. We show that the ratio of preventive to treatment producer surplus can be arbitrarily small, in particular when the distribution of consumer values has a Zipf shape and the disease is rare. The firm’s bias toward treatments can be reversed, for example, if the source of private information is disease severity learned ex post. The difference between the producer surplus earned from the products can result in distorted R&D incentives; the deadweight loss from this distortion can be as large as the entire producer-surplus difference. Calibrations for HIV and heart attacks based on risk factors in the U.S. population suggest that the distribution of disease risk is sufficiently Zipf-similar to generate substantial differences between producer surplus from preventives and treatments. Empirically, we find that proxies for the Zipf-similarity of the disease-risk distribution are associated a significantly lower likelihood of vaccine development but not drug development.

scholarly journals Derecho de patentes versus derecho de defensa de la competencia en la Unión Europea: ¿una relación de complementariedad? = Patent law versus competition law in the European Union: a complementary relationship?

2018 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 372
Author(s):  
Miriam Martínez Pérez
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Patent Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Complementary Relationship ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
Constant Tension ◽  
Two Sectors

Resumen: Las relaciones existentes entre el Derecho de patentes y el Derecho de defensa de la competencia en el Derecho de la Unión Europea se hallan en constante tensión. En muchas ocasiones, resulta realmente complicado determinar dónde termina el ámbito de actuación de uno para dejar paso a la aplicación del otro. Surge así la necesidad de analizar la difícil convivencia de estos dos sectores del ordenamiento jurídico, en aras a determinar si entre ellos existe una relación de complementariedad o si, por el contrario, se presentan como regulaciones antagónicas. Al estudio de estas cuestiones se dedicará el presente trabajo.Palabras clave: Derecho de patentes, Derecho de defensa de la competencia, relación de complementariedad, conductas anticompetitivas, correctivos ex ante y ex post.Abstract: Relationships between Patent law and Competition law in European Union law are in constant tension. In many cases, it is really difficult to determine where the scope of the action of one ends and where the application of the other begins. Thus, the need to analyse the difficult coexistence of these two sectors of the legal system arises in order to determine whether there is a complementary relationship between them or whether, on the contrary, they are antagonistic regulations. This paper will be dedicated to the study of these issues.Keywords: Patent law, Competition law, complementary relationship, anticompetitive behaviour, ex ante and ex post corrective tools.

On Choosing the Difference Principle Behind the Veil of Ignorance

2021 ◽  
Vol 118 (8) ◽  
pp. 450-463
Author(s):  
Hun Chung ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Original Position ◽  
Difference Principle ◽  
Veil Of Ignorance ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Ex Ante ◽  
The Difference ◽  
The Veil ◽  
Published Paper ◽  
Main Strategy

In a recently published paper entitled, “The Difference Principle Would Not Be Chosen behind the Veil of Ignorance”, Johan E. Gustafsson attempts to demonstrate that the parties in Rawls’s original position would not choose the difference principle. Gustafsson’s main strategy was to show that Rawls’s difference principle in both of its ex post and ex ante versions imply counterintuitive distributional prescriptions in a few contrived examples. The purpose of this paper is to precisely demonstrate exactly how Gustafsson’s arguments have failed to show that the difference principle would not be chosen behind the veil of ignorance.

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