4. Principle of supremacy of EU law

2020 ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers

This chapter examines the Court of Justice’s (CJ) case law on the supremacy of European Union (EU) law over national laws of Member States, analyses the question of priorities between directly effective EU law and domestic law, and also looks at this problem from the perspective of the national courts, including issues of human rights protection. It argues that the CJ’s introduction of the notion of supremacy, as part of EU law constituting a ‘new legal order’, was instrumental in providing a view of the Union as a body which went beyond what was normal for an international law organization. The chapter also describes how Member States developed their own constitutional rules as a response to EU law.

Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa

This chapter examines the Court of Justice's (CJ) case law on the supremacy of European Union (EU) law over national laws of Member States, analyses the question of priorities between directly effective EU law and domestic law, and also looks at this problem from the perspective of the national courts. It argues that the CJ's introduction of the notion of supremacy was instrumental in providing a view of the Union as a body which went beyond what was normal for an international law organization. The chapter also describes how Member States developed their own constitutional rules as a response to EU law.


Author(s):  
VLADIMÍRA PEJCHALOVÁ GRÜNWALDOVÁ

AbstractThis article deals with the implementation, at the national level, of European human rights protection standards as enshrined in theEuropean Convention on Human Rights(ECHR) and interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). It discusses the principles of interpretation of theECHRby the ECtHR, the interaction and mutual dialogue between the ECtHR and national courts, and the approach of the latter to interpretation and application of the case law of the ECtHR. Using the concrete examples of France and the Czech Republic as case studies, it is shown to what extent and how European constitutional courts take into account and apply the letter of the Convention and its interpretation by the ECtHR.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 35-62
Author(s):  
Matteo Bonelli

Effective judicial protection emerged as a EU law principle in the 1980s, operating alongside the Rewe principles of equivalence and effectiveness as a standard to assess national procedures for the enforcement of EU law. This article argues that the codification of effective judicial protection in Article 19 TEU and 47 of the Charter, operated by the Lisbon Treaty, has stimulated an evolution of the principle, which is evident in the recent case law of the Court of Justice. Today, effective judicial protection operates not only as a procedural principle, but also as a more substantive and structural one, and has generally acquired broader constitutional relevance. This evolution has crucial effects on the EU legal order: most importantly, it affects the division of competences between Member States and the EU, and between the Court of Justice and national courts.


2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Graham Butler

The vast majority of cases that are submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) through the preliminary reference procedure that is contained in Article 267 TFEU come from lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States. As a result, it is not always appellate courts, or higher instance national courts and tribunals, such as courts of final appeal, which make orders for reference. Judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court through this Article 267 TFEU procedure is notable for its particular quality of it being open to receiving orders for reference, for an interpretation of EU law from national courts and tribunals – of any instance – from first instance, to final instance. But can this judicial dialogue between lower instance national courts and tribunals and the Court be impeded by national courts’ more senior national Brethren, with appeals being allowed against orders for reference within national legal orders? The case law of the Court on such an issue has been progressive, in that it developed slowly over time, and the Court, by 2021, becoming increasingly assertive. As will be analysed in this article, the Court’s approach to the arising issue has clearly been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one hand, and national rules on the other. Yet, with the Court’s broader case law tightening the understanding of who constitutes the European judiciary, and ensuring that all national courts and tribunals remain independent from executive interference in EU Member States, the article commends recent developments, but makes the further plea for an affirmative judgment of the Court to not permit, as a matter of EU law, appeals against orders for reference made by lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States, in the name of preserving judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference procedure.


2017 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 137
Author(s):  
Mariane Morato Stival ◽  
Marcos André Ribeiro ◽  
Daniel Gonçalves Mendes da Costa

This article intends to analyze in the context of the complexity of the process of internationalization of human rights, the definitions and tensions between cultural universalism and relativism, the essence of human rights discourse, its basic norms and an analysis of the normative dialogues in case decisions involving violations of human rights in international tribunals such as the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and national courts. The well-established dialogue between courts can bring convergences closer together and remove differences of opinion on human rights protection. A new dynamic can occur through a complementarity of one court with respect to the other, even with the different characteristics between the legal orders.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.


2012 ◽  
pp. 475-511
Author(s):  
Federico Casolari

Law Although EU law has established a general framework concerning the fight against discriminations on the grounds of religion (namely as far as equal treatment in employment and occupation is concerned), the related ECJ case law is not very rich. This article tracks and evaluates the impact of the ECHR case law devoted to the freedom of religion on the interpretation and application of EU law concerning religion discriminations. It argues that the ECHR case law may contribute to identify the notion of ‘religion' which is relevant for EU law, while several arguments may be put forward against the application of the Strasbourg approach to the balancing between the right to quality based on religion and others human rights into the EU legal order.


Global Jurist ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 13 (2-3) ◽  
Author(s):  
Can Öztaş

AbstractEuropean human rights protection, ensured by the European Convention and Court of Human Rights, is declared to be universal and inclusive, protecting not only citizens of Europe but also anybody residing within the jurisdiction of the signatory countries. This article challenges this declaration and argues, with the help of some examples from the case law, that European human rights protection is based on the defined concepts of European-ness that exclude the perceived non-European within the Convention and the Court system.


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