4. Principle of supremacy of EU law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorna Woods ◽  
Philippa Watson ◽  
Marios Costa
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Domestic Law

This chapter examines the Court of Justice's (CJ) case law on the supremacy of European Union (EU) law over national laws of Member States, analyses the question of priorities between directly effective EU law and domestic law, and also looks at this problem from the perspective of the national courts. It argues that the CJ's introduction of the notion of supremacy was instrumental in providing a view of the Union as a body which went beyond what was normal for an international law organization. The chapter also describes how Member States developed their own constitutional rules as a response to EU law.

4. Principle of supremacy of EU law

2020 ◽  
pp. 89-110
Author(s):  
Marios Costa ◽  
Steve Peers
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Human Rights ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Legal Order ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Human Rights Protection ◽  
Rights Protection ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Domestic Law

This chapter examines the Court of Justice’s (CJ) case law on the supremacy of European Union (EU) law over national laws of Member States, analyses the question of priorities between directly effective EU law and domestic law, and also looks at this problem from the perspective of the national courts, including issues of human rights protection. It argues that the CJ’s introduction of the notion of supremacy, as part of EU law constituting a ‘new legal order’, was instrumental in providing a view of the Union as a body which went beyond what was normal for an international law organization. The chapter also describes how Member States developed their own constitutional rules as a response to EU law.

scholarly journals Is the Primacy of EU Law Based on the Equality of the Member States? A Comment on the CJEU’s Press Release Following the PSPP Judgment

2020 ◽  
Vol 21 (5) ◽  
pp. 1032-1044 ◽  
Author(s):  
Justin Lindeboom
Keyword(s):  
International Law ◽  
Critical Analysis ◽  
Recent Article ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Press Release ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Full Effect ◽  
The Press

AbstractIn response to the BVerfG’s PSPP judgment, the CJEU issued an unprecedented press release in which it claimed that national courts must give full effect to EU law because this is the only way to ensure the equality of the Member States. While the press release does not contain the word “primacy,” the obligation to give full effect to EU law clearly implies primacy of EU law. This article provides a constructive and critical analysis of the press release’s “equality argument.” First, it demonstrates how the CJEU most likely borrowed it from a recent article by Federico Fabbrini, and how the argument is virtually identical to Kelsen’s defense of international law primacy. Second, it criticizes the equality argument for being inconsistent with the CJEU’s case law, and shows how it is either wrong or tautological. After suggesting three possible reasons why the press release nonetheless justifies primacy in this way, the article concludes by showing how the CJEU’s case law is better conceptualized from a Hamiltonian perspective in which full effect is a goal rather than a means.

scholarly journals Lower Instance National Courts and Tribunals in Member States and Their Judicial Dialogue with the Court of Justice of the European Union

2021 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 19-36
Author(s):  
Graham Butler
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
Eu Member States ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Recent Developments

The vast majority of cases that are submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) through the preliminary reference procedure that is contained in Article 267 TFEU come from lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States. As a result, it is not always appellate courts, or higher instance national courts and tribunals, such as courts of final appeal, which make orders for reference. Judicial dialogue between national courts and the Court through this Article 267 TFEU procedure is notable for its particular quality of it being open to receiving orders for reference, for an interpretation of EU law from national courts and tribunals – of any instance – from first instance, to final instance. But can this judicial dialogue between lower instance national courts and tribunals and the Court be impeded by national courts’ more senior national Brethren, with appeals being allowed against orders for reference within national legal orders? The case law of the Court on such an issue has been progressive, in that it developed slowly over time, and the Court, by 2021, becoming increasingly assertive. As will be analysed in this article, the Court’s approach to the arising issue has clearly been an attempt to balance the interests of judicial dialogue on the one hand, and national rules on the other. Yet, with the Court’s broader case law tightening the understanding of who constitutes the European judiciary, and ensuring that all national courts and tribunals remain independent from executive interference in EU Member States, the article commends recent developments, but makes the further plea for an affirmative judgment of the Court to not permit, as a matter of EU law, appeals against orders for reference made by lower instance national courts and tribunals in EU Member States, in the name of preserving judicial dialogue through the preliminary reference procedure.

A Union of Peoples

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
International Law ◽  
Political Theory ◽  
Domestic Institutions ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Rival Theory ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
The Eu

This book offers a legal and political theory of the European Union. Many political and legal philosophers compare the EU to a federal union. They believe that its basic laws should be subject to the standards of constitutional law. They thus find it lacking or incomplete. This book offers a rival theory. If one looks more closely at the treaties and the precedents of the European courts, one sees that the substance of EU law is international, not constitutional. Just like international law, it applies primarily to the relations between states. It binds domestic institutions directly only when the local constitutions allow it. The member states have democratically chosen to adapt their constitutional arrangements in order to share legislative and executive powers with their partners. The legal architecture of the European Union is thus best understood under a theory of dualism and not pluralism. According to this internationalist view, EU law is part of the law of nations and its distinction from domestic law is a matter of substance, not form. This arrangement is supported by a cosmopolitan theory of international justice, which we may call progressive internationalism. The EU is a union of democratic peoples, that freely organize their interdependence on the basis of principles of equality and reciprocity. Its central principles are not the principles of a constitution, but cosmopolitan principles of accountability, liberty, and fairness,

Review by Constitutional Courts of the Obligation of National Courts of Last Instance to Refer a Preliminary Question to the Court of Justice of the EU

2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1663-1700 ◽  
Author(s):  
Clelia Lacchi
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Constitutional Courts ◽  
Member States ◽  
Constitutional Review ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Eu

The Constitutional Courts of a number of Member States exert a constitutional review on the obligation of national courts of last instance to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).Pursuant to Article 267(3) TFEU, national courts of last instance, namely courts or tribunals against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, are required to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary question related to the interpretation of the Treaties or the validity and interpretation of acts of European Union (EU) institutions. The CJEU specified the exceptions to this obligation inCILFIT. Indeed, national courts of last instance have a crucial role according to the devolution to national judges of the task of ensuring, in collaboration with the CJEU, the full application of EU law in all Member States and the judicial protection of individuals’ rights under EU law. With preliminary references as the keystone of the EU judicial system, the cooperation of national judges with the CJEU forms part of the EU constitutional structure in accordance with Article 19(1) TEU.

scholarly journals COLLECTIVE LABOUR RIGHTS AS THE PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION LABOUR LAW

2019 ◽  
pp. 43-46
Author(s):  
O. M. Rym
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Collective Bargaining ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Labour Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Labour Rights ◽  
Social Partners ◽  
The Right

The article deals with certain aspects of collective labour rights in the European Union. Prerequisites and procedure of this rights guaranting as general principles of EU law are analyzed and their content is characterized. It is emphasized that such legal establishing took place somewhat haphazardly, both at the level of the acts of primary and secondary law of the European Union and in the case law. As a result, there is no single position on the spectrum of collective labour rights as principles of EU labor law. The author focuses on significant changes in the understanding of the necessity of cooperation of social partners and the extension of their interaction at the supranational level. It is under the responsibility of the European Commission to promote cooperation between Member States and to facilitate coordination of their activities in the field of the right of association and collective bargaining between employers and employees. The article clarifies the content of collective labour rights as general principles of EU law on the basis of EU legal acts, the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as well as the scientific works of domestic and foreign scholars. It is noted that the system of collective labour rights, as general principles of EU labour law, consists of the right of collective bargaining and collective action, the right of employees to information and consultation within the enterprise, as well as the freedom of assembly and association. It is concluded that the necessity of cooperation between the social partners is recognized as one of the foundations of EU labour law. Herewith appropriate interaction is ensured through the normative-legal consolidation of collective labour rights and procedures for their implementation. After all, European Union legal acts allow employees and employers’ representatives to play an active role in regulating labour legal relations. For example, Member States may instruct employers and employees, upon their joint request, to implement Council directives or decisions. In addition, many directives contain warnings about the possibility of derogating from their provisions through the adoption of a collective agreement.

Mixed Agreements: The EU Law Fundamentals

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
International Agreements ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Basic Characteristics ◽  
Mixed Agreements ◽  
The Eu

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union

scholarly journals Brexit and Acquired Rights

AJIL Unbound ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 111 ◽  
pp. 440-444 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Waibel
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
United Kingdom ◽  
International Law ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Public International Law ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
Article 50

On March 29, 2017, the U.K. Government triggered Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) on withdrawal from the European Union following a referendum on June 23, 2016 in which 51.89 percent voted for the United Kingdom to leave the European Union. As a hybrid provision, the much-discussed withdrawal provision in Article 50 TEU is part of EU law yet also anchored in public international law. Although the European Union is a unique, supranational organization that creates rights for individuals that are directly effective in national law, its member states created the European Union based on traditional treaties under international law.

scholarly journals The obligation of national Courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union

2016 ◽  
Vol 17 (31) ◽  
pp. 24-36
Author(s):  
Valentin Paul Neamt
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Case Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Member States ◽  
Reference Procedure ◽  
National Courts ◽  
Court Of Justice ◽  
Judicial Remedy ◽  
The Subject

Abstract The present paper presents the obligation that courts in the member states of the European Union have to refer questions to the Court of Justice of the European Union, with a focus on courts against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law. The paper starts by presenting the applicable framework regarding the preliminary reference procedure, then focuses on analyzing the exceptions to national court’s duty under article 267 TFEU, with a focus on the direction in which the case law is heading based on the most recent judgments handed down by the Court of Justice of the European Union in 2015, finally presenting the author’s conclusions and observation on the subject.

A Community of Principle

2020 ◽  
pp. 108-143
Author(s):  
Pavlos Eleftheriadis
Keyword(s):  
European Union ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
The European Union ◽  
European Union Law ◽  
Member States ◽  
Law Of Nations ◽  
Domestic Law ◽  
Rival View ◽  
The Eu

This chapter examines the question of the relations between EU law and domestic law from the point of view of a political theory of the European Union. It is common to see EU law under ‘federalism’ or under a theory of ‘statism’. These two views are outlined at the start of this chapter by examining various arguments made for them. They are both rejected. The chapter defends a rival view, the ‘internationalist’ reading of the EU, according to which it is a branch of the law of nations. A careful look at the EU treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU shows that the EU endorses an internationalist model based on equality and reciprocity. The EU does not replace the relation between citizens and political power. It does not establish a new constitutional law that replaces the national ones. It is a new way of organizing the relations between the various member states whose equality it fully respects. The coherence of European Union law is therefore not provided by uniformity imposed by a single master or constitutional rule, but is given by the political coordination of the laws of the member states achieved under the treaties. Coherence is achieved because the member states have adopted similar, although not identical, constitutional principles.

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