3. Mens rea

2021 ◽  
pp. 79-125
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and contextual, Criminal Law provides a succinct overview of the key areas on the law curriculum balanced with thought-provoking contextual discussion. Mens rea refers to the mental element necessary for a particular crime. This may differ from one crime to another and the definition of each crime must be examined to determine what state of mind is required. This chapter discusses the meaning of intention, knowledge, recklessness, wilfulness, direct intent, oblique intent, ulterior intent, transferred malice, and mistake. These mens rea topics raise important questions about the extent to which a person is responsible and therefore deserving of blame and punishment. A revised and updated ‘The law in context’ feature examines critically the debates between those who favour subjectivist and objectivist approaches to mens rea, with particular reference to reform of the offence of unlawful act manslaughter.

Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter discusses the law on offences involving intoxication. It distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and between ‘specific’ and ‘basic’ intent. Cases are presented to show that state of mind is both a necessary element in the definition of an offence as well as in some defences. Just as intoxication may cause a person to lack the mens rea of an offence so it may cause him to have the necessary mental element of a defence.


Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and comprehensive, the Textbook on series provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. Mens rea refers to the mental element necessary for a particular crime. This may differ from one crime to another and the definition of each crime must be examined to determine what state of mind is required. This chapter discusses the meaning of intention, knowledge, recklessness, wilfulness, and mistake.


Author(s):  
David Ormerod ◽  
Karl Laird

This chapter discusses the law on offences involving intoxication. It distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary intoxication, and between ‘specific’ and ‘basic’ intent. Cases are presented to show that state of mind is both a necessary element in the definition of an offence as well as in some defences. Just as intoxication may cause a person to lack the mens rea of an offence so it may cause him to have the necessary mental element of a defence.


Criminal Law ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 76-122
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and comprehensive, the Textbook on series provides an accessible overview of the key areas on the law curriculum. Mens rea refers to the mental element necessary for a particular crime. This may differ from one crime to another and the definition of each crime must be examined to determine what state of mind is required. This chapter discusses the meaning of intention, knowledge, recklessness, wilfulness, direct intent, oblique intent, ulterior intent, transferred malice, and mistake. These mens rea topics raise important questions about the extent to which a person is responsible and therefore deserving of blame and punishment. A revised and updated Law in Context feature examines critically the debates between those who favour subjectivist and objectivist approaches to mens rea, with particular reference to reform of the offence of unlawful act manslaughter.


Author(s):  
Māris Leja ◽  

The article deals with the flaws of the Criminal Law in determination of the particular form of mental element (mens rea) which is required for the specific criminal offense. Taking into account that the majority of legal provisions does not contain such indications, one of the elements of criminal offense is not described by the law. Such legislator`s approach raises doubts about the compliance of the Criminal Law with the principle of legal certainty. The article also criticizes opinions expressed in legal theory that attempt to fill the gaps allowed by the legislator, as well as offers amendments to the Criminal Law aiming to improve its coherence.


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Ahadi

In the present paper the traditional and customary perspectives on the concept of Mens Rea are challenged and a new definition of the same is put forward. The challenge is based on the idea that the concepts in criminal law need evolution in order to keep their function and practicality. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein, while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law, the maintenance of the same is ensured. The mens rea is customarily defined as ‘culpable state of mind of the accused when committing an offence under criminal law and ‘rebellion intent’ under Islamic Jurisprudence. Both definitions of the concept have the capability to undergo evolution and, thus, a new definition of the same is envisaged herein as such that the mens rea constitutes ‘the culpable linkage of mind with the forbidden conduct’. Two changes are observable in the new definition compared with the existing one: first, the ‘state of mind’ is replaced with ‘linkage of mind’; second, the interpretation of the term ‘culpable’ as an independent constituent shall differ as per the common sense and the contextual conditions. The new definition grants dynamism to the concept and resolves the problems long associated with the definition of the mens rea under the criminal law.


Author(s):  
Guy Ben-David

How should the criminal law treat a person who did not pay any attention to the existence of attendant circumstances noted in the definition of an offense? This mental state of lack of attention to the existence of the attendant circumstance is analogous to the existence of a void in the actor’s consciousness, and has therefore been awarded the name “cognitive void.” Because the criminal law is founded on cognitive theory that offers a binary concept to establish an accused’s state of mind depending on the existence or absence of cognition, it is difficult to impose criminal liability on an actor who acted out of a cognitive void. The purpose of this Article is to discuss the difficulty that it engenders and the attempts to solve this difficulty. The Article presents the proposed thesis, suggesting that different states of cognitive void should be examined in accordance with the extent of culpability that they represent. Therefore, the Article calls for the abandonment of the prevalent basic assumption that sees cognitive void as a state indicating lack of subjective mens rea, and suggests replacing it with a normative approach that would recognize cognitive void as a multidimensional term covering a range of different mental states.


Author(s):  
Richard Holton

This paper develops an account of core criminal terms like ‘murder’ that parallels Williamson’s account of knowledge. It is argued that while murder requires that the murderer killed, and that they did so with a certain state of mind, murder cannot be regarded as the conjunction of these two elements (the action, the actus reus, and the associated mental element, the mens rea). Rather, murder should be seen as a primitive notion, which entails each of them. This explains some of the problems around criminal attempt. Attempted murder cannot be seen simply as involving the state of mind of murder minus success; rather, it has to be seen as a self-standing offence, that of attempting to commit the murder.


Legal Studies ◽  
1993 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 308-322
Author(s):  
Mitchell C. Davies

The objectives of the Criminal Law Revision Committee when drafting the radical reforms proposed by the 1966 Theft Bill were described by a contemporary commentator2 as being: ‘. . . to do away with the more embarrassing and restrictive technicalities of the existing law . . .’In the same place it was observed that the Committee faced a choice between creating a specific definition of the various theft offences and their elements, or one whose generality would allow it to evolve to meet the challenges presented by ever more complex and sophisticated dishonest dealing.


2018 ◽  
pp. 933
Author(s):  
Lucinda Vandervort

This article examines the operation of “reasonable steps” as a statutory standard for analysis of the availability of the defence of belief in consent in sexual assault cases and concludes that application of section 273.2(b) of the Criminal Code, as presently worded, often undermines the legal validity and correctness of decisions about whether the accused acted with mens rea, a guilty, blameworthy state of mind. When the conduct of an accused who is alleged to have made a mistake about whether a complainant communicated consent is assessed by the hybrid subjective-objective reasonableness standard prescribed by section 273.2, many decision-makers rely on extra-legal criteria and assumptions grounded in their personal experience and opinion about what is reasonable. In the midst of debate over what the accused knew and what steps were “reasonable,” given what the accused knew, the legal definition of consent in section 273.1 is easily overlooked and decision-makers focus on facts that are legally irrelevant and prejudice rational deliberation. The result is failure to enforce the law. The author proposes: (1) that section 273.2 be amended to reflect the significant developments achieved in sexual consent jurisprudence since enactment of the provision in 1992; and (2) that, in the interim, the judiciary act with resolve to make full and proper use of the statutory and common law tools that are presently available to determine whether the accused acted with mens rea in relation to the absence of sexual consent.


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