scholarly journals Re-visiting the Concept of Mens Rea: Challenging the Common Approaches Employed under Islamic Jurisprudence and Statute Law

2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Ahadi

In the present paper the traditional and customary perspectives on the concept of Mens Rea are challenged and a new definition of the same is put forward. The challenge is based on the idea that the concepts in criminal law need evolution in order to keep their function and practicality. Such an evolution demands such a condition wherein, while granting the characteristics of adaptability with the contextual conditions and principles of criminal law, the maintenance of the same is ensured. The mens rea is customarily defined as ‘culpable state of mind of the accused when committing an offence under criminal law and ‘rebellion intent’ under Islamic Jurisprudence. Both definitions of the concept have the capability to undergo evolution and, thus, a new definition of the same is envisaged herein as such that the mens rea constitutes ‘the culpable linkage of mind with the forbidden conduct’. Two changes are observable in the new definition compared with the existing one: first, the ‘state of mind’ is replaced with ‘linkage of mind’; second, the interpretation of the term ‘culpable’ as an independent constituent shall differ as per the common sense and the contextual conditions. The new definition grants dynamism to the concept and resolves the problems long associated with the definition of the mens rea under the criminal law.

2016 ◽  
Vol 80 (4) ◽  
pp. 254-263
Author(s):  
Fatemeh Ahadi

The present paper constitutes an attempt towards questioning the adequacy of the prevalent approached employed by Islamic jurisprudence and statute law in dealing with mens rea and its manifestations. It also provides a kind of reinterpretation of the concept since it attaches itself to the perspective that the concepts employed in criminal law need evolution in order to preserve their function and practicality; the conditions appertaining thereto necessitating adaptability of the concepts with the contextual conditions as well as the principles of the criminal law. Under criminal law, mens rea is referred to as ‘criminal intent or the state of mind indicating culpability which is required by statute as an element of a crime’ (see, for example, Staples v United States, 511 US 600 (1994)). Under Islamic jurisprudence it is defined as ‘rebellion intent’. These conceptualisations of the mens rea may be subject to evolution as well as the other concepts. The present paper provides a reformulation of these definitions wherein mens rea is considered to be ‘the culpable linkage of mind with the forbidden conduct’. Through this reformulation the author replaces the ‘state’ with ‘linkage’ presupposing that the interpretation of the term ‘culpable’, as an independent constituent, shall vary according to the provisions of common sense and the contextual conditions.


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-88 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nathan Brett

In this paper I address a question that has not been a prominent feature of cases or articles which have concerned the issue of consent in relation to sexual offenses. Much work has been done by judges and legal theorists regarding the defendant’s beliefs about the consent of the complainant and the mental element or mens rea of this offense. But, any answers to these questions presuppose some answer to a prior question: What is consent? What must be true of a person who does consent? What must be missing, on the other hand, in a situation where sexual activity takes place without consent?Common sense provides a relatively simple answer to these questions: To consent is to give permission; a person acts without consent where no such permission has been obtained. It is this answer that I want to defend in this paper. This view assumes that talk of consent only makes sense in relation to some autonomy right. Giving consent involves autonomously making changes in a prevailing pattern of rights and obligations. It is a limited withdrawal of a right not to be interfered with; and it will make legally permissible actions that would otherwise be subject to criminal and civil penalties. To me it seems obvious that such a change in the prevailing pattern of rights and obligations can only take place where there is communication between the parties. This means that the question of consent is not just a question about the state of mind or attitude of the complainant. Rather, the matter which should be central to a court’s consideration of consent is the question of what was said or done that could be construed as granting permission to do the acts in question.


2021 ◽  
pp. 79-125
Author(s):  
Michael J. Allen ◽  
Ian Edwards

Course-focused and contextual, Criminal Law provides a succinct overview of the key areas on the law curriculum balanced with thought-provoking contextual discussion. Mens rea refers to the mental element necessary for a particular crime. This may differ from one crime to another and the definition of each crime must be examined to determine what state of mind is required. This chapter discusses the meaning of intention, knowledge, recklessness, wilfulness, direct intent, oblique intent, ulterior intent, transferred malice, and mistake. These mens rea topics raise important questions about the extent to which a person is responsible and therefore deserving of blame and punishment. A revised and updated ‘The law in context’ feature examines critically the debates between those who favour subjectivist and objectivist approaches to mens rea, with particular reference to reform of the offence of unlawful act manslaughter.


Author(s):  
Guy Ben-David

How should the criminal law treat a person who did not pay any attention to the existence of attendant circumstances noted in the definition of an offense? This mental state of lack of attention to the existence of the attendant circumstance is analogous to the existence of a void in the actor’s consciousness, and has therefore been awarded the name “cognitive void.” Because the criminal law is founded on cognitive theory that offers a binary concept to establish an accused’s state of mind depending on the existence or absence of cognition, it is difficult to impose criminal liability on an actor who acted out of a cognitive void. The purpose of this Article is to discuss the difficulty that it engenders and the attempts to solve this difficulty. The Article presents the proposed thesis, suggesting that different states of cognitive void should be examined in accordance with the extent of culpability that they represent. Therefore, the Article calls for the abandonment of the prevalent basic assumption that sees cognitive void as a state indicating lack of subjective mens rea, and suggests replacing it with a normative approach that would recognize cognitive void as a multidimensional term covering a range of different mental states.


Author(s):  
Richard Holton

This paper develops an account of core criminal terms like ‘murder’ that parallels Williamson’s account of knowledge. It is argued that while murder requires that the murderer killed, and that they did so with a certain state of mind, murder cannot be regarded as the conjunction of these two elements (the action, the actus reus, and the associated mental element, the mens rea). Rather, murder should be seen as a primitive notion, which entails each of them. This explains some of the problems around criminal attempt. Attempted murder cannot be seen simply as involving the state of mind of murder minus success; rather, it has to be seen as a self-standing offence, that of attempting to commit the murder.


1987 ◽  
Vol 17 (4) ◽  
pp. 369-393
Author(s):  
Selden D. Bacon

In view of the low likelihood of the acceptance of the social science approach to alcohol problems proposed several years ago, a “common sense” approach is suggested as an alternative. Several assumptions guide this proposal, the principal one being the absence of any significant progress in the reduction of alcohol problems in the United States over the past 200 years. By the development of a common vocabulary and direct methods of observation and data collection, the “common sense” approach would provide for identifying the strengths of the multitude of past and current efforts in dealing with alcohol problems in terms of both intervention and prevention. The guiding criterion in such an approach would be the impact on alcoholism and alcohol-related problems, the definition of which would be a major task of the research.


2015 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 21-41
Author(s):  
William J. Novak ◽  
Stephen W. Sawyer ◽  
James T. Sparrow

Pierre Bourdieu began his posthumously published lectures “On the State” by highlighting the three dominant traditions that have framed most thinking about the state in Western social science and modern social theory. On the one hand, he highlighted what he termed the “initial definition” of the state as a “neutral site” designed to regulate conflict and “serve the common good.” Bourdieu traced this essentially classical liberal conception of the state back to the pioneering political treatises of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.1 In direct response to this “optimistic functionalism,” Bourdieu noted the rise of a critical and more “pessimistic” alternative—something of a diametric opposite.


Author(s):  
Vladimir Myslivyy ◽  
Angelina Mykyta

Problem setting. According to Art. 27 of the Constitution of Ukraine, everyone has an inalienable right to life, no one can be arbitrarily deprived of life, and the state, in turn, is obliged to protect human life. Protection of a person’s life, as a duty of the state, is manifested in the establishment of criminal liability, enshrined in Section II “Criminal offenses against life and health of a person” of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, who commit socially dangerous acts. whether there are criminal offenses and what punishments they should be committed. The distinction between crimes such as premeditated murder and negligent deprivation of another’s life is important, as criminal law theory still does not have sufficient information on this issue and does not have a complete list of features of the above crimes, but we tried to identify them in our article. Target of research. Deepening their knowledge on the caution of a person’s life due to inconsistency and drawing the line between possible offenses and conditional authority, clarifying the special characteristics of the perpetrator and the victim, outlining the essential features of the perpetrator and the victim, and researching the regulation of negligent proposal of a new version of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Analysis of resent researches and publications. The theoretical basis for the study of the problem of murder through negligence are the works of legal scholars, in particular, M. Bazhanov, V. Borisov, S. Borodin, V. Glushkov, O. Gorokhovskaya, I. Zinchenko , V. Tyutyugin, O. Us, E. Kisilyuk, V. Kuts, M. Yefimov, S. Likhova, V. Stashis, V. Shablisty and others. Article’s main body. According to Art. 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine, man, his life and health, honor and dignity, inviolability and security are recognized in Ukraine as the highest social value. Given this constitutional provision, the legislator should pay special attention to the criminal law protection of human life and health as the most important public relations. So it is no coincidence that considering such encroachments as one of the most dangerous in the criminal law dimension, the legislator established criminal liability for their commission in Section II “Criminal offenses against life and health” of the Special Part of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Due to the high public danger and the high prevalence of criminal offenses against human life and health, criminal law theory and law enforcement practice are under increasing scrutiny. Thus, the analysis of judicial practice in recent years shows that, for example, among all murders (Articles 117-119 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) the number of persons convicted of deprivation of life due to negligence is about 15 percent annually. In our opinion, it is also advisable to analyze the concept of “murder” by comparing the common and distinctive features of the offenses referred to in Art. Art. 115 and 119 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. According to scientific results, we can conclude that these offenses have many common features. It is possible to understand the common features and preconditions for the spread of these types of offenses. Conclusions and prospects for the development. A study of issues related to the criminal law analysis of murder through negligence and its difference from other types of murder, shows that these acts encroach on the identical object, which is “human life as a set of social relations.” Unfortunately, nowadays the dynamics of offenses committed in Art. Art. 115 and 119 is intensifying, so consideration of their delimitation and characterization of their features is very important. The study examines the main features of these types of crimes, as well as analyzes some provisions of national law and proposes some adjustments to them.


2018 ◽  
Vol 28 (6) ◽  
pp. 697-711 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth J. Gergen

Extending early work on the limits of hypothesis testing, I propose that psychological explanations for behavior draw their intelligibility from tautology. A reliance on tautology is born of the impossibility for ostensively defining the explanans (e.g., the state of mind presumably giving rise to action). Thus, one makes psychological sense by explaining a given behavior in terms of a “miniaturized” form of itself. Further, because each definition of a mental term relies on another mental term for its meaning, we enter a condition of unbridled diffusion of definition. We may thus account for psychological explanations far removed from simple or transparent tautology. Through extended definitional sequences, we find that any given behavior can be explained by virtually any randomly drawn motive or trait. This includes otherwise counter-intuitive or paradoxical explanations. These developments bear importantly on the grounding assumptions for psychological research, mental and diagnostic testing, and psychotherapy.


2015 ◽  
Vol 28 (4) ◽  
pp. 953-975 ◽  
Author(s):  
ATHANASIOS CHOULIARAS

AbstractThe article focuses on one of the most intriguing and, at the same time, controversial issues of international criminal law: whether the state policy requirement should be considered as a constitutive element in core international crimes. Adopting a criminal policy perspective, my intention is to contribute to the ongoing discussion by offering a doctrinal and criminological corroboration of the position that answers in the affirmative. Nevertheless, I am not necessarily promoting a normative choice entailing the amendment of the definition of core international crimes, but I rather call for a policy choice of focusing on cases that presume a state policy component.


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