13. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process

2019 ◽  
pp. 298-316
Author(s):  
Avi Shlaim
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
International System ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
International Order ◽  
Oslo Accords ◽  
Peaceful Resolution ◽  
Middle East Politics ◽  
Sustained Effort ◽  
Arab Israeli Conflict

This chapter examines the landmark series of negotiations between Arabs and Israelis in the early 1990s, culminating in the Oslo accords (1993), which marked the first and so far, the only sustained effort at peaceful resolution of the Arab–Israeli conflict. These events, which dominated the regional panorama and captured the international imagination, assist one's understanding not only of the nature and direction of Middle East politics, but also their positioning within the emerging international order as outlined by then US President George H. W. Bush. At first, it seemed that the accords, in reconciling the two major parties to the conflict — the Israelis and the Palestinians — were a demonstration of an emerging and more liberal international system. Yet the fragility of this system, in the Middle East as elsewhere, was soon exposed.

13. The Rise and Fall of the Oslo Peace Process

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Avi Shlaim
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
International Relations ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Gulf War ◽  
Palestine Liberation Organization ◽  
Oslo Accords ◽  
Peace Negotiations ◽  
Arab Israeli Conflict ◽  
The U.S

This chapter examines the landmark series of negotiations between Arabs and Israelis in the early 1990s, culminating in the Oslo accords of 1993. The U.S.-sponsored peace process between Israel and the Arabs was one of the salient strands in the international relations of the Middle East in the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War. On the Arab side, the principal participants were Syria, Jordan, and Palestine. This chapter analyses the emergence, development, and breakdown of the peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the two principal parties to the Arab–Israeli conflict, from 1991 to 2001. It considers the conclusion of the Oslo accord, the implementation of the accord, Oslo II, the Camp David summit, and the return to violence. The chapter argues that the Oslo peace process failed because Israel, under the leadership of the Likud Party, reneged on its side of the deal.

Conflict Management in the Middle East

2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Faten Ghosn
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Conflict Management ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Singular Stress ◽  
Dominant Strategies ◽  
Different Types ◽  
Arab Israeli Conflict ◽  
And Gender

Although the Middle East is a dynamic region that has witnessed countless endeavors dealing with managing, resolving, and preventing conflicts from even emerging, most of the mainstream academic and policy focus has been on the Arab-Israeli peace process, in general, and the strategies of negotiation and mediation, in particular. This article goes beyond the dominant strategies of conflict management and the singular stress on the Arab-Israeli conflict by focusing on the different types of mechanisms available for actors in dealing with their conflict, including track-two diplomacy, the role of culture and gender in conflict management, and, last but not least, the emerging interest in the nuclear negotiations with Iran.

Forty Years without Resolve: Tracing the Influence of Security Council Resolution 242 on the Middle East Peace Process

2007 ◽  
Vol 37 (1) ◽  
pp. 24-38 ◽  
Author(s):  
Omar M. Dajani
Keyword(s):  
Middle East ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Security Council ◽  
Peace Process ◽  
Historical Record ◽  
Security Council Resolution ◽  
The Political ◽  
Negotiated Settlement ◽  
Arab Israeli Conflict

This essay offers an assessment of the extent to which UNSC Resolution 242's procedural and substantive recommendations have facilitated a negotiated settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The historical record of each of the mechanisms of the Middle East peace process demonstrates that the mediation mechanism established in 242 was too feeble for the task assigned to it. The resolution's ambiguities and omissions further diminished its value as a tool of dispute resolution, creating confusion about what acceptance of 242 signified, encouraging hard bargaining by the parties, and denying leaders the political cover for necessary compromise.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document