4. Sources and forms of EU law

Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the forms and sources of European Union (EU) law. It describes the nature of the EU legal system and discusses the classification of various elements of EU law, which include institutional laws, procedural laws, and substantive laws. It explains that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are the principal sources of law for the Union. Other sources include regulations, Directives, procedural requirements, and international agreements and conventions. This chapter also discusses the contribution of the European Court of Justice (CoJ) to the sources of EU law.

2020 ◽  
pp. 100-130
Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the forms and sources of European Union (EU) law. It describes the nature of the EU legal system and discusses the classification of various elements of EU law, which include institutional laws, procedural laws, and substantive laws. It explains that the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are the principal sources of law for the Union. Other sources include regulations, Directives, procedural requirements, and international agreements and conventions. This chapter also discusses the contribution of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to the sources of EU law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (2-2019) ◽  
pp. 419-433
Author(s):  
Stefanie Vedder

National high courts in the European Union (EU) are constantly challenged: the European Court of Justice (ECJ) claims the authority to declare national standing interpretations invalid should it find them incompatible with its views on EU law. This principle noticeably impairs the formerly undisputed sovereignty of national high courts. In addition, preliminary references empower lower courts to question interpretations established by their national ‘superiors’. Assuming that courts want to protect their own interests, the article presumes that national high courts develop strategies to elude the breach of their standing interpretations. Building on principal-agent theory, the article proposes that national high courts can use the level of (im-) precision in the wording of the ECJ’s judgements to continue applying their own interpretations. The article develops theoretical strategies for national high courts in their struggle for authority.


Author(s):  
Joni Heliskoski

Whatever terminology one might wish to employ to describe the form of integration constituted by the European Union and its Member States, one fundamental attribute of that arrangement has always been the division, as between the Union and its Member States, of competence to conclude international agreements with other subjects of international law. Today, the fact that treaty-making competence—as an external facet of the more general division of legal authority—is divided and, to some extent, shared between the Union and its Member States is reflected by some of the opening provisions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. Notwithstanding the changes to the scope and nature of the powers conferred upon the Union, resulting from both changes to primary law and the evolution of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the basic characteristics of the conferment as an attribution of a limited kind has always been the same; there has always existed a polity endowed with a treaty-making authority divided between and, indeed, shared by, the Union and its Member States. In the early 1960s mixed agreements—that is, agreements to which the European Union


Author(s):  
Nigel Foster

This chapter examines the procedural law of the European Union (EU), focusing on Article 267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). It explains that Article 267 is the reference procedure by which courts in member states can endorse questions concerning EU law to the European Court of Justice (CoJ). Under this Article, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has the jurisdiction to provide preliminary rulings on the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices, or agencies of the Union and on the interpretation of the Treaties.


2015 ◽  
Vol 16 (6) ◽  
pp. 1491-1508
Author(s):  
Eva Julia Lohse

So far, the German Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht, henceforth:BVerfG) has only made a single preliminary reference to the (now) Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), despite frequent rulings on matters connected with European Union (EU) Law. Its apparent reluctance seemed odd considering the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation which prevails between the non-constitutional courts and the EU courts. This situation might, however, have changed with the preliminary reference from January 2014, proving predictions on the perceived “most powerful constitutional court” and its relationship to the EU partly wrong. The legal effects of its preliminary reference on the interpretation of Articles 119, 123, 127 ff. of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the validity of Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) by the European Central Bank (ECB) under EU Law are as yet unclear; although the Opinion of the Advocate General Cruz Villalón was delivered in the beginning of 2015, which did not confirm the doubts expressed by theBVerfGabout the conformity of the OMT programme with EU law. Nonetheless, the interpretative scheme and the normative questions as to the reluctance of theBVerfGremain the same after this single referral and offer explanations as to why theBVerfGhad for nearly sixty years not referred a question to the former European Court of Justice (ECJ).


Author(s):  
Berthold Rittberger

This chapter examines how the European Union acquired distinctive constitution-like features. It begins with a discussion of three routes to constitutionalization: the first is through changes in the EU's primary law; the second focuses on ‘in between’ constitutionalization; and the third leads directly to the European Court of Justice and its jurisprudence. The chapter proceeds by discussing two developments that have shaped the EU constitutional order almost since the beginning: the emergence of a body of EU law constituting a set of higher-order legal rules, and the consolidation of the constitutional principle of representative democracy. It explains how the supremacy and direct effect of EU law, as well as the EU court's concern with the protection of fundamental rights, helped transform the EU into a constitutional polity. It also considers how the extension of the legislative, budgetary, and other powers of the European Parliament animated the constitutional principle.


Author(s):  
Susanne K. Schmidt

The European Court of Justice is one of the most important actors in the process of European integration. Political science still struggles to understand its significance, with recent scholarship emphasizing how closely rulings reflect member states’ preferences. In this book, I argue that the implications of the supremacy and direct effect of the EU law have still been overlooked. As it constitutionalizes an intergovernmental treaty, the European Union has a detailed set of policies inscribed into its constitution that are extensively shaped by the Court’s case law. If rulings have constitutional status, their impact is considerable, even if the Court only occasionally diverts from member states’ preferences. By focusing on the four freedoms of goods, services, persons, and capital, as well as citizenship rights, the book analyses how the Court’s development of case law has ascribed a broad meaning to these freedoms. The constitutional status of this case law constrains policymaking at the European and member-state levels. Different case studies show how major pieces of EU legislation cannot move beyond case law but have to codify its principles. Judicialization is important in the EU. It also directly constrains member-state policies. Court rulings oriented towards individual disputes are difficult to translate into general policies, and into administrative practices. Policy options are thereby withdrawn from majoritarian decision-making. As the Court cannot be overruled, short of a Treaty change, its case law casts a long shadow over policymaking in the European Union and its member states, undermining the legitimacy of this political order.


2019 ◽  
pp. 195-212
Author(s):  
Roberto Reyes Izquierdo

The aim of this paper is to analyse how the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been a fundamental factor in the integration process of the European Union, in spite of the obstacles posed by the intergovernmental dynamics that have traditionally hindered the construction of a stronger, cohesive and more integrated Europe. Important principles such as direct effect or supremacy of EU law have been developed through ECJ rulings and case law, even when such principles were not literally foreseen in the foundational Treaties. Therefore, this paper argues that the role and power of the Court as an “indirect law-maker” have been essential for the construction of the European Union, and this has been possible due to the complexities and weaknesses of the legislative process involving the three main decision-makers: the Commission, the Council of the EU, and the European Parliament.


2012 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 4-14
Author(s):  
Jasmina Alihodžić ◽  

The rules of jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility contained in the Brussels II bis Regulation are based on the concept of habitual residence, while the legislation in B&H in this area gave priority to the principle of nationality. Analyzing these concepts, the author of the paper points to the importance of interpreting the concept of habitual residence by the European Court of Justice, and gives possible directions for reform of the relevant provisions of the PIL Act in terms of their compliance with EU law.


2021 ◽  
pp. 57-100
Author(s):  
Jan Wouters ◽  
Frank Hoffmeister ◽  
Geert De Baere ◽  
Thomas Ramopoulos

This chapter provides an overview of the treaty-making procedures in the European Union. It explains the historical evolution of primary law in the field and gives examples for each step under Article 218 TFEU (negotiation, signature, provisional application, and conclusion). Excerpts of European Court of Justice (ECJ) case law illustrate how these provisions are interpreted and applied in practice. The chapter also discusses the principles covering suspension and termination of EU agreements, and the ever more important system that allows the EU to contribute to the adoption of international secondary law under Article 218, paragraph 9 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). A final section describes EU practice for adopting non-legally binding instruments and reproduces the new guidance of December 2017 issued by the Council and the Commission in this respect after the ECJ’s judgment in the case relating to the EU–Swiss Memorandum of Understanding.


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