Competition law enforcement on digital markets—lessons from recent EU case law

2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-278
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

Abstract This article is set against the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decisions in Pierre Fabre and Coty Germany GmbH, observing that in the digital economy, price is no longer the sole important parameter of competition and that competition law therefore has to reconstruct the theoretical background required to explain the tensions contained in the design of concentrated marketplaces. As the CJEU’s approach taken in Pierre Fabre and Coty shows, competition authorities and courts also need to consider the market’s distinct psychological properties when they contemplate the legal framework that governs it. The article thus explains the CJEU’s decisions not against the well-known debate about inter- and intrabrand competition but with reference to the notion of creating distinct types of ‘variety’ in the marketplace so as to enable consumers to choose not just between the alternative options that they face but also to enable them to make decisions that will shape the manner in which they think about whether they should consider alternative options at all. The article’s findings aim to advance debates about the overarching policy goals of the way in which digital markets ought to be regulated.

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová

Abstract Digitalisation is a challenge from the regulatory point of view. Competition law, as a special type of regulation, is no exception to this. The article explores the risks of digitalisation, especially the ones related to the enhanced use of pricing algorithms. In theory, pricing algorithms are not easily assessed from the perspective of competition law, let alone its application in practice. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) is applied with certain difficulty to agreements created by using pricing algorithms. This is an unfortunate situation, as horizontal agreements represent one of the worst infringements of EU competition law, including price cartels or bid rigging. Apart from presenting a theoretical background, the article dives into the practice of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) in order to assess which practical issues the AMO might face when applying the theoretical concepts. In sum, the article asks from a theoretical perspective which issues of competition law have been introduced (or deepened) by the enhanced digitalisation, looking in particular to pricing algorithms. On top of that, the article explores the issues which may be encountered in practice, taking the Slovak jurisdiction as the example. The willingness and feasibility of the AMO to enforce digital issues such as pricing algorithms is assessed based on the previous acts of the AMO as well as the new Act on Protection of Competition, adopted by the Slovak parliament on 11 May 2021.


2018 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-101
Author(s):  
Nuno Calaim Lourenço

The topic of information exchanges between competing undertakings is central to competition law. These are practices that enhance market transparency and, as such, can generate significant efficiencies. However, they can also give rise to serious competition concerns, often because they afford competitors the possibility of reaching focal points of coordination. The analysis of information exchanges has traditionally taken place in the context of the legal framework that prohibits cartels. This article reviews, at first, the approach taken in Europe by competition authorities and courts, firmly grounded in the Commission Guidelines and in the most recent case law of the European Court of Justice. After discussing the relevant legal framework and the main criteria for the assessment of information exchanges in detail, the article elaborates on the specific problem that premature exchanges of information between competitors can create in the context of a merger transaction. As the competitors that they are, at least until closing of the deal, it is essential that contracting parties ensure that their due diligence exercise and the planning of the integration of their businesses are carried out in a manner that is consistent with competition rules, avoiding behaviour that can be interpreted as gun-jumping or as a cartel practice and, as a consequence, financial penalties and judicial claims.


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 161-180
Author(s):  
Anna Gulińska

Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages. The Damages Directive is a step forward in the facilitation of access to evidence relevant for private action claims. Its focus lies on, inter alia, 3rd party access to files in proceedings conducted by national competition authorities (NCAs). The harmonization was triggered by the inconsistencies in European case-law and yet the uniform rules on access to documents held in NCAs’ files proposed in the Damages Directive seem to follow a very stringent approach in order to protect public competition law enforcement. The article summarizes the most relevant case-law and new provisions of the Damages Directive and presents practical issues with respect to its implementation from the Polish perspective


2016 ◽  
Vol 9 (13) ◽  
pp. 61-76
Author(s):  
Ermal Nazifi ◽  
Petrina Broka

Infringements of competition law can cause serious harm to both consumers and undertakings. Aside from the development of public enforcement of competition law, much focus has been placed in recent years in the European Union on private competition law enforcement. Lawsuits raised by undertakings that sustained damages from anti-competitive practice concerning the compensation of such damages have historically not been widespread in Europe. No such cases have been recorded in Albania at all yet, despite the fact that its competition protection legislation has provided this possibility since 1995. The main causes of the lack of private competition law enforcement in Albania include the absence of judicial practice and doctrinal approaches in this area. Relevant here is also the inability of Albanian businesses and consumers to react to competition protection cases as they still lack competition law knowledge and as a result of the absence of an appropriate legal framework for class actions. The scope of this article is to analyze the current situation of private competition law enforcement in Albania. The paper emphasizes the current legal framework including existing obstacles to private competition law enforcement and improvements that should be introduced in the context of its competition law, the law of civil procedures and the law of obligations.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (4) ◽  
Author(s):  
Massimiliano Kadar

AbstractWhat is the role of European competition policy in the digital economy? Even if it cannot deal with all perceived issues in digital markets, competition law enforcement is the appropriate tool to remedy distortions to competition caused by market power, without the introduction of pervasive ex-ante sector-specific regulation being required. Whilst some of the proposals for reform of the European competition law legal framework recently brought may have some merit in principle, the current regime appears to be suitable and sufficiently flexible to allow the Commission to intervene effectively and remedy competitive distortions in digital markets.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Polina Westerhoven

This book explores the issues surrounding cartel damage claims from an EU law perspective. It follows an analysis of the existing EU legal framework for private competition law enforcement with a thorough examination of the relevant rules on international jurisdiction. Against this background, the author focuses on the role of jurisdiction agreements in the area of private enforcement. The study covers both the choice of Member State courts as well as the prorogation of third state forums and provides an interesting perspective on the various questions that arise in this context. With regard to the highly debated issue of the interpretation of choice-of-court clauses, it highlights the need to observe the guidelines deriving from the Brussels I Regulation itself. It furthermore outlines the system applicable to third state prorogations and examines how to deal with situations in which the choice of a third state forum may lead to the circumvention of EU competition rules.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.


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