scholarly journals Collecting Evidence Through Access to Competition Authorities’ Files – Interplay or Potential Conflicts Between Private and Public Enforcement Proceedings?

2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (12) ◽  
pp. 161-180
Author(s):  
Anna Gulińska

Information asymmetry between claimants seeking damages for competition law violations and the alleged infringing undertaking(s) is a key problem in the development of private antitrust enforcement because it often prevents successful actions for damages. The Damages Directive is a step forward in the facilitation of access to evidence relevant for private action claims. Its focus lies on, inter alia, 3rd party access to files in proceedings conducted by national competition authorities (NCAs). The harmonization was triggered by the inconsistencies in European case-law and yet the uniform rules on access to documents held in NCAs’ files proposed in the Damages Directive seem to follow a very stringent approach in order to protect public competition law enforcement. The article summarizes the most relevant case-law and new provisions of the Damages Directive and presents practical issues with respect to its implementation from the Polish perspective

2020 ◽  
Vol 40 (4) ◽  
pp. 846-877
Author(s):  
Maria Ioannidou

Abstract Over the years, regulators have sought to improve the effectiveness of both private and public competition law enforcement. In EU competition law, recent debates have concerned damages actions for competition law violations and the empowerment of national competition authorities. These debates are often premised on a clear dichotomy between public and private competition law enforcement, each pursuing a distinct set of aims. This article employs a novel holistic approach, which is informed by the theories of responsive regulation and restorative justice, and argues in favour of a ‘responsive’ remodelling of competition law enforcement. Such a ‘responsive’ remodelling advocates flexibility in enforcement mechanisms, with the consensual participation of the affected stakeholders and the adoption of remedies to restore the inflicted harm. The article discusses the current system and its respective aims and problems, and highlights an emerging hybridisation of remedies. Building on this emerging practice, it then constructs the ‘responsive’ remodelling benchmark for effective compliance. It discusses how this benchmark can inform competition law enforcement and it considers its potential to increase compliance, countenance various legitimacy and accountability concerns, increase consumers’ access to markets and bring benefits to the affected parties.


Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.


Law Review ◽  
2021 ◽  
pp. 342
Author(s):  
Carissa Christybella Wijaya ◽  
Micheline Hendrito ◽  
Monica Patricia Aripratama ◽  
Udin Silalahi

<div class="WordSection1"><p><em>KPPU (Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition) as the authority for business competition law in Indonesia still has many shortcomings. This is related to the KPPU’s failure to accommodate compensation payments to victims of business competition law violations. This can happen because Indonesia has only provided room for public enforcement to be implemented. In public enforcement, compensation payments are not paid directly to consumers who have suffered losses but instead come into the state treasury. This article discusses the compensation mechanism that should be received by victims of competition law violations through private enforcement, which is a mechanism for enforcing competition law by using the regulations of the Competition Law in civil courts to demand compensation. This research was conducted with the aim of creating a healthy business competition climate through the enforcement of private enforcement in Indonesia by implementing harmonization between public and private enforcement. In this article, the Authors used normative juridical method and refers to statutory and comparative approaches. The research method used is juridical normative with a statute approach, a case approach, and a comparative legal approach. The results and conclusions of this study are that the KPPU's failure to provide compensation for compensation to victims of business competition violations encourages the need to implement private enforcement in Indonesia which is harmonized with the previous mechanism, namely public enforcement.</em></p><p><strong>Bahasa Indonesia Abstrak: </strong>KPPU (Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha) sebagai lembaga otoritas dalam hukum persaingan usaha di Indonesia masih memiliki banyak kekurangan. Salah satunya terkait dengan kegagalan KPPU dalam mengakomodir pembayaran ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran hukum persaingan usaha. Hal ini dapat terjadi karena selama ini Indonesia hanya memberikan ruang bagi <em>public enforcement</em> untuk diterapkan. Dalam <em>public enforcement</em>, pembayaran ganti rugi tidak dibayarkan langsung kepada konsumen yang dirugikan melainkan masuk ke dalam kas negara. Oleh sebab itu, terdapat sebuah urgensi untuk mengalihfungsikan fungsi kompensasi dari KPPU kepada pelaku usaha melalui <em>private enforcement</em>, yaitu sebuah mekanisme penegakan hukum persaingan usaha dengan menggunakan regulasi UU Persaingan Usaha di peradilan perdata untuk menuntut ganti rugi. Penelitian ini dilakukan dengan tujuan untuk menciptakan iklim persaingan usaha yang sehat melalui ditegakkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia dengan menerapkan harmonisasi antara <em>public enforcement</em> dan <em>private enforcement</em>. Metode penelitian yang digunakan, yaitu yuridis normatif dengan pendekatan undang-undang, pendekatan kasus, dan pendekatan komparatif hukum. Hasil dan kesimpulan dari penelitian ini adalah kegagalan KPPU dalam memberikan kompensasi ganti rugi kepada korban pelanggaran persaingan usaha mendorong perlu diterapkannya <em>private enforcement</em> di Indonesia yang diharmonisasikan dengan mekanisme sebelumnya, yaitu <em>public enforcement.</em></p></div>


2019 ◽  
Vol 12 (19) ◽  
pp. 91-109
Author(s):  
Giacomo Dalla Valentina

Almost fifteen years after its adoption, the system of decentralized enforcement laid down in Regulation 1/2003 has shaped competition law in a way that could hardly be predicted, in terms of both magnitude and quality of the activities of National Competition Authorities. More recently, the so-called ‘ECN+ Directive’ was adopted to address the shortcoming of such system, namely a perceived lack of independence and accountability of several NCAs and a certain degree of divergence within the European Competition Network. In this scenario, the Italian Competition Authority has frequently been depicted as a well-equipped, independent and effective enforcer and – with a few notable exceptions – the international debate concerning such reform has mostly overlooked its possible impact within the Italian legal system. This paper aims to assess whether, and to what an extent, the ECN+ Directive should affect the enforcement of competition law in Italy and, in particular, those fundamental guarantees of independence and effectiveness that form the core of the rule of law in the field of EU competition law.


2019 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 249-278
Author(s):  
Adrian Kuenzler

Abstract This article is set against the Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) decisions in Pierre Fabre and Coty Germany GmbH, observing that in the digital economy, price is no longer the sole important parameter of competition and that competition law therefore has to reconstruct the theoretical background required to explain the tensions contained in the design of concentrated marketplaces. As the CJEU’s approach taken in Pierre Fabre and Coty shows, competition authorities and courts also need to consider the market’s distinct psychological properties when they contemplate the legal framework that governs it. The article thus explains the CJEU’s decisions not against the well-known debate about inter- and intrabrand competition but with reference to the notion of creating distinct types of ‘variety’ in the marketplace so as to enable consumers to choose not just between the alternative options that they face but also to enable them to make decisions that will shape the manner in which they think about whether they should consider alternative options at all. The article’s findings aim to advance debates about the overarching policy goals of the way in which digital markets ought to be regulated.


2018 ◽  
Vol 11 (17) ◽  
pp. 131-141
Author(s):  
Andrea Pezza

The paper examines strengths and weakness of the French system of competition enforcement, with the aim of contributing to the discussion on the institutional design of systems of competition law enforcement. In this regard, special attention will be devoted to choosing to introduce a clear separation between investigative and adjudicative functions within the same institution: while this solution ensures compliance with the impartiality principle, it also implies a lack of coordination between the board and the investigative services, which could have negative consequences for the administrative activity of the institution.


2003 ◽  
Vol 1 (2) ◽  
pp. 107-135 ◽  
Author(s):  
Frank Montag ◽  
Andreas Rosenfeld

Abstract On 16th December 2002 the Council adopted Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 on the implementation of rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty. This Regulation will not only replace the 40-year-old Regulation 17/ 62 but constitutes a radical reform of EC competition law enforcement. The purpose of this article is to analyse the basic principles of the new Regulation and the implications for current and future competition proceedings.


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