scholarly journals Enhanced Digitalisation and Competition Law Enforcement in Slovakia

2021 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-101
Author(s):  
Mária T. Patakyová
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Slovak Republic ◽  
Theoretical Perspective ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Theoretical Background ◽  
Point Of View ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Theoretical Concepts ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law

Abstract Digitalisation is a challenge from the regulatory point of view. Competition law, as a special type of regulation, is no exception to this. The article explores the risks of digitalisation, especially the ones related to the enhanced use of pricing algorithms. In theory, pricing algorithms are not easily assessed from the perspective of competition law, let alone its application in practice. The prohibition of anticompetitive agreements (pursuant to Article 101 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) is applied with certain difficulty to agreements created by using pricing algorithms. This is an unfortunate situation, as horizontal agreements represent one of the worst infringements of EU competition law, including price cartels or bid rigging. Apart from presenting a theoretical background, the article dives into the practice of the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak Republic (AMO) in order to assess which practical issues the AMO might face when applying the theoretical concepts. In sum, the article asks from a theoretical perspective which issues of competition law have been introduced (or deepened) by the enhanced digitalisation, looking in particular to pricing algorithms. On top of that, the article explores the issues which may be encountered in practice, taking the Slovak jurisdiction as the example. The willingness and feasibility of the AMO to enforce digital issues such as pricing algorithms is assessed based on the previous acts of the AMO as well as the new Act on Protection of Competition, adopted by the Slovak parliament on 11 May 2021.

Part I EU Competition Law Private Enforcement and the Antitrust Damages Directive, 2 Promotion and Harmonization of Antitrust Damages Claims by Directive 2014/104/EU?

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rodger Barry ◽  
Ferro Miguel Sousa ◽  
Marcos Francisco
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Dispute Resolution ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Private Enforcement ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Legal Basis ◽  
Member States ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law

This chapter explains the contents and goals of the Antitrust Damages Directive (Directive 2014/104/EU), the corollary of the EU’s policy towards the promotion and facilitation of private enforcement of competition law. It first traces the evolution in EU competition law enforcement and policy that led to the adoption of the Directive before considering the goals of the Directive in more detail, namely to provide rules for the effective compensation of victims of antitrust infringements and to harmonize some rules concerning damages claims. It then examines the Directive’s legal basis under EU Law as well as substantive provisions, including those relating to compensatory principles, quantification of harm, and consensual dispute resolution. The chapter goes on to highlight neglected issues, limitations, and inherent biases regarding the scope and nature of the Directive’s rules and concludes with an analysis of issues arising from implementation of the Directive in Member States.

Skanska: are jurisdiction challenges now an impossible undertaking?

2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 97-103
Author(s):  
Andrew Leitch
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Member State ◽  
National Court ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public And Private ◽  
The Public ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Industrial Solutions

Claimants in private damages actions following on from European Commission cartel decisions are often faced with a choice of jurisdiction in which to pursue their claims. However, seising jurisdiction in the national court of a desired Member State can require the claim to be pursued against an anchor defendant that is not an addressee of a Commission decision. This may, in the English courts, give rise to various disputes as to the role of that non-addressee defendant in the cartel and, accordingly, whether a claim can in fact be sustained as against that defendant. The Court of Justice's recent judgment in Vantaan Kaupunki v Skanska Industrial Solutions potentially relieves claimants from the burden of having to establish that the non-addressee defendant participated in, or implemented, the cartel in order to sustain a claim against it, by holding that it is entire undertakings that are liable for compensation in private damages actions. The Skanska judgment harmonizes the scope of liability under the public and private spheres of EU competition law enforcement and has potentially significant ramifications for competition litigation in the English courts.

Rule of Law Values in the Decentralized Public Enforcement of EU Competition Law

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Katalin J Cseres
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Rule Of Law ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Public Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Governance Model ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Competition Rules ◽  
Consistent Application ◽  
The Eu

This chapter evaluates the functioning of the decentralized public enforcement of EU competition law. The analysis focuses on the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement, which relies on Rule of Law principles. It has been argued that Rule of Law principles are a prerequisite for effective competition law enforcement. Aside from that, assessing the effectiveness of the decentralized enforcement framework also takes account of the problems of multilevel governance which have emerged as a result of the decentralization of enforcement powers and the creation of parallel competences for the Commission and national actors which made it essential to guarantee uniform and consistent application of the EU competition rules. Centrifugal pulls from the Member States towards their national legal systems and centripetal pushes from the Commission create uniformity and consistency in this multilevel system. Analysing these bottom-up and top-down approaches allows us to analyse decentralized enforcement as a specific governance model.

Introduction

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Cheng Thomas K
Keyword(s):  
Developing Countries ◽  
Law Enforcement ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Implicit Assumption ◽  
The European Union ◽  
Legal Principles ◽  
Competition Law Enforcement ◽  
Development Agenda

This introductory chapter provides an overview of competition law in developing countries. Following the proliferation of competition law across the globe in the last few decades, developing countries now comprise a majority of the jurisdictions that have in place a competition law. At least in terms of the language of the main substantive provisions on restrictive agreements and abuse of dominance, many of these new jurisdictions have chosen to follow the U.S. and the EU models. However, the proliferation of competition law regimes has given rise to a fear of balkanization of competition law enforcement and an excessive compliance burden for businesses, especially multi-national corporations. Out of this fear grew the rallying cry for convergence. The implicit assumption behind the drive for convergence is that there exists one or a handful of models of competition law enforcement that are suitable for most countries across the globe, to which new jurisdictions are expected to converge. Some commentators and officials have challenged this, questioning whether the legal principles regulating markets in the industrialized economies of the United States and the European Union can be transplanted directly to developing countries. Apart from the need to tailor to the local economic environment, competition law must contribute to the economic growth and development agenda of developing countries.

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